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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This study explores the meaning of the concept of ‘divine truth’, or truth as an attribute of 
the God of Christian theism, from a unique perspective, namely that of current interpretations of 
the divine attribute of eternity. It basically tries to establish if there is a connection between 
views of eternity and views of truth, both truth as a divine attribute and truth as a philosophical 
notion. Since it may not be clear why such a link would exist, it may be helpful to describe very 
briefly how this possible connection came to my attention in the first place. 
 The question of 'truth' can arguably be called the very core of philosophical investigation 
and it certainly has been the main reason for me personally to engage in the study of philosophy. 
From its early years in ancient Greece, Western philosophy has wanted to know what truth is and 
how we humans are seemingly able to acquire it in a world that is constantly changing. Plato, for 
instance, felt that truth can only be truth if it is anchored in an unchangeable reality, and he 
postulated the realm of the Forms mainly to provide such a foundation. Centuries later, however, 
Christian theism presented what I believe to be a more profound answer: all truth is anchored not 
in an impersonal realm but in a person, the Creator God of the Bible. If this is so, then an 
understanding of truth in all its philosophical implications may have to begin with an exploration 
of who this God is, and two sources seemed especially promising to me for gaining such 
knowledge. The first source was of course the Bible and what it says about who God is, the 
second was the set of divine attributes as formulated by classical theism. Even though the term 
‘truth’ has not played a major role in the traditional list of divine attributes, many of the other 
attributes could potentially shed light on the 'truth' side of God's nature, and this avenue seemed 
definitely worth exploring.   
 While studying the divine attributes, however, I soon realized that most of the complex 
debates in this area of philosophy seem to have a common element, namely the question of 
eternity. In fact, it seemed that those attributes that showed the most promise for shedding light 
on the issue of truth, were also somehow bound up with the question of how to interpret eternity. 
I realized that if I wanted to use the divine attributes to get a clearer view of truth, I would have 
to explore the issue of eternity first. Moreover, the question of eternity in its turn could not be 
solved without a deeper study of the current debates in the philosophy of time. And this is how 
the idea came about that there might be an essential link between views of time and views of 
truth. 
 While engaged in this exploration of the different views of time and eternity, I 
encountered one theory that seemed to me highly plausible, namely the view of eternity of 
philosopher William Lane Craig. His view seemed to me not only very well argued, but also 
consistent with biblical information on the topic, and it showed great promise for solving some of 
those thorny debates that plague the study of the divine attributes. Now, if it could solve some of 
those conundrums, it would most probably also shed light on my original question, the question 
of truth. And this is how the topic of this thesis came about: How does Craig's solution to the 
question of time and eternity clarify issues with the other divine attributes, and more specifically, 
what are its implications for understanding the notion of divine 'truth' and truth in general? 
In addressing this question we will follow the following format. The first three chapters 
will lay a conceptual foundation by highlighting the notion of truth from two different angles, 
Chapter One and Two exploring how truth and divine truth have been understood in philosophy 
and in scripture, while Chapter Three approaches our topic from the vantage point of the divine 
attributes. With this foundation in place, in Chapter Four we investigate the nature of time, both 
philosophically and from a biblical perspective, exploring for instance whether time is static or 
dynamic, finite or infinite. Our conclusions regarding time will then allow us to select the most 
plausible interpretation of divine eternity in Chapter Five. With this proposed new view of 
eternity in hand, in Chapter Six we first revisit those attributes that were found to be conceptually 
connected with eternity, and revise them accordingly. Finally, we apply the new insights gained 
and construct a plausible view of what is the main topic of this study—the nature of truth.  
As is the case with any such project, our investigation will be working with certain 
assumptions and limitations. When we speak of the God of Christian Theism, we refer to the text 
of the Bible, both Old and New Testament, and also to those doctrines that are traditionally 
regarded as directly implied by these scriptures, such as the triune nature of God. Moreover, the 
specific theological tradition we will be limiting ourselves to is the Latin one, and we will thus 
leave the Jewish and Greek traditions aside.  
Another point that needs clarification is that in this study the terms ‘truth’ and ‘divine 
truth’ are not always kept completely separate. The reason is that in the sources we have chosen 
to explore the two terms are frequently used interchangeably. To analyze every time whether the 
view referred to includes or excludes the divine would tend to divert our attention from the main 
topic, and in the end create more confusion than clarity. Moreover, the relationship between the 
concepts of truth and divine truth is explicitly addressed in the later part of our investigation, and 
it is hoped that any potential confusion in the beginning is thereby adequately resolved. 
 Finally, I want to express my deep gratitude for having been given the time and 
opportunity to study such an eminently worthy topic as that of divine truth. I can think of no 
other topic that has more profoundly shaped my own life and thought. 
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1 – PHILOSOPHY’S QUEST FOR THE NATURE OF TRUTH 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 Our aim in this thesis is to clarify the divine attribute of truth from a very specific 
perspective, namely William Craig's theory of the divine attribute of eternity. Normally 
speaking, the biblical text on the one hand and consistency with the other attributes on the 
other, would be the two main sources for understanding the attribute of truth. However, 
thought on some of the divine attributes has been confronted with persistent problems, 
thereby hampering any deeper understanding of the notion of 'truth' that could have been 
gained. It is argued in this thesis that Craig's theory of divine eternity has great potential 
for elucidating some of these known problems, and clarifying these attributes will in turn 
enable us to gain a better understanding of the attribute of truth itself. Moreover, from the 
perspective of Christian theism, our vantage point in this thesis, all truth is anchored in 
God, and a deeper understanding of divine truth will therefore also be profitable to the 
philosophical quest to comprehend what 'truth' is and how it can exist in a constantly 
changing reality.  
 With this larger project in mind, the central concern of this first chapter is to 
clarify the concept of truth as it has been understood in philosophy. We will start out with 
a brief section on how the term ‘truth’ is used in popular western discourse in the early 
21PstP century, a view which is captured in a diagram. Using this contemporary view as our 
guide, section two then explores the various interpretations of truth that have been 
developed throughout the history of western philosophy—traditions of thought that in 
their turn have crucially influenced today’s everyday view. Where applicable, we also 
explore how each of these views interacts with the more specific concept of divine truth. 
In this way, this chapter will lay the first part of a conceptual foundation regarding the 
nature of truth. In Chapter Two and Three we will complete this groundwork by first 
investigating the biblical notion of truth, and then exploring what the divine attributes of 
classical theism can teach us about the meaning and nature of truth. 
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 1.2  Truth in our daily life 
At the core of much philosophical inquiry lies the question: ‘What is truth?’ In fact, 
over the centuries so much thought has been spent on the matter that even our common 
sense understanding of truth has changed in the process. Because of this influence, it is 
clear that we cannot use this everyday notion as a standard to evaluate the merit of 
philosophical truth views throughout history. However, the everyday view can still be 
helpful to us by providing a common backdrop to each theory, so we can better compare 
and contrast these views and understand their differences. Let us, therefore, start out with 
a look at what we commonly mean when we use the term ‘truth’ in normal conversation. 
In our own time, our truth view is strongly influenced by the thought of modernity. 
As a result, we use the term ‘truth’ most frequently for that which corresponds with the 
facts as they exist ‘out there’, in reality, an actual extra-mental state of affairs. If we look 
at it in more detail, we find that such truth is almost always attributed to statements. We 
say that the statement “it is raining” is true when in fact and upon inspection, we find that 
it is actually raining right now.  
It also happens, however, that truth in this ‘reality’ sense is attributed directly to a 
thing, situation or person. The difference is that in such cases we usually find another type 
of linkage, not between a statement and a state of affairs, but between a state of affairs and 
an ideal or original. Such use of the term is synonymous with ‘genuineness’, and it is 
found in phrases like “a true disaster,” “a true statesman” or “a true work of art.” 
Finally, there is a third use of truth that is specifically and uniquely applied to 
persons. It denotes faithfulness or integrity, the moral quality of a person whose thoughts, 
words and actions consistently agree with each other and with his actual character, values 
and aspirations. 
To clarify the distinctions between these three concepts of truth, we can picture the 
interaction between person and world as one involving three units: (a) the person, (b) the 
thought, word or action, and (c) reality, as in Diagram 1 below. In this diagram, the 
‘person’ denotes the identity, character or self of the agent involved in the interaction, that 
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part of a person that makes her who she is and that is not prone to continual change. The 
unit in the middle represents the person’s modes of interaction with reality and consists 
primarily of words or statements. In some sense this unit could be regarded as part of the 
person, but this part is not directly essential to the person’s identity or character and its 
content changes as the person interacts with the world. Next to words, both thoughts and 
actions are included here, because they also represent interactions with reality; thoughts 
being unobservable and more closely related to the person-side, while actions are 
immediately observable and more directly linked to reality.  
Ideal reality      
          I 
          I       Genuineness 
                 I         
Person    (thought)/Word/(action)    Reality 
   [___________________]   [__________________] 
 Faithfulness   UFactuality 
 
Diagram 1 - Our own popular western view of truth: Factuality first and foremost 
 
We can now get a clearer view of what is meant by the three different ways in which 
we use the term ‘truth’. In all three senses we find the underlying concept of an 
agreement, but variant uses locate the agreement on different sides of the interaction. Our 
most common understanding of truth, truth as fitting-the-facts or ‘factuality’, locates the 
agreement between words on the one hand and reality on the other, a view also known as 
the classic correspondence view of truth.  Though its roots can be traced back much 
further in time, this view became the prominent one in modern thought, with scientific 
thinking being the paradigm example.  
As we shall see, our current understanding of truth as genuineness also has a long 
history, but it cannot boast a similar degree of popularity today. It seems to be related to a 
now-outdated Platonic view of reality. In our diagram, we can see that this sense of truth 
is also located on the side of reality, but there is a difference in how this reality is 
conceived. While truth in the sense of factuality assumed a simple view of reality as 
basically empirical, genuineness implies a multi-level reality featuring gradations of truth, 
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with only the highest level really deserving the name ‘true’. P1 P Moreover, the agreement in 
this case is not between two of our main interaction units, but between such levels of 
reality themselves.  
Our third sense of truth is ‘faithfulness’. Here the agreement is located on the 
personal side of the interaction, between the person’s character or self on the one hand and 
his thoughts, words and actions on the other. Of course, since we cannot directly perceive 
the character of a person and subsequently compare that character with words and actions, 
the observable proof of the agreement is often found between the person’s earlier words 
and actions and later ones. A person who is true in this sense portrays himself in words 
and actions as he really is, and it is for this reason that his interactions with other persons 
show a pattern of consistency over time. This sense of truth is also morally charged. Since 
the person’s words and actions faithfully reflect his character and intentions, he is reliable 
or faithful, a person you can count on.P P  
Other common terms that are related to these three uses of truth are ‘truthfulness’ 
(or veracity) and ‘trustworthiness’. These terms can be interpreted as either faithfulness or 
as factuality, depending on the context in which they are used. Truthfulness, for instance, 
can be used in both senses. It can mean that our words correspond with reality as it is 
(factuality), but it can also denote agreement between a person’s character on the one hand 
and his words or actions on the other (faithfulness). In the latter case, the person could be 
truthful only ‘as far as she knows’. She does not mean to deceive, and her words reflect 
faithfully what is in her mind, but they may not match actual reality. Finally, 
trustworthiness most often denotes the personal, faithfulness side of truth. Since any such 
additional terms fit within our three categories and do not add anything new, we will not 
introduce them as separate notions in the diagram.  
In sum, we see that in everyday life in our time we use the term truth in three main 
senses, namely factuality, genuineness and faithfulness. By far the most common meaning 
of truth is factuality, and it is mostly used to indicate agreement between propositions and 
empirical reality. Both genuineness and faithfulness are much less common. Genuineness 
is mainly applied to things, events or people as they fit a certain ideal or standard. 
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Faithfulness is specifically a moral attribute of persons, denoting agreement between the 
person’s character and words, as well as a consistency between earlier thoughts, words 
and deeds, and later ones. 
 
1.3  Philosophers’ answers to the question of truth 
 In this section we explore how truth and divine truth have been understood by the 
different traditions of thought throughout history. We will look at the Greek tradition, the 
Christian philosophers, the modern tradition and contemporary perspectives, and focus for 
each era on two thinkers who are deemed characteristic of their time.  
 
1.3.1.1  The Greek tradition: Plato 
The Greek word for truth, aletheia, literally means un-hiddenness or non-
concealment (Bultmann 1933:238). As we already noted when discussing genuineness, the 
Greeks often believed that truth pertained to the uncovering of what a thing really is, to 
finding its true nature. Truth was understood as the discovery of actual reality, a realm 
which in day-to-day life tended to be hidden behind the sensible world of appearances 
(Cohn 1996:1).  
Plato’s view on truth is one that gradually unfolds throughout his works, specifically 
the Meno, the Phaedo and the Republic. In the Meno, truth is mainly seen as an 
epistemological concept. One of the fundamental issues Plato tries to address is that of the 
one and the many: how can we have true knowledge of a thing as it really is if the things 
as we experience them via our senses are all varied and continually changing? For 
instance, how can we know what an apple really is if each apple we encounter is different 
from the next, and even the same apple changes from day to day? As a first step to solving 
this problem, Plato distinguishes between knowledge on the one hand and belief or 
opinion on the other.P2 P Knowledge is certain and involves a state of mind that is 
unshakeable and unchanging, while belief is based on changeable sensation and thus 
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inherently unreliable. At this stage of the theory, these two still merely denote mental 
attitudes and do not imply any differences in types of objects (Crombie 1963:51).  
Another element found in the Meno is that true belief can be converted into 
knowledge via a process called recollection. Through recollection, or anamnesis, we can 
access innate knowledge that we all have but of which we were previously unaware. 
Socrates’ conversation with the uneducated slave boy who, when properly questioned, is 
able to solve complex mathematical problems serves as proof of this universal type of 
knowledge (Plato 1980:41 ff.). Since this knowledge is a priori, and thus not based on 
changeable sense experience, it is reliable and true.  
The Phaedo is above all a moral treatise, but in his effort to find adequate answers to 
questions of morality, Plato necessarily also deals with epistemological and ontological 
issues here. It is in this dialogue, in fact, that the ontological theory is developed that 
forms the foundation for the epistemological issues first explored in the Meno (Gulley 
1962:31). Accordingly, the criterion for distinguishing knowledge and belief now shifts 
from differing cognitive states to the actual objects of these two types of cognition. Belief 
or opinion is typically about changing physical objects or ‘sensibles’, and the beliefs based 
on them are thus hopelessly unreliable. The world that the senses present to us is merely 
one of appearances. Knowledge, however, has unchangeable entities as its object, entities 
that transcend the sensible world and exist in a higher level of reality as eternal ‘Forms’. 
Since the objects of this knowledge are immutable, the knowledge itself is certain. In fact, 
this world of Forms exists at such a high level that even god, or the cosmic soul, uses it as 
a model to maintain the order of the universe (Audi 1999:217). 
Since the Phaedo’s focus is on ethics, it also expounds the moral side of this 
metaphysical theory. Sense perception is seen as morally inferior, unreliable, misleading 
and devoid of truth, while a priori knowledge is not so tainted because its object is 
intrinsically constant and reliable. This does not mean that the world of Forms only 
consists of moral entities—it comprises both the moral and non-moral, and both are 
objects of a priori knowledge. Rather, it shows that Plato’s notion of virtue is strongly 
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connected with those of order, clarity, rationality and reliability—a view that reflects the 
common Greek belief and Socratic doctrine that ‘virtue is knowledge’ (op.cit.:2). 
The distinction between knowledge and belief is again taken up in the Republic, 
where Plato describes what is involved in the creation of a utopian state. Crucial in this 
plan is the leadership of such a state, and the discussion therefore focuses on the education 
and character of those best suited to the task: the philosophers. The mark of a true 
philosopher is a love of truth, or aletheia. The central notion of this term is reliability, and 
it can be applied to things as well as propositions. Lack of aletheia is therefore not 
falsehood, but rather a lack of certainty (Crombie 1963:53). True philosophers strive for 
the kind of knowledge that has certainty, reliability and permanence, while “lovers of 
sounds and sights” (Plato 1982:207) are contented with beliefs about what merely 
resembles reality.  
We saw in the Phaedo that the certainty of true knowledge was ontologically 
founded in the unchangeableness of the Forms. This was Plato’s initial answer to the 
problem of the variability and change in the sensible world. In the Republic he further 
strengthens this foundation of knowledge. Sensible objects are not only constantly 
changing; they are also necessarily composites of opposing features, which is a second 
sense in which they are in flux (Kraut 1992:70). Even in a just man, for instance, there 
will be both justice and lack of justice. Beliefs about sensibles are therefore partly about 
being and partly about non-being. In contrast, the Forms are pure being, and “absolute 
being is or may be absolutely known” (Plato 1982:208). The Form ‘Justice’, for instance, 
is unqualifiedly and perfectly just and in no sense unjust, and it is by virtue of this 
absolute and perfect being that it can be fully known.  
The analogy of the divided line and the metaphor of the cave help to further clarify 
the epistemological and ontological framework of Plato’s theory (op.cit.:250-53). We are 
asked to imagine a line divided into two unequal segments, the shorter one representing 
the visible world, and the longer one the intelligible world of the Forms. Each part is again 
divided according to the same ratio, so that both realms have a higher and a lower 
division, the higher one represented by a longer line segment. We now have a view of 
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reality as consisting of four parts: the lowest level contains mere reflections of visible 
objects, next follow the objects themselves, then the lower Forms, and finally the higher 
Forms. The bigger the line segment is, the more reality and truth the corresponding section 
of reality contains, so that the higher Forms are most real and true, and the reflections of 
visible objects are the least so. Corresponding to these four levels of reality, there are four 
types of cognition that reflect the same ratio of clarity and truth. Finally, at the highest 
level the mind progresses by the power of thought to ultimately arrive at that which 
requires no assumption and is the starting point of all: the Form of the Good (op.cit.:252). 
The cave metaphor directly follows this analogy, and since Plato states it may be 
“appended to the previous argument,” it can profitably be used to interpret the same 
(op.cit.:257). It describes men living from childhood in a cave where no sunlight 
penetrates. They are chained by the leg and neck and can only see what is in front of them. 
Behind them is a raised platform with a walking path and parapet, and behind the path a 
fire is burning. People walking on the track carry objects, the shadows of which are 
reflected on the wall in front of the prisoners. One day, one of the men is loosed from his 
chains and shown the true objects. Next, he is taken out of the cave and confronted with 
true reality above ground. Plato then explains that the prisoners in the cave represent most 
of humanity, those who have only belief since they are merely acquainted with the 
reflections of visible things or at best the objects themselves. The one man who is led out 
of the cave is the philosopher who gains knowledge, first of the lower Forms, then of the 
higher ones. When the freed man encounters the outside world, he can see its objects 
because the light of the sun shines on them and empowers his sight. In the same way, the 
philosopher can have knowledge of the Forms because the Form of the Good “imparts 
truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower” (op.cit.:249).  
It is also in the Republic that Plato introduces his dialectic, a method for the 
acquisition of true knowledge that builds on the earlier notion of anamnesis as introduced 
in the Meno (Gulley 1962:44). This method provides an upward path via ever broader 
hypotheses to the “unhypothesized beginning,” thus resulting in direct acquaintance with 
the Form of the Good (White 1976:99-100). Once the philosopher knows this highest 
Form, she comprehends how the other Forms are related to the Good, and so can derive 
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proper definitions for these other unchangeable entities. The Form ‘Justice’, to take this 
example again, is of course perfect justice, but the essence of this perfection is grounded 
in its direct relation to the Form of the Good (op.cit.:101).  
Finally, we need to briefly address the question if Plato’s view features any sense of 
divine truth. Since the Form of the Good is the highest principle and also the source of 
truth (Plato 1982:257), could we speak of something like divine truth in the Platonic 
tradition? The answer depends, of course, on whether Plato saw the Good as in any sense 
divine. He calls the sun a deity, and even the “child of the Good,” but never directly 
attributes divinity to the Good itself (op.cit.:248). Etienne Gilson’s explanation of Plato’s 
religious context is helpful here. He states that the Greek gods were above all individual 
living beings. They were deemed immutable, necessary and eternal, and as such might 
resemble the Forms, but they were always live individuals first. Gilson concludes, “In 
Plato’s mind the gods were inferior to the Ideas” P3 P(1941:27). So, even though truth 
emanates from the highest principle, and from a source that is clearly beyond the natural, 
it does not hail from a god, and cannot be called divine in that sense.  
Still, there may be one or two facets of the Platonic notion of truth that resemble 
certain features of the later Christian tradition. Plato is clearly looking for a unified 
metaphysics, and postulating the Good as the highest Form and source of all true 
knowledge does accomplish this. And it is this specific sense of the unity of truth and its 
origin in a single supernatural source that resonates with the meaning of the term as it is 
found in the Christian scriptures. Moreover, it has been suggested that the theory of 
anamnesis presupposes that the a priori knowledge found in the human mind was 
somehow deposited there through a process of divine, or at least supernatural, 
illumination—a notion that is later expanded upon by Augustine of Hippo (Pasnau 2008). 
 
1.3.1.2  The Greek tradition: Aristotle 
Our second representative of the Greek tradition is of course the philosopher 
Aristotle. In Aristotle’s thought truth is approached from several different angles. It plays 
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a role in his extensive work in the field of logic, features as an aspect of human knowledge 
in his psychological views, reoccurs in his metaphysics, and finally appears briefly in his 
views on ethics. 
Aristotle laid the foundation for the discipline of logic by developing his syllogistic 
method, a system of rules for drawing true conclusions from true premises (Aristotle 
1984d). His logic works with propositions that attribute a predicate to a certain subject, 
and Aristotle deems such a proposition true if it “says of what is that it is, and of what is 
not that it is not”—a clear example of the correspondence or factuality view of truth 
(1984a:1597). Of course, true conclusions only derive their truth from true premises, 
which themselves are mere conclusions of previous syllogisms, so the question arises how 
we can avoid an infinite regress and find true premises that are somehow basic. Aristotle 
believes that such basic truths, axioms or archai, do exist and can be known. He 
distinguishes several types: definitions, common truths, existence statements, and logical 
laws like the law of non-contradiction (Edel 1967:122). These axioms are not all merely 
formal, but include content-filled material truths, and as such can provide a fruitful 
foundation for all kinds of scientific knowledge. 
The question how such basic truths can be more than purely formal leads us to the 
psychological process by which true knowledge is acquired. In knowing, we start with 
sensation, and sense perception is always of particulars (Aristotle 1984d:132). Next, from 
sensation memory arises, and several memories of the same thing produce a single 
experience (op.cit.:165-6). This experience at first generates a ‘primitive universal’, but 
when more sensations follow, knowledge of the universal becomes increasingly clear. 
Aristotle uses the metaphor of a retreat in battle that is stopped, since if “one man makes a 
stand another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached” (ibid.). Sense 
perception thus instills the universal through what Aristotle calls ‘induction’, a process 
which at its highest level yields the archai or axiomatic truths that form the foundation of 
scientific knowledge.  
If all knowledge starts with sensation, it is clear how it can be content-filled and 
material. However, the question now becomes how such material knowledge can be 
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necessarily true, and this question leads us in turn to Aristotle’s views concerning 
metaphysics. The reason why sense perception of mere particulars can generate 
knowledge of universals is that all matter actually contains mind, this mental element 
being its ‘form’ or the intelligible universal (Frost 1989:232). The universal that is grasped 
in knowing is therefore not a purely mental construct, but part of the particular, the 
essence or ‘what-ness’ of the actual object sensed. If thus in knowing “the thinking part of 
the soul must be … potentially identical in character with its object,” and if agreement 
with reality is what makes a belief true, this agreement is clearly established right from the 
start (Aristotle 1984c:682-83). Seen from this perspective, truth is one of the senses of 
‘being’ (1984a:1660), though it is only so in a secondary sense, since truth is not directly 
in things but rather in thought (Edel 1982:24).   
Though Aristotle uses the term ‘form’, he does not assign to such universals 
separate ontological status in the way Plato does. The universal exists in the particular and 
never apart from it (Muller 1999:30). In fact, he states, postulating such separately 
existing forms leads to an infinite regress and is thus logically absurd (1984a:1629). 
However, Aristotle does seem to agree with Plato that true knowledge must be of the 
universal and of ‘that which cannot be otherwise’, though this does not always fit well 
with his focus on the contingent and perishable particular. Philosopher and historian 
Jonathan Barnes concludes that Aristotle merely recognizes that science must necessarily 
strive for generality, for the recognition of general patterns (1982:36).  
Finally, we find a brief mention of truth as a moral attribute in Aristotle’s work on 
ethics, the Nicomachean ethics. Here, the truthful person is described as one who “pursues 
truth … alike in words and deeds” (1984b:1779). This means, for instance, that a person 
should neither overstate nor understate his position, “owning to what he has, and neither 
more nor less” (ibid.). He should not be boastful, nor overly humble, though the latter is in 
the end still preferable to the former.  
Is there any mention of truth as an attribute of the divine in Aristotle’s thought? 
Again, the deities of the Greeks are clearly too weak to function as the ground of truth. 
The gods of Plato and Aristotle are beings who in our eyes seem rather fallible and ‘down 
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to earth’, more like the characters in an American soap opera than divine beings that are 
worthy of worship. At the same time, the philosophical ultimate reality that Aristotle 
postulates is even further removed from a theist conception of God than Plato’s Form of 
the Good. He does postulate a first cause, an Unmoved Mover, but this is more a scientific 
than religious principle, necessary to explain the universal movement from potency to 
actuality (Stumpf 1994:94). In my estimate and understanding, then, there is no sense of 
divine truth in Aristotelian thought.  
It does need to be noted, though, that Aristotle clearly recognizes the need for a 
unified ground of truth. Truth, in his thinking, cannot in any way contradict itself, i.e. truth 
must be coherent and thus cannot be relative. With some humor he wonders why a man 
does not get up in the morning and walk, “into a well or over a precipice, if one happens 
to be in his way” (1984a:1592). He continues: 
“Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently not thinking it alike good 
 and not good? Evidently he judges one thing to be better and another worse. And if 
this is so, he must judge one thing to be man and another not-man, one thing to be 
sweet and another to be not-sweet. … Again, … we should not say that two and 
three are equally even, nor is he who thinks four things are five equally wrong with 
him who thinks they are a thousand. …obviously one is less wrong and therefore 
more right. If then that which has more of any quality is nearer to it, there must be 
some truth to which the more true is nearer … and we shall have got rid of the 
unqualified doctrine which would prevent us from determining anything in our 
thought” (ibid.).   
 
 
1.3.1.3  The Greek tradition and our popular view of truth 
Let us now return briefly to our contemporary understanding of truth and the 
diagram that captured it. We saw that in our own use, the word ‘truth’ denotes primarily 
an attribute of statements that agree with actual reality (factuality), and in a related sense, 
truth is sometimes attributed to things, persons or situations, when they agree with a 
certain ideal (genuineness). Secondly, we attribute truth to persons when their beliefs, 
words or actions agree with each other or with the person’s own character (faithfulness) 
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(locus 1.2). How does this view of truth compare with what we find in the Platonic 
tradition? 
We clearly find in Plato ‘truth’ as agreement between man’s thoughts or words on 
the one hand and reality on the other, but it would be overly simple to call this connection 
factuality. There are two significant differences. First, Plato speaks of “true knowledge” as 
corresponding to the realm of the Ideas, not to empirical reality. This singular focus on the 
unadulterated ideal is best captured by our sense of truth as genuineness. It is the second 
difference, however, that brings in the similarity to our factuality sense of truth.  
This second point is that Plato deals with ‘truth’ in both an ontological and an 
epistemological sense, while in our time we tend to look at truth mostly as a quality of our 
knowing. While the epistemological question of truth asks how we can have true 
knowledge, the ontological asks how and where truth is grounded in actual existence. 
Plato sees the solution to the knowledge question in a correspondence between word 
(knowledge) and ideal reality, and answers the ontological question by looking at the 
object’s proximity to the highest Forms. Since both these types of agreement stress the 
need to approach ideal reality as closely as possible, they both have this strong sense of 
genuineness. But when we look specifically at his epistemological treatment of the truth 
issue, the link between word and reality, we see the factuality sense emerge. So, Plato sees 
truth as both factuality and genuineness, but we need to remember that in Plato’s view the 
latter term is much more prominent and carries a lot more content than it does for us in our 
time. 
What about the view of truth as faithfulness, a personal and moral characteristic? Do 
we find this anywhere in Plato’s thought? On the one hand, we saw in the Phaedo that 
Platonic truth is morally charged. On the other, however, we must keep in mind that 
morality in Plato’s time was quite different from how most western thinkers tend to see it 
now. We inevitably look at moral theory through a Judeo-Christian filter, while the Greek 
view was much more utilitarian in orientation (Gulley 1962:2). True knowledge simply 
always led to the good. From the Greek perspective it is natural, then, to deem truth 
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morally praiseworthy, but since this kind of truth is not necessarily attributed to persons, it 
is clearly not the same as our current view of faithfulness. 
How does Aristotle’s notion of truth compare to our own popular view? One 
passage in his Metaphysics has been labeled the classic formulation of the correspondence 
view of truth. This is the above mentioned definition: “To say of what is that it is not, or 
of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is 
not, is true” (1984a:1597). These words, which Aristotle precedes by stating his intention 
to define what is true and false, certainly strongly suggest the view of truth as 
correspondence between word and reality—in our diagram: factuality. The only difference 
with our current view might be that Aristotle’s notion implies a stronger connection than 
we would dare to assume, especially where he speaks of the thought being potentially 
identical in character with the object, and knowledge of the universal being a matter of 
immediate intuition (1984b:682-83). 
The notion of truth as faithfulness is not really found in Aristotle’s thought. The 
brief section on truth in his Nichomachean ethics cannot be seen as an instance of 
faithfulness. Rather, this is an example of the ambiguous term ‘truthfulness’ discussed 
above (locus 1.2), and here it is the type of truthfulness that denotes factuality. Aristotle is 
not primarily referring to giving a true picture of one’s inner character or being true to 
earlier words and deeds. Instead, the truthful man states things ‘as they are’, no more and 
no less, and his words are therefore characterized by a correspondence to reality, the real 
state of affairs. 
In sum, in Plato we find truth both in the sense of factuality and genuineness, while 
truth as faithfulness is not represented. There is no explicit mention of divine truth either, 
though there is the recognition of the need to ground truth in one eternal source, and his 
anamnesis theory may suggest something like divine illumination as the origin of 
universal a priori knowledge in the human mind. In Aristotle truth mostly means 
factuality, and we find here even less of a hint of divine truth than was found in Plato, 
though again the need for a unified source of truth seems evident.  
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In terms of our diagram, both Plato and Aristotle can be found on the right-hand 
side, finding a ground for truth somewhere in reality. Both also agree that truth can only 
properly be anchored in the unchanging. But there is a difference in where they find this 
unchanging foundation. Plato posits his realm of Ideas to find an unchanging ground for 
truth and this locates him at the top of the right side in the diagram. But Aristotle attempts 
to ground truth instead in an unchanging element within changeable empirical reality, 
namely the form. What we see, therefore, is a subtle shift downward. Let us now move to 
the next era in philosophy and see how the search for truth further unfolds. 
 
1.3.2.1  The Christian philosophers: Augustine 
The notion of truth as it had been viewed in Greek philosophy underwent significant 
change after the apostle Paul brought Christianity to the Greco-Roman world. In this brief 
section, the truth views of the two most influential early Christian philosophers will be 
presented, meaning of course Aurelius Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. 
Augustine repeatedly asserts that the only things he wants to know are God and the 
soul of man (e.g., 1948d:277), and in both these field of enquiry the notion of truth turns 
out to play a central role. In the later part of his work On the Trinity, Augustine focuses 
briefly on the soul. He postulates that it has three major parts, or a ‘trinity’ of capacities: 
memory, understanding and will (1948c:866-67). Memory plays a key role here, not only 
in our understanding, but also in our recognition of the objects of sensation (Weinberg 
1964:40). In the memory we find all that we know. More than that, it contains all truth, 
because we even find entirely new truths here that we had never thought of before 
(Augustine 1948c:866).  
Augustine was strongly influenced by the views of Plato and Plotinus, and truth was 
for him something that is above all intelligible, immaterial and immutable (Gilson 
1941:60). His question therefore becomes: Since man himself is clearly mutable, how can 
he or she have knowledge of immutable truth? Sensation involves both changeable objects 
and changeable sense organs, so it cannot yield pure and unshakeable truth. Still, man is 
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somehow possessed of such truth, for when a person makes true judgments about objects 
he or she uses eternal standards, especially when comparing things (Augustine 
1948c:797). Moreover, all judgments of morality and mathematics involve eternal truths 
(Augustine 1955:110). So, what can be the source of such immutable truth in the memory 
of mutable man? Plato had answered this question with his theory of anamnesis, a view 
which required the pre-existence of the soul. Plotinus had answered that man is possessed 
of truth because he or she is a god (Gilson 1941:59). Both these answers went against the 
Christian scriptures, so for Augustine the truth of the matter clearly had to be sought 
elsewhere. 
In his dialogue Concerning the teacher Augustine hints at the answer. We have 
access to eternal truths because we have an inner teacher, who teaches not through words 
but “by means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul” (1948a:391). 
Eternal truths, then, come to us through God who is eternal. With regard to God’s 
relationship to man, Augustine stresses the importance of two attributes: beatitude and 
light, identified by him with the Holy Spirit and Christ. In scripture, Christ is described as 
the “true light that gives light to every man” (John 1:9). P4P It is Christ, then, who is the Inner 
Teacher, and who makes truth known to man. He is the “exact representation of his 
[God’s] being” (Heb 1:3), and since God is pure being (Ex 3:14) Christ is the model of all 
that is or can be. Christ thus contains within himself the intelligible patterns, or Ideas, of 
all that which is capable of existence (Gilson 1972:71).  
The process by which Christ, the Light, imparts eternal truth to our finite minds is a 
kind of illumination or shining upon the objects of our understanding. As Augustine states 
in his Soliloquies, God is “the intelligible Light, in whom and from whom and through 
whom all things intelligibly shine” (1948d:260). Like Plato, Augustine uses the sun here 
as a metaphor (cf. Plato 1982:248). Just as the sun illumines physical objects, so the Light 
shines on the eternal, immutable and necessary within the objects and “makes things to be 
apprehended” (Augustine 1948d:267). In fact, the mind of man has been designed in such 
a way that when it is directed to intelligible things it sees them “by a sort of incorporeal 
light of a unique kind; as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily 
17 
 
light” (1948c:824). Eternal truths, then, are made visible to the human mind by the 
illuminating activity of Christ (Copleston 1950:63).  
It is clear that for Augustine, truth is above all divine truth. Whatever is true, 
including that which is possible, actually exists in the mind of God, and the forms of 
created beings are images of, or participate in, these divine Ideas (Gilson 1972:73). 
Actually, God is not only the source of all truth, but God himself is truth, as Augustine 
repeatedly writes in his Confessions (1948b:33,49,165; cf. John 14:6).  
The only more mundane definition of truth in Augustine’s metaphysics is found in 
his On True Religion. Here he specifies the exact meaning of the term ‘truth’ as “that 
which points to what is” (Augustine 1953:258).  
Searching for any use of truth in the moral sense, we don’t find in Augustine a well 
defined system of ethics with a detailed list of specific moral values. For Augustine, to 
live rightly is above all a matter of the heart, rather than outward conduct. Our inner 
posture should be one of caritas toward God, and this alone should motivate us in all 
matters of life (Battenhouse 1955:372). In fact, without reference to God no moral trait or 
action can be good: “virtues which have reference only to themselves … are to be 
reckoned vices rather than virtues” (Augustine 1950:707). This being so, it is surprising to 
find that Augustine wrote two treatises on just one specific virtue, namely truthfulness. P5 P 
Not only that, he took a uniquely uncompromising stand on the issue of lying: it is never 
under any circumstances the right thing to do (Griffiths 2004:14). The reason why moral 
truth is so crucial to Augustine is that God is truth, or more specifically, within the triune 
God, Christ, who is the Word, is Truth. Thus, since man is created in God’s image, just as 
the Word reveals the Father, our words should also reveal who we really are. There should 
be no discrepancy between our speaking and our mind, which is why Augustine defines as 
a liar a man who has “one thing in his mind and utters another in words” (1956:458).  
 
1.3.2.2  The Christian philosophers: Aquinas 
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Thomas Aquinas had quite a different view on how true knowledge is acquired. He 
stated that all knowledge is basically derived from sensation, and before it receives such 
input the intellect is to be regarded a tabula rasa (Aquinas 1952a:415). For the intellect to 
apprehend a thing and fashion a concept of it, two things have to happen. First, a likeness 
of the thing is generated in us, which is the form or species of the object itself. This 
likeness, however, is as indistinguishable from the object “as is the action which the seal 
exerts on wax from the seal itself” (Gilson 1956:229). Secondly, from this form a 
representation is conceived, which can be expressed in a word and is the concept in our 
intellect.  
The concepts thus formed are fully reliable, but they cannot properly be called true, 
just as objects are not ‘true’ in the primary sense. What Aquinas is referring to here is that 
truth implies active involvement of the intellect, which at this stage has not yet taken 
place. A stone is only called true “because it expresses the nature of a proper stone,” and 
words are said to be true “so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect” (1952a:94). 
But truth proper applies not to things or their concepts, but to the mind’s active knowledge 
of things. It is only in the activity of knowing that the mind knows truth (Copleston 
1976:50). “Truth is principally in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they 
are related to the intellect as their principle” (Aquinas 1952a:95).  
It follows that truth only enters the stage at the level of making judgments with these 
concepts, judgments that affirm or negate, ‘join’ or ‘separate’ in Aquinas’ words. In 
making a judgment that the object perceived “is a tree,” for instance, something new is 
added to the concept—an affirmation which exists only in the mind. At this stage there are 
two distinct realities, one being the object and the other the judgment, and only when there 
are two separate entities does the notion of an agreement between the two make sense. 
Truth then becomes “the conformity of intellect and thing (adaequatio rei et intellectus), 
and hence to know this conformity is to know truth” (op.cit.:96). 
Even though this is the only real sense of truth for Aquinas, he does speak of other 
ways in which the notion of truth can be used:  
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“The true is predicated, first of all, of joining and separating by the intellect; second, 
of the definitions of things in so far as they imply a true or a false judgment. Third, 
the true may be predicated of things in so far as they are conformed with the divine 
intellect or in so far as, by their very nature, they can be conformed with human 
intellects. Fourth, true or false may be predicated of man in so far as he chooses to 
express truth, or in so far as he gives a true or false impression of himself or of 
others by his words and actions; for truth can be predicated of words in the same 
way as it can be predicated of the ideas which they convey” (1952b:9).  
In man truth is mutable, because it can change as either the opinion changes or the 
thing itself changes, but Aquinas also affirms immutable and eternal truth, truth as it exists 
in the mind of God (1952a:100). Where Augustine posited divine illumination as the 
means by which man can have eternal truth, Aquinas identified such illumination with the 
creation in man of the natural light of reason (Gilson 1956:715 n117). At best, we are able 
to catch “a faint glimmer of the divine rays … finding in things the trace of the intelligible 
that was active at the time of their formation” (op.cit.:377). Nevertheless, the truth that is 
in God is the measure according to which all things are said to be true, and this truth is one 
(Aquinas 1952a:98). Furthermore, not only is the truth in God, but “the truth of the divine 
intellect is God himself” and “He is truth itself, and the supreme and first truth” 
(op.cit.:99,97).  
   
1.3.2.3  The Christian philosophers and our daily view of truth 
Just as for Plato, for Augustine the main sense of truth is that of agreement with 
genuine reality. Man has access to immutable truth, but since sensible reality is constantly 
changing, this is not where true reality is found. Eternal and immutable reality is found in 
the Ideas, Ideas that under the influence of Christianity now find a new realm, namely the 
mind of God. All this reminds us strongly of the Platonic notion of truth as genuineness, 
both in the ontological sense of a link between empirical and eternal reality, and in the 
epistemological sense that connected words with reality and thus also leaned toward 
factuality. So, we clearly find both genuineness and factuality in Augustine. 
Does Augustine’s teaching on the virtue of truthfulness also classify him as a 
proponent of the faithfulness view of truth? To a certain extent, yes. Augustine’s 
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understanding of truthfulness is not simply another word for factuality, as seemed the case 
with Aristotle’s interpretation. Augustine defines truthfulness as correspondence between 
our words and our mind, and this gives it a meaning that approaches that of faithfulness 
more closely. It is in this way that we do find truth as faithfulness in Augustine’s thought, 
though truth as factuality and genuineness are clearly primary. 
With the thought of Thomas Aquinas, we come a step closer to our popular western 
view of truth today. We saw how Aquinas, with characteristic precision and thoroughness, 
lists the varied uses of the notion of truth and then gives his own well-reasoned 
commentary. He sees truth above all as intellectual, as an attribute of judgments or 
statements, and this is for him the primary sense of truth. When we affirm or negate that 
something exists or that a subject has a certain predicate, our statement will be either true 
or false. The criterion for it being true is its conformity to reality as we perceive it with the 
senses—in other words factuality as we understand it today. Moreover, a definition of a 
thing can be called true in a derived but closely related sense, namely if it implies a true 
judgment.  
In his list of applications of the concept, Aquinas mentions two more senses of truth 
that are to be distinguished from the primary sense. First, objects can be called true to the 
extent they conform to intellect, or are intelligible, and supremely so when they conform 
to the divine Intellect, in other words when they are ‘as they should be’. It is here that we 
find the more Platonian sense of truth as true being or genuineness. Lastly, truth can be 
attributed to persons in so far as they choose to express truth, or give a true impression of 
themselves or others by their words and actions. In the first case, the person’s thought 
agrees with his words, an expression of faithfulness. In the second, his words or actions 
either agree with his character, pointing to faithfulness, or with the facts about another 
person, signifying factuality. Thus we see in Aquinas all three uses of truth identified, but 
the primary one for him is without doubt factuality, agreement between word and reality.  
In terms of our diagram, both Plato and Augustine centered truth in correspondence 
with ideal reality, which was how man could have ‘genuine’ knowledge, while Aristotle 
and Aquinas focused more on actual changing reality or ‘factuality’. Though all these 
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thinkers located truth clearly on the right side of the diagram, the change from unchanging 
ideal reality to mostly changeable factual reality is of course a move in a downward 
direction. True knowledge is still anchored in outside reality, but the view of reality itself 
has shifted from ideal and unchanging to empirical and changing, with just the 
unchangeable ‘form’ in the particular keeping knowledge secure. Though these 
similarities between the first two eras of philosophical thought are striking, it should of 
course be remembered that the Christian thinkers see truth as divine truth first of all, while 
such a notion was not clearly represented in the Greek tradition.  
 
1.3.3.1  The modern tradition: Descartes 
The closer we come to our own era, the harder it is to select thinkers that truly 
represent their time. Few will disagree with the selection of Plato and Aristotle to 
represent the Greek tradition, or with the choice of Augustine and Aquinas for the 
Christian thinkers, but the choice of Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant as ambassadors 
of the modern tradition seems already a bit more arbitrary. Descartes has been chosen here 
as the prime representative of rationalism, a school of thought that is clearly central to 
modernity and that inaugurated the turn to human reason and individualism. Kant has 
possibly been even more influential, but here he has been selected because it is in his 
thinking that the inevitable logical implication of rationalism starts to emerge, namely the 
crucial disconnect of human knowledge from reality as it is in itself. These thinkers thus 
represent the great hope of modernism on the one hand and its gradual demise on the 
other, and together they pave the way for the relativism and subjectivism of our own time, 
seen first in existentialists like Søren Kierkegaard and then in the postmodern views of 
contemporary figures like Richard Rorty. So, let us now turn to the notion of truth in the 
pivotal work of the French philosopher Rene Descartes. 
Truth or how to acquire true knowledge is of course the main concern of Descartes’ 
thought. Convinced after years of study that “there was no learning in the world,” and that 
even in esteemed philosophy “no single thing is to be found … which is not subject of 
dispute,” he decides to make it his life work to devise a universal and infallible method of 
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constructing absolutely certain truth (1952a:42-3). Furthermore, “considering … that of all 
those who have hitherto sought for truth … it has been the mathematicians alone who 
have been able to succeed,” he confidently models his own approach on that of 
mathematics (op.cit.:47). In fact, he believes that just like Archimedes only needed one 
fixed point to move all the earth, so he would need “one thing only which is certain and 
indubitable” to serve as the foundation of all further human knowledge (1952b:77).  
Underlying this heroic and vast endeavor was not just a confidence which many of 
us today might label as naïve, but a sentiment that is less easily dismissed in our time. 
Bernstein notes that the ‘Cartesian anxiety’ that drives this quest is not just the dread of 
epistemological skepticism, but that of a terrifying madness and chaos where nothing is 
fixed. “Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, 
or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual 
and moral chaos,” writes Descartes (Bernstein 1983:18). Again, his confidence in a solid 
foundation to all knowledge may seem somewhat simplistic to many of our 
contemporaries, but the underlying spiritual anxiety clearly still haunts mankind today. 
Descartes seeks an indubitable foundation for human knowledge, and he believes he 
can find it at the very center of his own doubting mind. He reasons that in doubting the 
truth of all he has ever believed only one thing remains that cannot be doubted. This one 
thing is the existence of his own mind, for he cannot doubt its existence without affirming 
it in the process, and thus he arrives at his famous conclusion: cogito ergo sum 
(1952b:78). The next step for Descartes is to study carefully what makes this true and 
certain proposition different from all other beliefs. Identifying as its only distinguishing 
mark that he sees its truth very clearly and distinctly, he derives the general rule that 
“things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true” (1952a:52). With this criterion 
in hand, he now finds several such clear and distinct ideas in his mind, notions that he 
simply cannot seem to doubt. 
Though his method of doubt has now apparently given him a foothold in the mind, it 
has also driven a wedge between the mind on the one hand and all that exists outside of it, 
and is as yet unredeemed, on the other. For if the mind cannot be linked to extra-mental 
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reality, how can we trust our clear and distinct ideas to be true, how can we distinguish 
them, for instance, from what we believe to be true when we dream? A letter to his friend 
Marin Mersenne reveals that for Descartes such a connection with the outside world is 
indeed crucial to the definition of truth: “The word ‘truth’, in its proper signification, 
denotes the conformity of the thought with the object” (Morris 1971:228).  
It is at this apparent impasse that Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence 
of God comes to the rescue (1952b:93ff.). One of the clear and distinct ideas Descartes 
finds in his mind is the idea of a perfect being, God. Since this idea implies perfection and 
thus cannot be the product of an imperfect human mind, it must find its origin in God 
himself. Our belief that all those ideas that we can conceive of clearly and distinctly are 
indeed true is now anchored in the existence of God. Since God is the one who has 
implanted such ideas in us, and since He is perfect and truthful, we can be sure that those 
ideas of simple natures are indeed true (1952a:54). In other words, we can find within 
ourselves indubitable, absolute and eternal truths, truths that we could never have derived 
from mere sense experience. 
Descartes hopes in this way not only to provide a basis for the truth of simple ideas, 
and thus via sound deduction to an extensive structure of human knowledge, but also to 
gain a reason to believe in an objective, rational order in the outside world. Still, truth as 
an attribute does not directly apply to outside reality, since “when [truth] is attributed to 
things which are external to thought, it signifies only that these things can serve as objects 
of true thoughts” (Morris 1971:228). 
Is there any sense of divine truth in Descartes’ thinking? On the surface it seems that 
his theory does make room for such a notion. We have seen that he believes that the clear 
and distinct ideas in the mind of man find their origin in God, and in this he seems to 
follow Augustine’s thinking on divine truth. However, since Descartes makes the idea of 
God ultimately dependent on the human mind, rather than the other way around, this 
version of divine truth soon turns out to be powerless and is no longer able to provide a 
firm anchor for truth.   
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1.3.3.2  The modern tradition: Kant 
The Cartesian solution to the problem of true knowledge certainly did not convince 
the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and so the question of how we can ever attain 
true knowledge also became a major issue for him. The philosophy of Kant’s time was 
divided between Cartesian rationalism, with its increasingly debated connection between 
mind and matter, and British empiricism, which, with Hume’s critique of causality and 
induction, had taken a decisively skeptical turn. It was clear that neither of these could 
explain the factual existence of what Kant believed was indeed true human knowledge. 
Kant was duly impressed, for instance, by the ability of Newtonian physics to 
generate apparently true knowledge, and he wondered how such knowledge could be 
explained. At the same time, he was concerned that the thoroughly mechanistic outlook of 
natural science would eventually limit all knowledge to the realm of mere sense 
experience, leaving no room for key metaphysical notions such as freedom or God. That 
there is such a thing as universal and necessary knowledge (a priori) that is also content-
filled (synthetic) seemed clear to him, and he found such truths not only in Newtonian 
physics, but also in Euclidian mathematics, in ethics and in metaphysics. But what puzzled 
him was how such synthetic a priori knowledge could actually have come about.  
Like Copernicus, who took a most daring step by replacing the geocentric 
hypothesis with a heliocentric one, Kant finally decided to try a radically new approach in 
epistemology. He postulated that in knowledge it is not the mind that is shaped by the 
object, but that it is rather the object that is shaped by the knowing mind (1934:22). He 
thus agreed with the empiricist that knowledge does indeed start with experience, but as 
he made clear “it does not follow that it all arises out of experience” (op.cit.:41). In 
experience, he explained, the mind processes the object of knowledge according to certain 
specific categories, such as space and time, and since all experience is processed in a 
similar manner these categories are universal and necessary. Experience, then, gives such 
knowledge its content and makes it synthetic, while the process of knowing itself provides 
its unavoidable form and makes it a priori.  
25 
 
With this revolutionary new hypothesis, Kant was able to explain how we can have 
knowledge that is universal, certain and necessarily true. However, since empirical 
knowledge was now seen as extensively shaped by the human mind itself, it became 
severely limited in its reach. We can have knowledge of things as-they-appear-to-us 
(phenomena), but knowledge of things as they actually are in themselves (noumena) is 
permanently inaccessible. This does not mean that Kant did not believe in an actual extra-
mental reality. Since the existence of our world of experience is not produced by the mind, 
he acknowledged there must be a reality external to us that gives rise to experience 
(Stumpf 1966:315). However, this world is now by definition unknowable, and the truth 
of any theories about the world can therefore neither be proved nor disproved, just as had 
already been acknowledged for theories about God and the self (op.cit.:317). 
For Kant, this limitation was not just a negative factor. He had wanted to find room 
for such notions as freedom and God, and his view of an unknowable noumenal world 
actually provided just that. God, the self, reality and freedom were now seen to be beyond 
the phenomenal world of experience. The conclusions of science, which threatened to 
subject all such notions to a mechanistic worldview, no longer had jurisdiction in the 
moral and religious life (Jones 1969:65). Of course, since these notions necessarily 
transcend our knowledge, from now on they had to be seen as merely regulatory. But what 
Kant had accomplished was that to speak of the self or of God was not incoherent with the 
findings of science, since the territory of science had now been properly limited.  
Kant’s famous saying was that, “Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing 
wonder and awe … the starry heavens above and the moral law within” (1952:360). So, 
having provided an explanation of how scientific knowledge of the starry heavens can be 
true, he now focused on his other passion: the moral law. Kant’s ethical theory aimed to 
provide a universal standard for what is morally right: the categorical imperative. In its 
best known version, it states that “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will 
that my maxim should become a universal law,” but since this formulation proved 
troublesome, he later developed another (1956:70). This later version reads, “Act in such a 
way that you always treat humanity … never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end” (op.cit.:96), and it is here that he uses the virtue of truthfulness as an 
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example. The man who makes a false promise clearly uses another “merely as a means,” 
and he is therefore morally wrong (op.cit.:97). Being faithful and keeping one’s promise is 
even a so-called perfect duty, meaning there can be no exceptions to this rule, ever.  
Though Kant speaks confidently of God, the idea of divine truth, accessible to man, 
that can function as a standard is now no longer available. Like reality, God becomes a 
mere regulatory concept and such a God can no longer be the guarantor of knowledge. 
This job must therefore now fall to the universal categories in the mind of man. 
 
1.3.3.3  The modern tradition and our daily view of truth 
In studying Descartes we recognize where in history our own understanding of truth 
comes into view. It is evident from his letter to Mersenne that Descartes sees truth as 
factuality, but in this he still mostly follows in the footsteps of those before him. What 
makes Descartes’ thought so much more like our own is that he rests truth on the human 
mind alone. The preceding thinkers had seen the need to safeguard true knowledge by 
resting it on the perceived link between the mind and an outside reality. In Plato and 
Augustine, the unchangeable reality of the Ideas was clearly accessible to man, while 
Aristotle and Aquinas stressed the link between truth in human thought and the 
unchangeable forms embedded in the empirical world. But Descartes foregoes both types 
of connectedness and endeavors to rest all truth on the mind alone. Since the existence of 
God is similarly founded on an idea in the mind of man, Descartes’ subsequent effort to 
reestablish the link by making God the guarantor of truth of such innate ideas is less than 
successful in the long run.  
Most major thinkers before Descartes had recognized that truth cannot be truth if it 
has no element of changelessness and eternity—a segment that necessarily transcends 
finite, temporal and changing man and that had often been captured in the genuineness 
sense of truth. The question as to where exactly this eternal element is found dominated 
the quest for truth for two millennia. With Descartes this quest is abruptly abandoned. The 
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question that then arises instead is how we can have any knowledge at all of empirical 
reality—no matter if this reality is changing or not.  
So we see a decisive shift away from the genuineness sense of truth toward 
factuality alone, a factuality that itself is also weakened by a lack of connection with 
anything eternal. Descartes’ thought further resembles ours in that it does not dwell much 
on truth as an ethical concept. In fact, Descartes hardly focused on ethics at all, since he 
believed it to be one of the last branches of knowledge to grow on the ‘tree of philosophy’ 
(1966:119). Thus, the systematic investigation of la morale can only begin after certainty 
has been achieved in metaphysics and physics. Though he does make a certain connection 
between truth and ethics, this does not lead to an understanding of truth as faithfulness. 
Descartes’ principal focus in ethics is the ‘good life’ as it was understood by the Greeks, a 
life of mental flourishing, made possible by philosophy and the cultivation of true and 
sound judgment. As we have seen, true judgments are those that accord with reality. Thus, 
even truth in an ethical sense is for Descartes again closely related to factuality, and not to 
the personal characteristic of faithfulness. 
In the work of Kant reality becomes noumenal, merely a regulative concept, and 
since nothing can be known about it, reality as it is has effectively disappeared from the 
radar screen of human knowledge. What does this mean for Kant’s understanding of truth? 
It is clear that Kant’s view has no room for the genuineness sense of truth. Moreover, it 
can no longer accommodate truth as factuality in the sense of agreement with even just 
empirical reality. If truth is “the agreement of knowledge with its object” writes Kant, “I 
can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking 
knowledge of it. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being 
sufficient for truth” (2005:45). Still, Kant acknowledges that Newton’s laws, for instance, 
reflect truth. What is left then is truth as agreement between words and reality, but reality 
is now merely the phenomenal world—not reality an sich. Finally, truth in the sense of 
faithfulness is found to be important in Kant’s ethical theory, but it in no way takes the 
place of the primary truth sense of factuality, or agreement with phenomenal reality.  
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In sum, both Descartes and Kant move decisively away from genuineness with its 
linkage to eternal truth. Their primary understanding of truth is factuality, but a factuality 
that links thought only to empirical reality. At the same time the possibility of a real 
connection with the empirical world is increasingly undermined. Such a bridge between 
knowledge and reality becomes already shaky in Descartes and further disintegrates in 
Kant, and in terms of our diagram both thinkers find themselves eventually isolated in the 
middle, namely in the finite thoughts of man. Moreover, since Descartes built all 
knowledge on the ideas of one man—even though he assumed they would be universal—
it is his thinking that opens the door for subjectivism and relativism. Kant makes a heroic 
effort to stem the tide by positing his universal categories, but even this defense will 
eventually give way. Finally, both thinkers still speak of God, but any sense of divine truth 
in Descartes is a powerless one, and Kant cannot base any true knowledge on a concept 
that itself has now become merely regulatory.  
 
1.3.4.1  Contemporary perspectives: Kierkegaard 
As we approach our own time, philosophical perspectives seem to multiply and 
diverge, and this makes selection of thinkers on truth more difficult. Only time will tell 
which philosophers truly changed the course of human thought, but Kierkegaard and 
Rorty have been chosen here as they seem key representatives of the existential and 
postmodern direction in philosophy respectively. It should be noted, though, that next to 
these two directions that tend to devaluate earlier truth views, there are other trends that 
reconfirm their significance (see e.g., Rorty 1982:9 ff.).  
19 PthP century thinker Søren Kierkegaard rejects any type of truth that is understood as 
being detached from the person seeking truth. Those branches of knowledge which were 
traditionally seen as generating more certain truth, such as mathematics and science, are 
completely rejected by him as unimportant. Such objective truth are accidental and in their 
“degree and scope … a matter of indifference” (Kierkegaard 1992:197). Though they give 
certainty, they can all sooner or later be reduced to mere tautologies and are thus entirely 
insignificant.  
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What Kierkegaard seeks instead is what he calls ‘essential truth’ or ‘subjectivity’, 
truth that does not reside in sentences. Such knowledge is uncertain, even paradoxical, but 
it is essential because it actually “pertains to existence” (ibid.). True knowledge must 
relate to the knower, and is typically limited to the ethical and ethical-religious realm. It 
focuses on how something is said, rather than on what is being said. Kierkegaard further 
elaborates on this unusual notion of truth: 
“Objectively the interest is focused merely on the thought-content, subjectively on 
the inwardness. At its maximum this inward ‘how’ is the passion of the infinite, and 
the passion of the infinite is truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely 
subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the truth. … Here is such a definition of 
truth: an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most 
passionate inwardness” (op.cit.:203). 
“True truth” is not learned but rather ‘appropriated’, a continual process which 
makes it part of our very existence, making truth something that we actually live. 
Objective and subjective truth are mutually exclusive for Kierkegaard, and since it is the 
latter we should seek, we should avoid the pursuit of objective truth through the use of 
reasoning. Instead, we must seek and hold on to what is actually repulsive to objective 
understanding, especially in religion and the Christian faith, “for faith begins precisely 
where thinking leaves off” (1954:64).  
In the ethical realm, the pursuit of subjective truth has some fascinating 
implications. A person who has faith and has consequently become a true individual is 
superior to the universal, and thus also to universal ethical rules. Therefore, such a person 
can suspend ethical rules and still be morally justified (op.cit.:67). Another element in 
Kierkegaard’s moral philosophy that may have some relevance for truth views is the 
importance he gives to the unity of the self and his condemnation of any form of double-
mindedness (Pattison 2005:100). We will explore this further when we compare 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth with our own (locus 1.3.8).  
Finally, Kierkegaard evidently does believe in God and even in his eternal truth, but 
for the individual this divine truth can only be purely subjective and thus relative. 
Ultimately, it is only the individual human heart that can determine its own truth.  
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1.3.4.2  Contemporary perspectives: Rorty 
Richard Rorty, our last philosopher in this overview, is a representative of more 
postmodern views on truth. Rorty critiques what he calls representationalism, the pursuit 
of truth as an “accurate representation of reality” (1979:10). As a pragmatist in the 
tradition of Dewey and James, he sees truth rather as “what it is better for us to believe” 
(ibid.). Philosophy from the time of Plato onward has been searching desperately for 
eternal and necessary truth, seeing it either as correspondence to an eternal reality beyond 
space and time, or as representing spatiotemporal reality (Rorty 1982:3). Even when Kant 
made knowledge contingent on mental processes, he still posited a universal 
epistemological foundation. And several centuries later, the modern language 
philosophers were still found engaged in the quest for a foundation to human 
knowledge—not seeking it in truth or thought this time, but substituting language instead 
(op.cit.:6).  
According to Rorty, the time has now come for philosophy to realize that this search 
has been wholly misguided, that the universal human aspiration to objective truth has 
merely been motivated by what Sartre saw as “a common human hope that the burden of 
choice will pass away” (Rorty 1979:376). From now on philosophy, ‘edifying philosophy’ 
that is, should aim to “keep the conversation going” rather than to find objective truth, a 
pursuit which after all has merely resulted in seeing human beings as objects and in 
“freezing over culture” (op.cit.:377). Instead, philosophy should be therapeutic; it should 
“break the crust of convention, preventing man from deluding himself that he knows 
anything, except under optional descriptions” (op.cit.:379).   
What is left of the notion of truth in this neo-pragmatic and anti-foundationalist 
view? Rorty states that his theory allows for several incompatible interpretations of truth 
at the same time, because truth is simply not the type of notion that has a single referent. 
There is not one objective reality, and thus no one set of conditions for the one true theory 
(op.cit.:374). Rather than an eternal, universal, necessary notion, truth is historical, 
embedded in our language, culture and social context, and thus continually changing. Not 
only that, there is no common ground or universal reference frame that makes comparison 
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or communication between truth views possible. Truth is something that is made, not 
found. Commenting on the generally accepted definition of knowledge as “justified true 
belief”, he states that since ‘justified’ beliefs are simply those that our epistemic 
community agrees on, when we say that beliefs are ‘true’ we are merely using an honorific 
term for those beliefs that we consider “justified to the hilt” (Gutting 1999:798). P  
Within such a view, there is hardly any need to look for a place for God and for truth 
as having a divine origin. Actually, Rorty only refers to God when in a side-note he 
commends secularists on getting rid of God language (1982:2). Moreover, ethical theories 
are seen as in the same predicament as theories of truth. There is no grounding for moral 
values outside of our arbitrary commitment to them. However, this does not keep Rorty 
from presenting his own preference. His ‘liberal ironism’ asserts freedom as its basic 
value: first, freedom from suffering, and next, freedom to choose one’s own values and 
live fully in accordance with these (op.cit.:798).   
 
1.3.4.3  Contemporary perspectives and our daily view of truth 
In Kierkegaard we clearly see a further movement toward the subjective or personal 
side of truth. Objective truth, which is of course closer to factuality, does exist for 
Kierkegaard, but it has no real significance for life. “True truth” is subjective truth, a 
notion that in everyday terms is maybe better represented by the word ‘meaning’. In our 
diagram it may reside in the person, or possibly in thought, but correspondence to reality 
is of no significance in this view.  
Does this then mean that we find truth in the more personal and moral sense here, 
truth as faithfulness? Yes and no. As an existentialist, authenticity is an important concept 
for Kierkegaard, and being authentic does imply being true to one’s own inner desires and 
principles, a refusal to be molded by external pressures into someone one is not. We 
already noted Kierkegaard’s focus on the unity of the self and on single-mindedness. This 
sense of truth, however, seems primarily centered on the self and at most only indirectly 
related to one’s behavior toward others. Thus, it is strongly personal but not necessarily 
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moral, while faithfulness clearly has moral implications. If, for instance, a person would 
make a promise but then genuinely change his mind, his authenticity might, morally 
speaking, allow him to break the promise, while such an act would be inconsistent with 
the moral content of faithfulness. 
What we do see in Kierkegaard, however, is the genuineness sense of truth, but now 
as applied to the self rather than outside reality. To reflect Kierkegaard’s position in our 
diagram, what is needed is a shift to the extreme left. Truth is subjective and personal 
truth, a very individual affair for Kierkegaard, and it thus centers around the person and 
his inner self. The element of agreement between two entities that has been characterizing 
all our truth views till now would in Kierkegaard be located in the person himself, 
signifying authenticity and unity of self. 
While Kierkegaard did not deny objective factual truth, but merely considered it 
insignificant, with Rorty truth as agreement with objective facts seems to have come to the 
end of the road. Truth is not agreement with objective reality, but rather agreement with 
the social and historical context of the knower.  
Just like Kierkegaard, then, Rorty takes us to the left of the diagram, the personal 
side, but that is where any similarity between them ends. While in Kierkegaard morality 
still plays a role, Rorty sees moral values as nothing more than individual preferences, and 
where Kierkegaard focuses intensely on the person as individual, Rorty sees the person as 
a much wider entity. Rorty best fits on the ‘person’ side of the diagram, but with the 
explicit understanding that a person is not an isolated individual but a product of his social 
and historical environment. Truth in Rorty’s view might then at best be seen as agreement 
between the person’s thoughts, words and actions on the one hand and the person-as-
product-of-his-social-background on the other. 
In sum, both Kierkegaard and Rorty bring us to the extreme left of the diagram, even 
further than Descartes and Kant. In the modern tradition there was still an effort to ground 
truth. There was a looking toward reality, even if not the eternal but only the empirical 
world. The quest for the unchanging had been given up, but there was still a changing 
reality to explore. In Kierkegaard this endeavor is finally given up, and even though he 
33 
 
still believes in eternal truth, such notions can only be accessed in subjective and finite 
experience and thus become finite themselves. The person has become the central concern 
and the final arbiter of his own truth. Finally, in Rorty the notion of truth in any of the 
traditional senses is rejected altogether. Genuineness, factuality and faithfulness may still 
play a role in our everyday view, but they are no longer found in the official postmodern 
world of thought. 
 
1.4  Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have looked at selected major ways that the term truth has been 
understood throughout the history of human thought. Even though this survey has had to 
be brief and many worthy thinkers on the subject had to be ignored, we were still able to 
recognize certain broad trends in man’s thought about truth from the ancients right up to 
our own time. The tool we used to facilitate comparing truth views was a diagram of how 
the term is currently used in everyday western conversation. We noted that in popular 
western usage truth is primarily factuality, and sometimes genuineness or faithfulness.  
Comparing the various philosophical views of truth with this diagram, we were able 
to conclude that truth as genuineness, and thus as unchanging, played an important role in 
Greek thought. Transcendence of all that is temporal and changing was seen as critical in 
order to properly ground truth. This singular focus on eternal reality was gradually 
replaced by an interest in the empirical world, but even then an eternal element embedded 
in that reality was still regarded as an absolute requirement to make true knowledge 
possible. In our diagram this development from genuineness to factuality meant a move 
downward on the right-hand side of the interaction between person and world. 
The next change came with the methodological skepticism of Descartes, and his 
retreat to the questioning mind of man as the foundation of all knowledge. The battle to 
hold on to an unchanging ingredient in ever-fluctuating sense experience now became the 
fight to retain even the most fleeting link with the extra-mental world, no matter if it is 
changing or not. Factuality was still the main use of truth in this era, but its 
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correspondence with reality became progressively weaker. In our diagram, this therefore 
meant a shift from the right-hand side to the middle, from empirical reality to the 
struggling mind of man.  
Finally, with Kierkegaard and Rorty, the focus has shifted from human thought in its 
effort to know to the human person himself, while subjective experience or collective 
worldview construction has made all knowledge merely relative. This move toward the 
extreme left of our diagram was seen not to signify a shift from factuality to faithfulness, 
but rather a mounting disillusionment with the belief itself that reality and truth can be 
known, and a corresponding retreat to man-alone as she learns to deal with, and 
sometimes celebrate, this failure of philosophy to deliver an adequate ground of truth. 
Roughly parallel to this move away from a robust view of truth, the idea of divine 
truth also gradually diminished in importance. The main champions of divine truth were 
of course the Christian philosophers Augustine and, to a lesser extent, Aquinas. The 
notion of divine truth still played a role in the thinking of Descartes, but since he based the 
existence of God on the human mind, this view had been emptied of its main significance. 
Since that time, the notion of divine truth has not played a major role in philosophy, 
though it must be noted that Christian thought as a whole has made a come-back during 
the last few decades, and much of what will be presented in the later chapters of this thesis 
is evidence of that. 
We will now turn to an investigation of the notions of truth and divine truth as they 
occur in the Bible, again comparing this view with society’s current popular view of what 
we mean when we say of a statement or person, thing or event that “it is true.” 
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NOTES 
 
P
1
P This ideal reality can be seen as either existing outside of the mind (as in Plato) or within the mind, but this 
difference is not crucial since in both cases the agreement that underlies the term genuineness is that 
between an entity that is directly perceived (this diamond here) and one that is the ideal version (the perfect 
ideal diamond—as it exists outside the mind or as a prototype in the mind). 
P
2
P Plato’s concepts of belief and knowledge would fit under the middle section of our diagram.  
P
3 
P‘Ideas’ is of course another word for Forms, and they are used interchangeably in this study. 
P
4
P Scripture references are from the New international version, unless noted otherwise. See bibliography 
under: Bible. 
P
5
P On lying, written in AD 394 or 395, and Against lying, written 25 years later.  
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2 - THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN SCRIPTURE 
 
2.1  Introduction 
From eternal reality to redundant illusion, from principle of life to lifeless tradition, 
philosophical views on truth have seemingly run the gamut. But at the root of Western 
culture lies another source of views on truth, namely the Bible. We saw that philosophy 
and biblical theology intertwined for a season in the thinking of the Christian philosophers. 
We now want to explore that very source these philosophers drew upon, and find what the 
Bible has to say about truth. To get a clearer grasp, we will again compare these notions 
with our current daily view as pictured in the diagram below. 
                    Ideal reality      
          I 
          I       Genuineness 
                 I         
Person    (thought)/word/(action)    reality 
   [__________________]   [__________________] 
 Faithfulness   UFactuality 
 
 
  
2.2  Truth in the Old Testament 
The Hebrew word for truth, ’emeth, appears no less than 126 times throughout the 
Old Testament (Quell 1933:232). It developed from the root word ’mn, which means 
firmness or stability (Carver 1956), and it is closely related to the still currently used term 
‘amen’ which concludes and confirms prayer (Baab 1949:130). In the Old Testament, 
something is true that is firm and won’t collapse under pressure. In 2 Kings 18:16 P1P, for 
example, the word that is used for the supports or doorposts of the temple is directly 
related to ’emeth (Nicole 1983:288). What is true also persists through time, as is seen in 
Deuteronomy 28:59 where the adjective true is used for prolonged and lingering illnesses 
(Rimbach 1980:171).  
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Over time, from this root meaning further uses of truth developed, all of them 
recognizable to our contemporary understanding and thus fitting our diagram. 
Interestingly, the most frequently used form reflects the more rare variant of truth in our 
day. Truth in this sense is always attributed to a person and has a uniquely moral feel to it 
(Nicole 1983:288). In other words, it is truth as faithfulness.  
The second use of ’emeth represents our contemporary understanding of the term, 
and is therefore—not surprisingly—often directly translated as ‘truth’. In hundreds of 
passages ’emeth is used of statements that conform to reality, and represent the facts as 
they really are, what we have called factuality. How could the people know, for instance, 
that a certain message was from God or not? The test was simple: “If what a prophet 
proclaims … does not take place or come true, that is a message the Lord has not spoken” 
(Deut 18:22). Similarly, in Genesis 42:16, Joseph wants to establish if his brothers have 
told the truth about their younger brother, and he does so by asking them to produce this 
brother. In other words, he will deem their words true if they are seen to agree with the 
empirical facts.  
Finally, closely related to this second use of ’emeth, we also find the contemporary 
variation described in Chapter One as genuineness. In Jeremiah 2:21, for instance, a 
“corrupt, wild vine” is compared to a true vine, a genuine one, of sound and reliable stock 
(Quell 1933:234).  
The Old Testament ’emeth, then, incorporates all three senses of truth as faithfulness, 
genuineness and factuality, and this is further confirmed by the type of words with which it 
is contrasted. We find morally charged terms like ‘deceit’ and ‘lie’, best explained as a 
disagreement between a person’s intentions and his words, and thus located on the personal 
side of the diagram. We also encounter morally neutral words such as ‘error’ and 
‘falsehood’, which point to the reality side of the person’s interaction with the world (cf. 
Nicole 1983:291), while as antonyms for truth in the sense of genuineness we find terms 
like ‘worthless’, ‘corrupt’ and ‘degenerate’.  
When we ask which of these senses of truth are used as an attribute of God, 
faithfulness presents itself as the most likely candidate, but we also find the other two used 
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of the divine. ’Emeth as  the faithfulness of God is of course found throughout the Old 
Testament. Examples are “your faithfulness” in Psalms 30:9, and “I will be faithful and 
righteous to them as their God” in Zechariah 8:8. Still, there remain two uses of ’emeth 
with direct or indirect reference to God that seem to fit the meaning of genuineness or 
factuality better than faithfulness. 
In the first group we find a verse like Jeremiah 10:10 which reads, “The Lord is the 
true God.” In this case ’emeth cannot be interpreted as faithful, because the context 
contrasts the creator God, who is living and eternal, and made the earth by his power, to 
gods who will perish and can do neither harm nor good. The contrast is not one of moral 
character, but of genuineness and actual reality. This verse echoes the teaching in the later 
part of Isaiah where we repeatedly find the phrase, “apart from me there is no God” (45:5) 
and 2 Chronicles 15:3, which speaks of a terrible and godless time when Israel was 
“without the true God.”   
The second group features references to God’s laws, precepts or commandments, 
which together are described as God’s truth. An example is Psalm 119:160, “The sum of 
thy word is truth.” P2 P The sense here is that of factuality, but it is not to God himself that 
truth is attributed, but to his word. It is interesting to note, though, that in this case the two 
uses of ’emeth as faithfulness and factuality seem to converge because the word is so 
strongly identified as God’s word (Nicole 1983:289). And this connection becomes even 
stronger when instead of an adjective, a noun is used and God’s word is literally identified 
with truth. As Ramsdell notes, “the truth of God is always his faithfulness, and his 
faithfulness always connotes the truth” (1951:270). We shall see that this use of truth for 
God’s word actually develops into a full-fledged divine attribute in the New Testament, 
where God and his word are even more closely identified with each other.  
Still, our overall conclusion must be that when the Old Testament declares God to be 
true, this attribution is primarily meant in a personal, moral sense, and only secondarily as 
a confirmation of factuality or genuineness. Again, this seems almost a reversed image of 
how we in our own time tend to use, and therefore interpret, the term ‘truth’. Aalen 
explains this discrepancy by noting that the factuality of God was less of a concern in 
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earlier Judaism because it had not been exposed to later Hellenistic thought and the great 
variability among religious views in the larger Roman empire (1964:14). Of course, these 
circumstances were changing by the time the New Testament writers got to work. 
The Old Testament teaching on truth can be summarized as follows: truth is 
characterized by firmness, reliability and by the ability to last through time. When we 
compare this Old Testament notion with our daily use, we find all three senses of truth 
represented, but truth as faithfulness is clearly primary. Truth as a noun is also used for the 
word of God, which suggest a strong convergence of faithfulness and factuality, especially 
when seen in the light of the later New Testament assertion that God is his word.  
When we compare this notion of truth with those we encountered in the history of 
philosophy, we see a good fit with the thought of both Greek and Medieval thinkers. Even 
though genuineness and factuality were the primary notions of truth in these traditions and 
not faithfulness, the unquestioned assumption was always that truth requires an eternal and 
unchanging ontological ground. As we saw, the Old Testament could not agree more; the 
very root of its understanding of truth is firmness and permanence and it is in this fact that 
we find a reflection of the genuineness sense of truth that was more explicit in the early 
philosophical traditions. With the modern tradition, however, the focus of philosophy shifts 
from the eternal to temporal and changing realities and from there to the finite mind of 
man. Finally, in contemporary philosophy we find very little in common with the Old 
Testament view of truth. Even though we noted a movement toward the personal side of 
truth in current thought, this move does not bring it in line with the Old Testament notion 
of faithfulness but rather reflects a rejection of all senses of truth, and of even the 
possibility of truth itself. 
 
2.3  Truth in the New Testament 
In the New Testament, truth is represented by the Greek term aletheia, which is 
derived from the verb lanthano, ‘to be hidden’. Together with the privative prefix ‘a’, 
aletheia is therefore best understood as non-concealment, or truth in the sense of “the full 
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or real state of affairs” (Bultmann 1933:238), a sense that again bears a resemblance to 
genuineness. In the New Testament aletheia is mostly attributed to statements, but when 
applied to persons, it takes on the alternative sense of truth, meaning truthfulness or 
faithfulness (Aalen 1964:3; Thiselton 1978:874). Related words are the adjectives alethes 
(true, sincere) and alethinos, plus the adverb alethos (truly), which was selected to translate 
the typical use of the Hebrew word ‘amen’, a close relative of ’emeth, as we saw earlier 
(locus 2.2). 
The use of aletheia in the New Testament is by no means evenly spread out. It is 
found 109 times, but outside of the writings of the apostles John and Paul it occurs only 
eight times in all, and in none of these instances does it carry a distinctive theological 
meaning (Thiselton 1978:883). Moreover, the distribution of its cognates shows a similarly 
skewed picture. To get a better understanding of the New Testament use of the term, we 
will therefore focus here on New Testament writers John and Paul.   
When the apostle Paul uses the noun aletheia he usually means the gospel itself, 
which seems no different from the way the Old Testament refers to God’s word as ’emeth 
(Col 1:5, Eph 1:13). He also uses aletheia in a wider sense as God’s revelation of his will 
or his being, as in Romans 1:18 where men are stated to “suppress the truth.” The sense in 
which the term is used in these cases is primarily that of factuality—God’s revelation is 
true in that it corresponds with reality. However, truth also stands in contrast to lying, 
deception or even wickedness in Paul’s writings. Thiselton asserts that Paul’s use of truth 
reflects an intellectual interest, but also an ethical concern (1978:885). This suggests that 
Paul’s understanding of aletheia indeed encompasses both factuality and faithfulness. The 
two concerns frequently go hand in hand, for instance, in his second letter to the 
Corinthians where he writes that he does not use deception or distortion, and tells the truth 
as it is (4:2). Finally, Paul also uses the term alethinos in the sense of a thing being 
genuine. He writes about “true faith,” and “true righteousness,” and he calls Timothy his 
“true son in the faith” (1Ti 2:7, Eph 4:24, 1Ti 1:2).  
When it comes to attributing truth to God, Paul again uses the term alethinos. In 1 
Thessalonians 1:9 he speaks of the “living and true God”, using true in the same sense of 
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genuine, as found earlier in the Old Testament (Jer 10:10, 2Ch 15:3). However, again in 
line with the Old Testament, Paul does not use the noun aletheia as a direct attribute of 
God.  
It is in the Johannine writings that the concept of truth takes center stage and actually 
moves beyond the Old Testament use. The first time we find ‘truth’ in John is in the very 
first chapter of his gospel where he speaks of Christ as both “full of grace and truth” and 
indeed as the one through whom “grace and truth” came into existence (1:14, 17). Most 
scholars agree that this phrase reflects back to the description of God in Exodus 34:6, "the 
compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger, abounding in love and faithfulness,” and 
since this Old Testament passage explicitly stresses God’s faithfulness, some have argued 
that truth must here uniquely be understood in the Hebrew manner as faithfulness (Kuyper 
1964). Thiselton finds this conclusion unwarranted, and suggests instead that John means 
that in Christ men can “see God in his genuine actuality and reality” (1978:890).  
Similarly debated are John’s understanding of the role of a witness whose testimony 
is valid, and thus true, and his statement that true believers worship “in Spirit and truth” 
(John 8:13-18, 4:23). In John 8, God is appealed to as a truthful witness, but is God’s 
testimony regarding Jesus reliable because of God’s moral nature (faithfulness), or is it so 
because his knowledge is perfect and therefore more true to reality than ours (factuality)? 
Similarly, when in John 4 true worshipers are described as those who worship in Spirit and 
truth, does truth here refer to some sense of genuineness or to the conceptual content of 
worship as in accord with reality, and thus factuality? How ever these specific verses are 
interpreted, further study suggests that throughout John’s gospel and letters the terms 
aletheia and alethes are used in all three senses, as factuality but also as faithfulness and 
genuineness.  
An undebated example of the first use is found in Jesus’ conversation with the 
Samaritan woman at the well. When she tells him she has no husband, Jesus asserts that 
she is telling the truth, because the man she now lives with is indeed not her husband (John 
4:18). Truth is here agreement with the facts. Further examples of the use of truth in the 
sense of factuality are abundant in John’s first letter (1Jo 1:6, 8; 2:21; 4:6). Moreover, the 
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use of truth as genuineness gets special attention in John’s gospel. He repeatedly uses 
alethes in the sense of alethinos to contrast something that is more fully real, or genuine, 
with something that is less so. Examples of this usage are “true light” and “true bread” 
(1:9, 6:32). 
John’s use of truth as faithfulness is equally well attested. When in John 7 the Jews 
are amazed at Jesus’ teaching, He explains that the man who works for the honor of 
someone else rather than his own “is a man of truth; there is nothing false about him” (v. 
18). Here truth takes the meaning of integrity or faithfulness, not factuality. Similarly, the 
person who claims to have fellowship with God yet walks in darkness is one who lacks 
truth, just as the person who says she knows Jesus but does not do what He commands 
(1:6, 2:4). Both these examples are a clear case of a person’s words not matching her 
actions, thus what she lacks is faithfulness. 
So we see that John, like Paul, uses the noun aletheia in both senses of faithfulness 
and factuality, and that he uses the adjective, in this case alethes, to denote genuineness. 
Moreover, just like Paul, he uses truth to indicate the gospel, God’s word or revelation. 
This is clear when he contrasts Jesus with Moses: “The law was given through Moses; 
grace and truth came through Jesus Christ” (John 1:17), and in John 17:17 where he simply 
states, “your word is truth.”  
Where John’s use of truth starts to break free from our diagram is when he describes 
truth, in the sense of God’s word or teaching, as having power. For instance, this truth can 
sanctify a person (John 17:17), or set him free (John 8:32-36), achievements that seem 
utterly beyond simple faithfulness or factuality. This liberating power of God’s truth comes 
as a result of much more than a mere intellectual grasping of true knowledge (Aalen 
1964:9). It involves the whole person, and is the opposite of sin, which is stated by contrast 
to enslave mankind (John 8:34). Furthermore it should be noted that once that strong 
connection between the God’s word and truth is in place, we can see the fact that this truth 
has power confirmed throughout the entire scriptures, and not just in the writings of John. 
For instance, reality is created by the speaking of the word, the word accomplishes God’s 
will and achieves his purpose, God sustains all things by his “powerful word,” the word is 
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living and active, and it is the judge of those who reject Christ (Gen 1, Isa 55:11, John 
12:48, Heb 1:3, 4:12). All these verses about God’s word speak of a powerful entity 
indeed.  
That truth has power is also confirmed when we look at how John attributes truth to 
God, specifically when he uses the adjective alethinos. John 17:3 speaks of the “only true 
God” and 1 John 20 of “the true God,” and Aalen suggests that such uses of true should be 
understood specifically as “life-giving” (1964:20). In John 6, for instance, the difference 
between the true bread (Christ) and what it is contrasted with, the bread given by Moses, is 
that those who ate manna still died in the end (6:49). Moreover, this life-giving power of 
truth is confirmed by looking at its antonyms, and John 8:44 is quite illuminating here. He 
who has no truth in him, Satan, is called a liar and even the father of lies, but he is also 
called a murderer, one who produces death as opposed to life.  
Finally, we have to look at John’s understanding of the noun aletheia, as a direct 
attribute of God. John makes it clearer than any other scripture writer: God is truth. John 
equates the Word with God (1:1), and Christ both with the Word (1:14) and with truth 
(14:6). Taken together, these statements yield the conclusion that God is truth. The same 
can be inferred from 1 John 3:19, where “the truth” is personal and where the context 
indicates that this person is God. Of course, Christ is explicitly identified with the truth in 
the assertion “I am the way, the truth and the life” (John 14:6), and so is the Spirit (1Jo 
5:6), so that truth as a property of all the persons of God is firmly established.  
In sum, in the New Testament we again find all three popular uses of truth 
represented, but the clear preference for faithfulness that we saw in the Old Testament now 
becomes less pronounced. While the root meaning of ’emeth could be captured in the word 
firmness, which then developed into all three of our senses of truth, the most basic sense of 
aletheia was uncovering, a word that actually seemed to point most strongly to 
genuineness. Further comparisons to both the popular and the philosophical senses of truth 
started to become increasingly difficult when we looked at the notion of truth in John. Here 
we encountered a truth that is not only strongly linked to the word of God, as it is in the 
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Old Testament, but also one that is life-giving and incredibly powerful, and that is finally 
identified with the person of God himself.  
 
2.4  Implications of the scriptural view of truth  
In our first chapter we noted significant variations in philosophical views of truth. In 
terms of our diagram we saw first a movement downward from truth as genuineness to 
factuality, and then a shift to the left from truth based in reality, be it changing or 
unchanging, to truth as somehow based in the human mind. Comparing these philosophical 
ideas of truth with the biblical notion, several facts about scriptural truth stand out, all of 
which can still be related to the diagram. First, the view of early philosophy that truth, and 
especially divine truth, must be unchanging and permanent is also strongly represented in 
the Bible, not only in the root meaning of ’emeth as firmness but also in the connection of 
aletheia with a sense of genuineness. This means that both in early philosophy and in 
scripture we see a stronger accent on the top right-hand corner of the diagram then we see 
in later philosophy and in our daily view. 
A second feature of biblical truth that our diagram can still accommodate without 
any problem was the strong accent on the personal and moral side of truth, namely 
faithfulness. We saw a similar move to the person-side of the diagram in later philosophy, 
but on closer inspection these two foci on the personal proved very different. Not only did 
philosophy’s adoption of the personal lack any moral connotation, it also meant a new 
accent on the human person as the actual ground of truth, a stance that seems contrary to 
the biblical view that truth needs an eternal and unchanging foundation. Again, the 
personal dimension of truth in the Bible represents the moral quality of faithfulness, and 
this sense of truth was actually seen to play a much more important role than it was given 
in either our daily view or in philosophy.  
Moreover, the two truth senses of faithfulness and factuality were also seen to 
converge in scripture, specifically where God’s word was identified with truth (Nicole 
1983:289). Some would even say that the factuality of God’s words is actually grounded in 
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his faithfulness, especially when in the New Testament we see the further identification of 
God with his word (Holmes 1977). The reasoning is that if God is perfectly faithful then—
given his perfect knowledge and power—his word will necessarily be perfectly factual. It 
is interesting to note that this connection resembles the one made by Descartes when he 
reasoned that our clear and distinct ideas must be true since God is the source of the human 
faculty of judgment and since a good God will not deceive (1996:37-8). 
So, comparing the biblical view of truth with our daily and philosophical views two 
things could be learned. First, truth in scripture has a strong connotation of permanence, of 
something that is reliable because it does not change. Secondly, faithfulness is the 
preferred sense in scripture, and it is sometimes linked with factuality, while genuineness 
also plays a bigger role than in our daily understanding. However, next to these 
recognizable points, we found in the scriptural view also traits that completely transcended 
the diagram in ways that neither the daily nor any of the philosophical views had done. 
What are these completely new facets of truth that emerge in scripture? 
One unusual trait of the scriptural view is that truth can have great power. When in 
our own time we say “knowledge is power” we mean that true knowledge can be used as a 
tool to understand and thus manipulate certain patterns and regularities. This type of power 
is indirect and impersonal, and can be compared with the power of money. The power of 
biblical truth, however, seems much more direct and personal in nature. We saw that, 
especially when truth is equated with God’s word, we are dealing with a specific content 
that apparently has power to create, sustain, give life, sanctify, convict and judge.  
A second rather unique facet of truth in scripture is that while truth in everyday use 
and philosophy is primarily seen as a relationship of agreement between entities, truth in 
scripture often denotes the entities themselves. This becomes evident when we see the 
frequent use of the noun ‘truth’ for God’s word—a very concrete set of instructions, 
explanations, prophecies and principles that are claimed to reflect reality. In terms of our 
diagram this means that next to labeling the correspondence between person and word 
(faithfulness), and between word and reality (factuality) as truth, we can also label the 
word itself as truth.  
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That truth is primarily seen as a moral concept or as an entity that has power seems 
strange enough to us, but even more foreign is the idea that truth is somehow imbued with 
agency and personhood. More than that, truth is directly equated with a personal being. It 
is here that the biblical understanding truly stretches our contemporary way of thinking. 
Even if we don’t take this statement as one of complete identification, it certainly implies 
that there can be no inconsistencies between God and truth. We can clarify the implications 
of the idea that God is truth by trying to fit such divine truth in our diagram and inserting 
the name of God where this seems warranted by the biblical teaching. Accordingly, we 
label two of the three entities as God, namely the person of God and his word.  
                                                                        Ideal reality      
          I 
          I       Genuineness 
                 I   
 GOD                    GOD                   I 
Person    (thought)/Word/(action)    Reality 
   [__________________]   [___________________] 
  
Faithfulness   Factuality            
 
Diagram 2 - The biblical view of truth, as applied to God 
 
 
Doing this, we immediately note a revolutionary difference between the diagram as 
we have been applying it to human persons and as it applies to the divine Person. When 
applied to humans, the diagram’s three elements of person, word and reality are naturally 
distinct. The middle section does not necessarily mirror who the person really is on the one 
hand, and what reality is like on the other. This means that disagreement can occur on 
either side, resulting in duplicity where there was faithfulness, and falsehood where there 
was factuality. But when this diagram is applied to a divine personal being, specifically the 
God of the Bible, suddenly there can be no such discrepancies. 
Let us explore what happens on each side, starting with faithfulness. When God is 
directly identified with Christ, his word, and Christ with truth, this implies there can be no 
discrepancy ever between God’s revelation and his person. Whatever God reveals of 
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himself will always match his character and intentions, and thus also his earlier words and 
deeds. His revelation, both in Christ and in his words, is therefore completely and fully 
reliable.  
A somewhat similar change takes place on the factuality side, with the connection 
between God’s word and reality. Because God’s word is truth, his statements must always 
match the actual state of affairs and thus present true knowledge. The Bible confirms of 
course that God is “perfect in knowledge” (Job 37:16, cf. Ps 147:5, Heb 4:13), and we can 
also infer this strong link between word and reality from the creation account. God spoke 
and it was so, or as John says “through him [the Word] all things were made” (Jo 1:3). 
However, the link between the person of God and his word is stronger than that between 
his word and reality, since the Word is identified with God, but created reality itself is 
never so identified, and the Bible even explicitly warns against doing so. P3 
So, when applied to truth as a divine attribute, the diagram shows us that in God’s 
interaction with the world, He always necessarily portrays himself as He is in word and 
deed, and He portrays the real state of affairs with complete accuracy. In fact, to do 
differently would be to contradict his very nature and being. Paul writes that God cannot 
lie and the letter to the Hebrews states that God’s words, in this case his oath and his 
promise, are “two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible that God should prove 
false” (Tit 1:2, Heb 6:18). Similarly, for God to be unfaithful would be to deny or “disown 
himself” (2Ti 2:13). 
Finally, the fact that God is truth suggests that all truth is somehow directly related to 
God, and that truth as faithfulness, genuineness and factuality as we encounter these in our 
human interaction with reality find their ultimate source in God. Given our contemporary 
tendency to focus on truth as factuality, the most significant implication here would be that 
God is the source of all true statements. We saw that scripture states that God is perfect in 
knowledge (Job 37:16) and if perfection in any area can be said to entail completeness, 
even apparently insignificant truths (e.g., “I am sitting at my desk”) would need to be 
related to God. Similarly, all faithfulness and genuineness we encounter around us would 
find its ultimate source in God. In other words, any truth we encounter might in some sense 
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be divine truth, no matter if it is of a trivial nature or highly significant (see Holmes 1977). 
Another implication of this connection between divine truth and all truth would be that our 
findings regarding divine truth would also affect the meaning of truth in general—an 
implication that we will have to return to at a later stage.  
We see, then, that truth in scripture diverges in several important ways from both our 
daily view and the truth views that emerged through philosophical reflection. In summary, 
truth as it is found in scripture has the following characteristics:  
(1) it has a strong connotation of reliability and permanence, especially when 
attributed to God or his word; 
(2) it is primarily used in the sense of faithfulness rather than factuality, and 
genuineness also plays a more important role than in our daily use; 
(3) when applied to God in its noun form, it carries a strong sense of personhood, of 
personal agency and power; 
(4) it is not just a relationship of agreement but also an entity in itself. When used in 
noun form of God or his word, it defies the ‘daily view’ diagram in that the distance 
between person and word practically collapses, while the link between word and 
reality becomes markedly stronger.  
(5) when applied to God in noun form, it strongly suggests that God is the source of  
all faithfulness, genuineness and factuality wherever it is found and no matter how 
variable or mundane.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigated the way the term ‘truth’ is used in biblical revelation. 
Comparing this notion with our daily use and with philosophical views on the issue, we 
found that scripture not only tends to put the accent differently when it comes to truth 
notions, but also that it significantly transcends these other views of truth.   
With our exploration of both the biblical and philosophical truth views, we now have 
a large part of our conceptual framework in place. There is one more knowledge base we 
can explore, however, and this is an area where philosophy and scripture both have their 
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say, namely the divine attributes as formulated by classical theism. This means our focus 
will become more narrow in that we will now zero in on truth as an attribute of God 
specifically, and thus no longer on truth as a general concept. At the same time, our 
approach will also broaden in that we will include all the various divine attributes that have 
been generally agreed upon by theism, and then analyze each attribute’s logical 
connections with the notion of divine truth. In this way, we hope to unearth additional data 
that can clarify the meaning and implications of truth as an attribute of the God of the 
Bible. 
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NOTES 
 
P
1
P The biblical evidence presented in this study is not exhaustive. Wherever possible and fitting, verses from both 
the Old and the New Testament are included. 
P
2
P The Bible translation used here is the New American Standard Version. P P  
P
3
P Romans 1:18-25. In fact, such identification would imply pantheism or panentheism  rather than theism. 
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3 - THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND THE NATURE OF TRUTH 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In the last two chapters, we explored the meaning of the word ‘truth’, and more 
specifically divine truth, in our daily understanding, in the thought of some of the most 
significant thinkers in the history of philosophy, and in the Christian scriptures. We were 
able to conclude that while the various philosophical views could still be fruitfully 
compared and contrasted with the daily view, the scriptural view seemed to transcend 
human ideas of truth to a significant extent.  
In this chapter we will approach divine truth from a different angle, to see if we can 
further clarify its meaning. We will explore what are known as the divine attributes, a set 
of biblically based properties of God. Since every true attribute of God needs to be 
logically consistent with all the others, exploring each of these characteristics in more 
detail should give us additional information about the attribute of divine truth itself. As 
Peterson puts it rather directly, “a ‘God’ whose nature can be stated only in contradictions 
cannot possibly exist, and to suppose that there is such a God as that is nonsense” 
(Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach & Basinger 1998:64). For each attribute, therefore, we 
will first look at scriptural basis, philosophical support and major debates, and then 
analyze it for any conceptual connections with the notions of truth and divine truth. In this 
manner, it is hoped that further clarification of the concept of divine truth can eventually 
be attained.  
 
3.2  The divine attributes: historical background  
One of the earliest occurrences of some of the divine attributes is found in 
Athenagoras’ Plea (Richardson 1953:307). In 176 AD, Athenagoras of Athens made a plea 
to the two emperors of the time on behalf of the Christians in the empire. He argued for the 
uniqueness of the Christian God, and thus for the legitimacy of the Christian refusal to 
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worship the civic deities in addition to their own God. Reading this plea, we get an idea 
about the divine attributes that were at that early stage of Christianity generally accepted 
among believers. Athenagoras described the Christian God as the “creator… [who] retains 
the world in his providence,” “who is above [the world],” and is “uncreated, impassible 
and indivisible” (ibid.). Somewhat later in the same document he sums up the 
characteristics Christians believe their God to possess as: “eternal, invisible, impassible, 
incomprehensible, illimitable” (op.cit.:308).  
Around the same time, Theophilus of Antioch expounded God’s nature thus:  
“In glory he is incomprehensible, in greatness unfathomable, in height 
inconceivable, in power incomparable, in wisdom unrivalled, in goodness  
inimitable, in kindness unutterable. … he is unchangeable, because he is 
immortal” (1975:89-90). 
 
Finally, two centuries later, in his On the Trinity, Hilary of Poitiers hailed God as 
eternal, all-powerful and most beautiful, and as “passionless and bodiless. … 
Incomprehensibly, ineffably, before time or worlds” (1977-79:41, 62).  
From such early beginnings, the Christian philosophers sat down to the task of 
formulating a systematic and comprehensive set of divine attributes. A particularly fruitful 
basis for such thought were the arguments developed in defense of God’s existence, the 
most famous being Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological argument and Thomas Aquinas’ 
five arguments for the existence of God, known as the ‘Five Ways’.  
Anselm’s argument starts with the definition of God as a being “than which nothing 
greater can be thought” (1962:7). He then reasons that it is greater to exist than not to exist. 
Therefore, God necessarily exists. What interests us here is not so much the argument 
itself, but Anselm’s description of God. If God is indeed a being than which nothing 
greater can be conceived, then there are certain other things that can be said about him, for 
instance that He must be omnipotent and omniscient. Similarly, in his famous Five Ways, 
Aquinas—inspired by Aristotle—reasons that God has to be an ‘Uncaused Cause’ and an 
‘Unmoved Mover’ (1952:12-13; Aristotle 1984:1694). He then deduces the various divine 
attributes from these foundational descriptions. 
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Traditional Christian philosophy, or classical theism, eventually produced a 
generally agreed upon cluster of divine attributes or properties of God. Among the many 
characteristics of God that can be gleaned from scripture, the specific term ‘attribute’ was 
usually reserved for a property of God without which God would not be God (Nash 
1983:16). The property of being the creator, for instance, was not labeled an attribute, 
since it could be argued that God would still be God even if He had not created the 
universe. Variations in the final set generated by different thinkers were mainly due to a 
high degree of conceptual overlap between certain of the attributes, so that they could 
either be described as separate entities or be combined together. The following list of 
attributes is representative of most major thinkers in classical theism: perfection, infinity, 
aseity, necessity, incorporeality, immutability, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect 
goodness and eternity.  
With the arrival of modern thought and its renewed accent on human reason as a 
powerful tool in the quest for true knowledge, the role of biblical revelation gradually 
waned. However, philosophizing about the nature of God did not thereby come to an end. 
The notion of a divine being, whether seen as an actually existing entity or as a mere 
mental concept, continued to intrigue philosophers. It was recognized that further analysis 
of the God-concept itself, an approach which had originated with Anselm, could provide 
knowledge about the nature of God without necessarily referring to scripture. Since the 
divine being must be, above all, worthy of worship and total devotion, other attributes 
could now be deduced that are necessarily implied by this description. Thus, ‘Perfect 
Being Theology’ aims to deduce by sound reasoning which characteristics God must have 
in order to be God, characteristics that—as we saw—must also be consistent with each 
other and thus form a systematic whole (Peterson 1998:64-65).  
It would fall beyond the limits of this study to give a detailed rationale for omitting 
the more debated attributes from the list given above; as stated, the listed attributes broadly 
represent classical theism. However, I would like to make one exception, and give reasons 
here for the omission of probably the most debated among the attributes, namely divine 
simplicity. Understanding why this attribute is generally not included will help clarify 
certain issues that emerge later on in this study. 
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As we saw, the divine attributes are commonly defined as those properties of God 
that are essential to his nature and without which He would not be God. But this raises a 
question: what exactly is the ontological status of such attributes? If some attributes 
depend on God, He is logically prior to their existence, and this suggests they are not 
essential to his nature—for God can still be God without these properties. But the view 
that the attributes are logically prior to God is even less acceptable (Nash 1983:91). Some 
within classical theism, notably Thomas Aquinas, felt that the relationship of God to his 
own properties needed to be clarified and the attribute of simplicity seemed to fill this need 
(1952:14-20). This attribute stated that God is absolutely indivisible and one with his 
attributes. It is only because our limited human minds cannot fathom such an indivisible 
being that we have to use the language of separate attributes. In fact, we cannot know 
anything about God’s nature. We can only describe God in terms of what He is not 
(op.cit.:14). Though this solution seemed to provide an acceptable way of going between 
the horns of the dilemma, it soon became clear that simplicity itself was a problematic 
notion. 
Why is the attribute of simplicity so questionable? First, in this thinking God is one 
with his attributes, and thus each of the attributes also becomes identical with the others. 
But to say that perfect goodness, omnipotence and eternity are essentially the same 
property makes no sense, for a being can have one of these properties without having the 
other (Moreland & Craig 2003:524). Furthermore, if God’s essence (the attributes) is 
identical to his existence, then everything about him is essential to him and thus necessary, 
and this includes his knowledge, power and will. This entails that God can only will the 
necessary, and thus that He does not have free will—an implication which is clearly 
unbiblical.  
Not only that, simplicity entails that God is his knowledge, and it therefore makes his 
knowledge absolutely necessary. But then all that exists becomes necessary, and that 
includes creation and every event in created reality, leading to absolute determinism and a 
denial of human free will (op.cit.:525). Finally, as contemporary philosopher Alvin 
Plantinga has pointed out, Aquinas’ view actually reduces God himself to a property and 
thus an abstract object, rather than the personal God of the Bible. Plantinga concludes that 
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“the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake” (1980:47). In fact, simplicity replaces the 
personal knowable God of the Bible with a being that more closely resembles the 
impersonal unknowable ‘One’ of Neo-Platonism (Moreland 2003:524). 
In the following section we will look at each of the generally accepted attributes in 
turn. We will first note their occurrence in scripture, and then see how they have been 
understood by classical theism and which debates these views have triggered in 
contemporary philosophy. Lastly we will explore if and how each attribute can possibly 
shed light on the question of the nature of divine truth. 
 
3.3  The divine attributes and their relation to the concept of truth  
As we have seen, a divine attribute in the narrow sense typically has to denote a 
quality that God cannot lack and still be God, but opinions may vary on where exactly to 
draw the line. Accordingly, theologians and philosophers have not always agreed on 
whether truth qualifies as a divine attribute in this narrow sense, though both Augustine 
and Aquinas affirmed it as such (Augustine 1948:33, Aquinas 1952:98). P1 
Even though truth is not universally seen as a divine attribute, scripture strongly 
confirms God’s truth, to the extent even of attributing this notion to him in noun form 
(locus 2.3)—something that is restricted to only a handful of other predicates, namely 
‘spirit’, ‘light’, ‘love’, ‘way’ and ‘life’ (Jo 4:24, 1:5, 1 Jo 4:8, Jo 14:6). Another reason to 
consider truth as one of the divine attributes is that the scriptural view of truth puts so 
much stress on moral truth or faithfulness. Being faithful would of course be one of the 
expressions of perfect goodness, and since the latter is not debated as an essential property 
of God, it seems plausible to assign truth the same status. But leaving the question of 
truth’s attribute status aside, our actual goal in this study is to find out as much as we can 
about divine truth itself. So, let us now turn to each of the divine attributes listed above and 
see what they can possibly teach us about the notion of truth.  
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3.3.1  Perfection and infinity 
The attribute of perfection declares, of course, that God is perfect in every way. 
Since a being that has a certain attribute to the measure of perfection, also has this attribute 
to an infinite extent, the terms perfection and infinity are often used interchangeably. We 
will follow this practice with just one side-note. Purely logically speaking infinity can also 
be applied to less praiseworthy characteristics, like weakness, ugliness or evil. However, 
such properties have traditionally been seen as privations, and thus as incapable of 
augmentation to infinity. More importantly, such characteristics would clearly contradict 
key doctrines of scripture, such as the perfect goodness of God, so that perfection and 
infinity as applied to God seem close enough in meaning to be treated together.  
The 17 PthP century theologian Francis Turretin affirms this close connection by 
deducing infinity from perfection. He writes, “For since he [God] has every perfection 
which can be possessed, it is evident that nothing can be conceived better and more 
perfect. Thus he must necessarily be infinite because an infinite good is better than a finite 
[one]” (1992:195). Interestingly, William Shedd, systematic theologian of the 19 PthP century, 
reasoned from infinity to perfection: “Since limitation implies imperfection, the infinity of 
God implies that he is perfect in every respect in which he is infinite” (1903:339). 
The term ‘infinite’ is seldom found in scripture, P2 Pbut we find the following verses 
that speak of God’s perfection: “His works are perfect, and all his ways are just,” “as for 
God, his way is perfect,” and “be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect” 
(Deut 32:4, 2 Sam 22:31, Mat 5:48). 
That divine perfection is an attribute of God has also been the outcome of rational 
thought. Anselm’s ontological argument makes this attribute the unquestionable 
assumption, and the very first assertion of Perfect Being Theology must of course be that 
God is perfect (Peterson 1998:64-65). Centuries later, we encounter a variation of 
Anselm’s ontological argument in Rene Descartes’ thought about God. Descartes reasoned 
that we all find in our mind the clear and distinct idea of a perfect being, or God. However, 
this idea of a perfect being cannot have been generated by our own mind, because the 
human mind is imperfect and finite. Reasoning further that “something cannot arise from 
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nothing, and also that what is more perfect … cannot arise from what is less perfect,” 
Descartes concludes that our idea of God can only come from God himself, and thus that 
“it must be concluded that God necessarily exists” (1996:28,31). What makes these 
arguments interesting for the present discussion is that they all confirm that this necessarily 
existing God must have the attribute of perfection, and even today this notion seems 
central to the idea of God as a being who above all is “worthy of worship” (Peterson 
1998:64). 
In general, then, philosophy seems to agree with scripture as far as divine perfection 
is concerned, and any debates concerning this attribute mostly center around the correct 
interpretation of perfection. Does his perfection entail, for instance, that God is immutable, 
absolutely unchangeable in his being? Most ancient and medieval thinkers would answer 
affirmatively, reasoning that any change in a perfect being would mean a loss of 
perfection,P3 P but in our time many scholars regard absolute immutability difficult to rhyme 
with his perfect knowledge of changing reality and his real relationship to changeable 
creatures (e.g. Nicholas Wolterstorff).P P That God is perfect, then, is not contested, but 
which other attributes are entailed by this perfection is indeed a matter of debate, and these 
issues are better discussed under the particular attributes involved. 
Before we go on to the next attribute, we need to determine if the attribute of 
perfection is in any way conceptually connected to that of truth. If God is perfect, He is so 
in every aspect of his being. This means that He possesses each of his properties perfectly 
and to an infinite extent. Consequently, if God possesses the property of truth, He does so 
to the extent of perfection. For our understanding of truth this means there can then be no 
shade of doubt about the faithfulness of God, the true factuality of his words and his 
genuine reality. If He is true in terms of his words matching his person on the one hand 
and reality on the other, He must be so perfectly. He cannot portray himself differently 
than He is or break his promises, a type of truth that seems closely connected to the 
attribute of God’s perfect goodness. He also cannot deceive or be mistaken about the real 
state of affairs, and here we see a connection with the attribute of omniscience. 
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3.3.2  Aseity and necessity  
Like perfection and infinity, the attributes of aseity and necessity are closely related, 
though maybe not fully interchangeable. The attribute of aseity claims that God exists 
completely self-sufficiently. We humans have existence, but only in a derived sense. We 
exist merely temporarily, are dependent on other people to begin our existence, and on 
food, water and protection from harmful influences in order to sustain it. Aseity implies 
that this state of affairs does not apply to God. God has existence in the fullest sense of the 
term, an existence that depends on nothing outside of him, but only on himself (a se). As 
such, God can exist with or without the universe and his creation of the world is simply a 
free choice. Clearly, divine aseity implies divine necessity, since that which exists fully 
self-sufficiently also exists necessarily.  
Scriptural support may be found in verses that confirm that God exists 
independently, and that He exists before and thus independent of anything else. The 
apostle Paul reflects this insight when he states, “he is not served by human hands as if he 
needed anything” (Acts 17:25). Moreover, Psalm 90:2 states that God was God “before … 
[He] brought forth the earth and the world,” and in John’s gospel Christ prays “glorify me 
… with the glory I had with you before the world began” (Jo 17:5, see also Jo 17:24, Eph 
1:4, 1Pe 1:20).  
The idea that God gives existence to all other beings is of course found in Genesis 
1:1, “God created the heavens and the earth,” in Romans 11:36, “God … from whom all 
things came,” and Hebrews 2:10, “God … through whom everything exists.” John 1:3 
makes this distinction between God and all other beings even more explicit: “All things 
came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come 
into being” (Bible NASB). Finally, the divine self-description in Exodus 3:14 “I AM 
WHO I AM”P P—confirmed by Christ in John 8:58—strongly suggests that God’s existence 
is essential to his nature, and thus necessary and a se. 
Aseity and necessity follow logically from perfection. It seems clear that God is 
more perfect if He depends on nothing outside himself rather than being so dependent. In 
Anselm’s famous argument, necessity is also directly derived from perfection. Anselm 
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reasons that once we really understand what is meant by the term God or “that-than-which-
a-greater-cannot-be-thought,” we know that He must necessarily exist, since necessary 
existence is greater than contingent existence (1962:8). Whether God’s actual existence 
can be validly deduced from this reasoning remains a question for debate, but most would 
agree at least that if God exists He does so in a necessary manner, meaning that it is 
impossible that He ever began or will cease to exist.  
Divine aseity and necessity also follow from other lines of argumentation for God’s 
existence. Aquinas’ conclusion that God is the Uncaused Cause of all that exists clearly 
implies, first, that God has no cause for his existence and thus exists independently, and 
secondly that He existed before, or at the very least causally prior to, all other existence 
(1952:13). In his third way, moreover, Aquinas reasoned from the apparent existence of 
contingent beings to the existence of a necessary being (ibid.). Anselm had used the same 
reasoning to assert the existence of one self-existent entity. As he put it, “since, then, all 
things that are exist through this one being, doubtless this one being exists through itself” 
(1962:42). Finally, in Turretin we find a similar argument from the contingency of creation 
to a necessary and self-existent God: 
 “Nature proves the being of God since she proclaims that she not only is, but is
 from another. For if it is certain and indubitable that out of nothing, nothing is 
 made and that nothing can be the cause of itself (for then it would be before and 
 after itself), it is also certain that we must grant some first and unproduced being
 from which all things are, but who is himself from no one” (1992:170). 
 Aseity has been challenged by two schools of thought, namely panentheism and 
various forms of Platonism. Panentheism sees creation as a part of God, and creatures as 
actually partially sharing in God’s ontology (Cooper 2006:330). However, as we saw, John 
1:3 clearly stresses the radical difference in existence between God and creation that forms 
the basis of Christian ontological dualism: “All things came into being through Him, and 
apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being.” God thus exists a se 
and all other things that exist do so only ab alio, or through another, namely Christ.  
Platonism of course believes in a plurality of things that exist a se, for instance 
abstract entities like numbers, properties, propositions, and the laws of logic and 
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mathematics. We saw above (locus 3.2) that a Platonic solution to the question of the 
ontological status of the attributes themselves had to be rejected as unbiblical. We can now 
see why. It is because divine aseity stipulates that only God exist a se.  Since a Platonic 
view of the status of abstract objects is clearly unacceptable, modified forms of Platonism 
have proposed that such objects are still created by God but in a timeless manner 
(Moreland 2003:504). However, since these created entities exist necessarily, this solution 
implies that God was not really free in creating them—a view that violates the 
fundamental doctrine that God is absolutely free to create or not create whatever He 
chooses. Classical theism has therefore mostly affirmed a conceptual view like that of 
Augustine who regarded such entities as Ideas in the mind of Christ (see locus 1.3.3).  
In current thought on divine necessity the debate centers on the issue if necessity 
should be understood as either a factual or a logical notion. The former can be said to 
claim that God exists necessarily, while the latter would argue that He necessarily exists 
and that it is a logical contradiction to state that He doesn’t exist. Anselm’s ontological 
argument had of course aimed to prove the latter and stronger claim, but with the thinking 
of Immanuel Kant many started to doubt Anselm’s conclusion. According to Kant, any 
proposition that merely states that something exists can be denied without contradiction, 
and such a proposition is therefore never logically necessary. Consequently, “God is” is 
not a necessarily true statement, and thus God does not necessarily exist (Kant 1934:349-
350). Thinkers who follow Kant’s reasoning, such as J.N. Findlay and Thomas Morris, 
therefore assert that if God exists, He exists necessarily, but the ‘if’ remains an ‘if’ 
(Findlay 1955; Morris 1991). 
Several contemporary thinkers, such as Alvin Plantinga and John Hick, have recently 
come to Anselm’s defense (Plantinga 1974; Hick & McGill 1967). The development of 
Possible World Semantics, or modal logic, has been especially fruitful in formulating a 
viable response to the Kantian critique (Moreland 2003:502). According to modal logic, to 
say that God is a logically necessary being is to say that God exists in every possible 
world. Of course, this also means that the existential proposition “God exists” is true in 
every possible world, including ours. Moreover, modal logic distinguishes between strict 
and broad logical necessity. Broad logical necessity asks the question if the proposition is 
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really actualizable. According to this modified view of necessity the fact that “God does 
not exist” is not logically contradictory, does not entail that “God exists” is not broadly 
necessary (op.cit.:503).  
There is another sense of necessity that has sometimes been attributed to God, which 
leads to a clearly unbiblical view, a sense that often goes hand-in-hand with the 
questionable attribute of divine simplicity we rejected earlier. In his argumentation against 
miracles, 17Pth P century Jewish philosopher Baruch de Spinoza asserted, for instance, that 
every aspect of God, including his will and knowledge, are absolutely necessary (1989). In 
other words, God could not know or will anything different than what He knows or wills. 
Of course this stance again denies that God has free will, and creates tension with the 
doctrine of the personhood of God. Spinoza’s view was firmly rejected by Christian theists 
and is generally seen as closer to pantheism than theism (Craig 2008:264).  
What can divine aseity and necessity teach us about divine truth? First of all, we saw 
that the divine attributes themselves must be grounded in God himself, and this means that 
any attributes that are strongly connected with divine truth may clarify how truth itself is 
grounded. Furthermore, aseity can give us more insight on truth as factuality. We saw that 
if God is uniquely self-existent, then any necessary entities or truths must be somehow 
grounded in God, otherwise we could end up affirming an unbiblical Platonic pluralism. 
But could aseity point to more than the grounding of necessary truths? If all created things 
only exist “through Christ” (Jo 1:3), would it not follow that truths about the created 
world, contingent truths, are also grounded in him? We will have to see if our further study 
of the attributes and their implications will help us answer such questions.  
Faithfulness in its turn would seem to find its ontological ground in God, since it 
constitutes a moral value and thus a moral truth. Finally, we can see a connection between 
aseity and genuineness. The genuineness sense of truth pointed to an ideal reality, a higher 
level of truth and being, and this clearly resonates with the idea of a God who alone exists 
a se and who himself discloses his name to be “I AM WHO I AM.” Again, we will have to 
see how what we learn about the other attributes may bring all these associations more 
clearly into focus. 
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3.3.3  Incorporeality and omnipresence  
According to this attribute, God is pure spirit, in no way corporeal or composed of 
matter, and therefore not extended in space. His omnipresence, sometimes taken as a 
separate attribute, follows directly from this incorporeality together with his infinity. 
Though God is aware of and causally active at every point in the universe, He is not so in a 
spatial sense because this would still be a limitation. Martin Luther warned against such a 
view of omnipresence as a kind of infinite extension:  
“We deny that God is such an extended, long, broad, thick, high, low Being. We 
rather contend that God is a supernatural, unfathomable Being, who at one and the  
same time is in every kernel of grain and also in and above and outside all 
creatures” (quoted in Geisler 2003:75). P4 
Scriptural evidence comes from verses that directly state God’s immateriality or 
spiritual nature, and from those that affirm God as creator and as existing beyond the 
universe, since a being that is beyond the spatial universe and actually created it cannot 
itself be spatial. That God is immaterial is simply stated by John, “God is spirit” (Jo 4:24). 
It is further confirmed in innumerable verses where God the Father, Christ and the Holy 
Spirit are designated as ‘Spirit’. God is also called “the Father of our spirits,” which 
indicates He must be an immaterial spiritual being himself (Heb 12:9).  
God as creator beyond creation appears in the following verses: “In the beginning 
God created the heavens and the earth,” “even the highest heaven cannot contain you,” and 
“can you probe the limits of the Almighty? They are higher than the heavens” (Gen 1:1, 
1Ki 8:27, Job 11:7-8). Finally, his omnipresence is asserted in Psalm 139, “Where can I 
flee from your presence? If I go up to the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the 
depths, you are there” (v. 7-8). 
An argument for immateriality from divine perfection comes from the 17 Pth P century 
Puritan theologian Stephen Charnock: “If we grant that God is, we must necessarily grant 
that he cannot be corporeal, because a body is of an imperfect nature” (1979:181). 
Incorporeality is also entailed by divine immutability. Any change in God would of course 
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deny his immutability, but a spatial being changes constantly, even if only in relation to 
other spatial and changeable beings. Therefore, if we accept immutability as an essential 
property of God, then so is incorporeality. 
That God is incorporeal and thus transcends space can also be argued without 
derivation from other attributes. There are two main views of the nature of space, the 
substantival and the relational view. The substantival view sees space as a thing or 
substance that exists apart from material reality. If this view is correct then space is an 
entity and therefore it has been created by God, even if this took place before the rest of 
creation (cf. Jo 1:3). On the other hand, if space is relational then it is dependent on the 
existence of certain other entities that are spatially related to each other. In other words, it 
only exists as a by-product of physical reality. In both cases, then, space is created by God 
and without creation God exists spacelessly (Moreland 2003:510). 
Does the fact that God is incorporeal and omnipresent shed further light on our 
understanding of truth? It seems that omnipresence might facilitate divine truth in the 
sense of his perfect knowledge. If knowledge of an event is gained by perception of that 
event, then omniscience would require some type of omnipresence. However, even if we 
would grant the debatable assumption that human knowledge can only be acquired by 
perception, such a view of divine cognition would seem very limited and not easily 
compatible with divine perfection.  
 
3.3.4  Immutability  
Classical theism’s attribute of immutability asserts that God is both changeless and 
unchangeable, He does not and cannot change. Attributes like perfection, aseity and 
eternity seem to confirm the need for God to be immutable. But this attribute raises some 
issues when combined with other scriptural information about God, namely creation and 
sustaining the created order, incarnation, his responsive relationship with temporal human 
beings, and his perfect knowledge or omniscience. Let us first look at scriptural support for 
immutability and then address these issues in turn. 
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Some Old Testament verses that confirm divine immutability or changelessness are, 
“He…does not lie or change his mind,” “You remain the same,” and “I the Lord do not 
change” (1Sa 15:29, Ps 102:27, Mal 3:6). In the New Testament we find, “Jesus Christ is 
the same yesterday, today and forever” and “the Father … who does not change like 
shifting shadows” (Heb 13:8, Jas 1:17). These verses clearly testify of God’s reliability and 
his unchanging character, but they do not necessarily imply a level of immutability that 
views God as a completely static and isolated being. 
The attribute of perfection, however, may necessitate interpreting such verses as 
indeed pointing to a radical or ‘strong’ immutability. We saw that both scripture and 
philosophy agree that God must above all be a perfect being, a being worthy of worship. 
Turretin reasoned, for example, that God “can neither be changed for the better (for he is 
the best) nor for the worse (because he would cease to be the most perfect)” (1992:205). 
The reasoning is that any change would imply imperfection either before or after the 
change. But is this necessarily so? It has been argued that a change in God’s knowledge in 
accordance with changing reality would be one example of a “horizontal” change, one that 
is neither a change for the better nor for the worse. Rather, it maintains God’s perfection 
with regards to his knowledge of changeable facts (Moreland 2003:527). So, divine 
perfection alone does not necessarily imply radical immutability. 
Aseity also does not seem to necessitate radical immutability. Aseity defines the 
ontological status of God as independent of any other being, but it does not preclude him 
from creating and being related to creation in a manner that might involve change. As long 
as it is clear that such an event would be the result of a divine free will decision, it need not 
compromise the divine existence itself as a se. 
Does divine eternity then imply strong immutability? Augustine asserted that divine 
eternity implies the impossibility of changes in God, for “no mutable thing is eternal; but 
our God is eternal” (1948b:212). Anselm also argued for a strong connection between 
divine immutability and eternity: “It is evident that this supreme Substance is without 
beginning and without end; that it has neither past, nor future, nor the temporal, that is, 
transient present in which we live; since its age, or eternity, which is nothing else than 
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itself, is immutable and without parts” (1962:83, italics mine). Anselm seems to attribute 
immutability to God here, based on his immutable and indivisible eternity. Apart from the 
question if there is any circularity involved here, the italicized words in Anselm’s 
argument suggest that his reasoning rests heavily on simplicity, the attribute we rejected 
earlier. In fact, this tends to happen in some of the argumentation of classical theism and it 
is something we must watch out for. So, the question remains: Does eternity all by itself 
really imply radical immutability? 
Moreover, if it does, how can God be said to remain immutable while orchestrating 
such events in time as the creation and incarnation? Turretin proposes a solution to this 
problem: 
“When God became the Creator, he was not changed Himself (for nothing new  
happened to Him, for from eternity he had the efficacious will of creating the world    
in time), but only in order to the creature (because a new relation took place with it)” 
(1992:205).  
Turretin further adds, “The Word (logos) was made flesh, not by a conversion of the 
Word (tou logou) into flesh, but by an assumption of the flesh to the hypostasis of the 
Word” (ibid.). His reasoning here is that creation did not change God intrinsically but only 
extrinsically, or as he says “in order to the creature.” In a similar vein, in the incarnation 
Christ was not intrinsically changed but the flesh was added to the “hypostasis of the 
Word.” Intrinsic change alters the being itself, while an extrinsic one merely changes an 
entity to whom the being is related, thereby changing the relationship. If my son is now 
taller than I am, this is not due to an intrinsic change in me, but rather to an extrinsic one. 
Strong immutability would entail the impossibility of both types of change, but if we 
interpret immutability as only referring to intrinsic change, it may not preclude God having 
a relationship with mutable entities like us humans, in terms of creation, incarnation or 
even responsiveness. Such immutability is often called weak immutability.  
However, even if God is only weakly immutable, and thus extrinsically mutable, can 
He then still be deemed eternal in the classical sense? Moreover, the option of weak 
immutability may possibly solve the problem of God’s relationship with his creatures, but 
it may not go far enough with regards to divine omniscience. As we already saw when we 
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looked at perfection, having true knowledge of every event arguably includes knowledge 
of time-related facts, such as “today is the first day of spring.” But tomorrow this bit of 
knowledge is no longer true, and thus God’s knowledge will have changed—a change that 
seems more radical than just an extrinsic one. What is intriguing here is that it is again 
God’s relationship to time that seems to play a key role in clarifying the correct view 
regarding divine immutability. 
So, a sound understanding of divine immutability is somehow tied up with the right 
interpretation of God’s eternity. In other words, only a further exploration of God’s 
relationship to time would seem able to clear up these issues, and this topic will be 
addressed in the coming chapters. In the meantime, we need to determine if 
immutability—be it strong or weak or mere constancy of character—has potential to help 
us clarify the notion of divine truth.  
As we have seen, truth in a biblical sense is rooted in words like firmness and 
reliability, terms that suggest strength in a physical sense but also the ability to remain the 
same through time. We even saw this notion that truth must necessarily be unchanging in 
much of the history of philosophy where it was connected with the genuineness sense of 
truth. Immutability and truth, then, would seem at face value to fit perfectly together.  
However, a closer look yields possible inconsistencies. If we look at truth as 
factuality, that God’s thoughts or words correspond with what happens in changeable 
reality, and we combine it with divine immutability, we soon run into the above mentioned 
issues with divine omniscience. How can God have perfect knowledge, including 
knowledge of a reality that changes through time, if his knowledge cannot change? It looks 
like divine immutability has definite potential to enlighten us regarding divine truth, but 
again it seems that it cannot do so adequately without further exploration of the issue of 
God’s relationship to time.  
Combining immutability with truth in the sense of faithfulness leads to similar 
tensions. Being faithful involves keeping one’s promises, and since many of God’s 
promises are contingent upon man’s attitude, God must be able to respond to man. And the 
Bible clearly teaches that He does. But this seems to imply that God can change. More 
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than that, such an interaction with a temporal world suggests that the responder may 
somehow be temporally located and not eternal. So again we seem to end up with the 
question how exactly God is related to time. 
We conclude, then, that divine immutability has great potential for clarifying the 
notion of divine truth, but it can only do so after further study of the question of God and 
time will have clarified how immutability should exactly be understood.  
 
3.3.5  Omnipotence  
God is omnipotent, all-powerful or almighty, and scripture amply confirms this, both 
in direct statements about his great power as well as in numerous descriptions of divine 
acts that imply such power.  First, one of the biblical names of God is El-Shaddai, God 
Almighty, and the term ‘almighty’ is used 345 times of God throughout scripture 
(Goodrick 1999). Secondly, the statements “nothing is too hard for you,” “he does 
whatever pleases him,” and “with God all things are possible” certainly describe seemingly 
unlimited power (Jer 32:17, Ps 115:3, Mt 19:26). Thirdly, Jesus’ incarnation, his 
miracles—specifically his raising Lazarus from the dead—and his resurrection, imply a 
level of power that is already staggering to our finite mind, but creation of the universe out 
of nothing seems to go far beyond all these. As 19 PthP century American theologian John 
Miley explains: “The concentration of all finite forces into a single point of energy would 
be infinitely insufficient for the creation of a single atom” (1989:213). 
Again, perfection and infinity seem to entails omnipotence. If we could even 
conceive of a more powerful being than God, that more powerful being would be more 
perfect in our estimation and thus become God. In terms of infinity: if God is infinite, He 
is infinite in his power and thus omnipotent. Aquinas reasons very simply from infinity, 
“the divine Being is infinite: and hence it is clear that his might or active power is infinite” 
(1932:11-12).  
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Finally, the attribute of aseity points to God’s great power, simply because all other 
beings are dependent upon and thus less powerful than God. As 17 PthP century theologian 
Jacobus Arminius wrote: 
“The Power or Capability of God is infinite because it can do not only all things 
possible … but likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created things depend 
upon the Divine Power, as upon their efficient Principle … both in their being and in 
their preservation; whence OMNIPOTENCE is deservedly attributed to him” 
(1956:353).  
Even so, the great majority of thinkers have also acknowledged that God’s power 
cannot be simply limitless without any qualification. Two types of limitation to divine 
omnipotence have been commonly accepted. First, God cannot do the logically impossible 
or violate the law of non-contradiction. As Aquinas’ explained, “What implies 
contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence… It is more 
appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them” 
(1952:137). The reasoning here is that if God could bring about two states of affairs that 
are contradictory then the logically impossible would become reality, resulting in 
something that cannot possibly exist. So, the fact that God cannot cause such a ‘thing’ 
implies in no way a defect in his power.  
One thinker who famously disagreed with this first limitation was Rene Descartes. 
We saw earlier that Platonic views tend to threaten God’s unique aseity, and maybe it was 
with this in mind that Descartes asserted that God freely decreed the logical and 
mathematical truths that apply in this world, but that He could just as well have created a 
world in which these laws were false. But such an unconventional view of omnipotence 
has vast implications, not the least of which is that it makes God completely unknowable 
and unintelligible. Can such a divine being still be the God of the Bible? 
The second generally agreed-upon limitation is of a moral nature. If God’s power is 
only limited by logic, He can logically still do things that would be morally reprehensible, 
but at the same time this would be utterly unthinkable. Anselm struggled with this question 
and asked, “if Thou canst not be corrupted, and canst not lie … how art Thou capable of 
all things?” (1962:12). But can God still be God if his character is not defined by perfect 
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goodness? Again, most scholars would agree that God’s omnipotence is not only restricted 
by logic but also by his own moral nature.  
From the above it appears that omnipotence does have certain conceptual 
connections with the notion of truth. For both limitations to omnipotence here discussed 
are really ways to preserve divine truth. If we believe, with Descartes, that God can cause 
that which is contradictory, then divine truth may well become an empty concept. As 
Ronald Nash graphically describes it, 
“If God can do self-contradictory acts, then there is no inconsistency in His 
promising eternal life to all who trust in Christ but actually condemning to  
everlasting damnation all who trust in Christ. Such duplicity (inconsistency) would  
be entirely in character for a God not bound by the law of noncontradiction since,  
in a world where the law does not apply, there is no difference between eternal life  
and eternal damnation” (1983:40-41).  
We see here that both truth as factuality and as faithfulness become meaningless concepts. 
Factuality no longer means anything since the distinction between two contradictory states 
of affairs is no longer applicable, and the same happens to faithfulness since the same 
word (or promise) can lead to both states of affairs equally.  
On the other hand, a correct view of omnipotence may also bolster truth. We saw 
that divine truth in the Bible is often seen as having power, and the attribute of 
omnipotence clearly confirms this notion. A similar confirmation results for truth as 
factuality, faithfulness and genuineness. Omnipotence confirms that God is fully able to 
speak and know all truths, be absolutely faithful in every aspect of his being and sustain 
himself in existence as He is.  
 
3.3.6  Omniscience  
The divine attribute of omniscience claims that God knows every true proposition 
(Audi 1995:240). Such knowledge includes true beliefs about past and present events but 
also of the future. Not only that, scripture teaches that God also foreknows those future 
events that involve free will decisions of man and that are therefore contingent and 
humanly speaking unpredictable, events that are known as future contingents. Let us look 
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at scripture again for evidence of both unlimited knowledge and knowledge of future 
events. 
First, that God does not only possess great knowledge, but that his knowledge is 
unlimited can be seen from the following verses, “him who is perfect in knowledge”, “his 
understanding has no limit”, “everything is uncovered and laid bare before the eyes of him 
to whom we must give account”, and “nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight” 
(Job 37: 16, Ps 147:5, Heb 4:13).  
Secondly, God’s perfect knowledge of the future is affirmed by, “new things I 
declare; before they spring into being I announce them to you” (Is 42:9). Similarly, when 
Peter preaches on Pentecost he asserts that Jesus was “handed over to you by God’s set 
purpose and foreknowledge” (Acts 2:23). Foreknowledge of specifically future contingents 
is found again in Psalm 139, “Before a word is on my tongue you know it completely” (v. 
4), while actual instances of such foreknowledge are “these people will soon prostitute 
themselves to the foreign gods,” “one of you will betray me--one who is eating with me," 
and  “8Tthis very night, before the rooster crows, you will disown me three times”8T (Deut 
31:16, Mark 14:18, Mat 26:34).  
In addition to these examples, the fact of divine foreknowledge is seen to be an 
essential part of biblical doctrine. World history is described as directed by God, both in 
the past and in the future, in accordance with his plan and purpose (Isa 46:9-10, Eph 3:9-
11). Moreover, prophecy, or divine foreknowledge revealed through man (2Pe 1:21), plays 
a central role in scripture, not only in the Old Testament but also in the New (Deut 18:22, 
Mat 24). In fact, the sayings of the prophets, based in divine foreknowledge, reveal an 
underlying pattern and unity between the books of the Bible as well as in human  history. 
Finally, the Bible presents true knowledge of the future as the distinguishing mark of real 
divinity, as opposed to the defective knowledge that false gods produce (Is 41:21-24). 
Divine omniscience follows of course from the attribute of perfection or infinity, 
which necessarily implies that all true propositions are known by God, including those 
about future choices of man and the myriads of events that depend upon such decisions. As 
18 PthP century theologian Jonathan Edwards explained “If God does not know the future 
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volitions of moral agents, then neither can he certainly foreknow those events which are 
consequent and dependent on these volitions” (1974:239). He continued that in this case 
God “must have little else to do but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be 
rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements in the best manner the case will 
allow” (op.cit.:254). Without such foreknowledge, our view of God’s omniscience may 
indeed become quite impoverished and no longer satisfy the demands of divine perfection 
or fit with such scriptural evidence as Paul’s exclamation: “Oh, the depth of the riches of 
the wisdom and knowledge of God!” (Rom 11:33).  
Purely philosophically speaking, however, deduction from divine perfection alone 
may not be enough to guarantee that foreknowledge is part and parcel of divine 
omniscience. For, while acknowledging that omniscience requires knowledge of all true 
propositions, some contemporary scholars have instead questioned if propositions about 
future events can really be called ‘true’ (Helm 1974, Hasker 1994). The underlying issue 
here is that of the ontological status of the future. Does the future already exist, even 
though it is not accessible to us, or is it as yet non-existent? If the future does not exist, 
then propositions about future events could possibly be seen as having no truth value, in 
which case they would not be true propositions and thus not be a necessary ingredient in 
divine omniscience.  
In fact, it seems that the current existence of the future may simply have been 
assumed by some of the major classical theists, and this explains why they had no great 
difficulty with the notion of divine foreknowledge (Craig 1985). Since they also saw God 
as absolutely timeless, divine foreknowledge could be compared to what we today would 
call a bird’s eye view of the physical environment. In Aquinas’ words, “he who sees the 
whole road from a height sees at once all those traveling on it” (1952:88). Moreover, such 
a view solves another problematic aspect of divine foreknowledge, namely its seeming 
tension with the notion of human free will. If God is timeless then He does not actually 
have fore-knowledge but simply knows the future in the same way we know the present, 
because all times are equally present to him (Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach & Basinger 
1998:79). But it is not at all clear that such views of both time and eternity can be firmly 
defended, especially from a biblical perspective. Therefore, just as with the attribute of 
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immutability, a correct understanding of omniscience seems to require a more thorough 
understanding of the concepts of time and eternity. 
 But the debate about divine foreknowledge is not the only one in omniscience. 
There is also the issue of the changing character of knowledge which we already touched 
upon when we looked at immutability. Physical reality is constantly changing, and it seems 
that knowledge of this reality must therefore also continually change. But this means that 
God’s knowledge is in flux. Since change always assumes temporality, knowledge of our 
changing reality may imply that God is temporal. Again, we see that the notion of eternity 
plays a key role if we want to get a clear view of divine omniscience.  
Finally, let us look at how profitable a solid understanding of omniscience may be in 
shedding light on our main topic, divine truth. And here it comes as no surprise that the 
connections between omniscience and divine truth are indeed abundant. First of all, since 
divine knowledge is absolutely perfect, it is virtually synonymous with truth—truth as 
factuality that is. This link has promising implications. It means, for instance, that a further 
clarification of the ontological status of the attributes, the question that led to Aquinas’ 
adoption of divine simplicity, may also help us understand the ontological status of divine 
truth itself. It also suggests that a sound solution to the issue of foreknowledge may help us 
clarify the nature of truth, and the same goes for a plausible scenario of how God can 
know changing reality.  
The connection of omniscience with truth as faithfulness or genuineness does not 
appear that fruitful. As far as faithfulness is concerned, we seem to be dealing here with a 
simple confirmation again, such as we already encountered when exploring God’s 
perfection. His complete knowledge of all events, including those in the future, gives us 
simply an extra guarantee that God will be faithful, since there will be no unforeseen 
human decisions causing events that might force him to change his plans or go against his 
promises.   
 
3.3.7  Perfect goodness  
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God is omnibenevolent or  perfectly good. He possesses all the moral virtues, such as 
justice, mercy, righteousness and love, and He does so essentially and to the maximum 
degree. Traditionally, God has been deemed the source of all varieties of perfect goodness, 
whether moral or not, but our focus here will be on the moral understanding of perfect 
goodness. 
God’s perfect goodness is of course amply attested in scripture. In the Old Testament 
we especially find this attribute with great frequency in the psalms. Examples are, “your 
abundant goodness,” and “how great is your goodness” (145:7, 31:19). How closely linked 
perfect goodness is with God himself is seen when God promises to show himself to 
Moses in the desert by stating, “I will cause all my goodness to pass in front of you” (Ex 
33:19, italics mine).P PIn the New Testament we find verses like: “no one is good but God 
alone,” and “him, who called us by his … goodness” (Mark 10:18, 2Pe 1:3). In addition, 
there are countless verses that attribute to God more specific types of goodness, such as 
those mentioned above.  
God’s perfect goodness again follows quite naturally from his perfection: a perfect 
God must be perfectly good. By definition God is a being worthy of worship, and only a 
being that is the source of all goodness, or moral value, is really worthy of worship. As we 
saw earlier, both Anselm and Aquinas also argued for God’s perfect goodness from the 
occurrence of different degrees of goodness in people and things around us. In order for us 
to recognize that one person has a certain degree of goodness, but another person has 
more, there must be a perfect standard of perfect goodness, and this is God.  
One debate regarding perfect goodness that goes back to the very beginning of 
philosophy is the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. In his dialogue called Euthyphro, Plato 
asked if something is good because God approves it, or whether God approves it because it 
is good. Both horns of the dilemma lead to problematic consequences. The first option 
seems to imply that if God’s approval makes a thing good then perfect goodness is not 
essential to God’s nature and whatever He happens to approve is merely an arbitrary 
choice. The second horn leads to the unacceptable view that perfect goodness exists as an 
abstract entity independently from God. This dilemma is of course the same one that 
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already emerged in our discussion on the ontological status of the attributes. If perfect 
goodness is truly a divine attribute then this trait is essential to God and cannot be 
dependent on him. But if perfect goodness exists independently from God then we must 
deny divine aseity. The question to ask here is of course if Plato’s dilemma actually allows 
for a third option. Several solutions have been forthcoming, the most promising being 
Divine Command Theory. It presents a viable scenario by grounding perfect goodness in 
the very nature of God and thus preserving perfect goodness as an essential attribute 
without compromising God’s aseity (Helm 1981, Quinn 1978). 
Though perfect goodness does feature prominently in most lists of divine attributes 
within classical theism, it is also often distinguished from the other attributes, for instance 
by calling it a moral attribute, as opposed to a natural one (Erickson 1983:267). And the 
fact that this attribute is a moral one has an interesting implication for our topic. The 
classical list of attributes has been criticized in our time by those who find that most of the 
attributes seem to point to an impersonal divine power, something resembling more closely 
the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, rather than the Christian God (Pinnock, Rice, Sanders, 
Hasker & Basinger 1994). But omnibenevolence must clearly be exempted from such 
criticism—the crucial difference being that moral goodness can only be ascribed to a 
personal being. So, perfect goodness implies that God has personhood. 
Of course, that God is a person is emphatically assumed and confirmed all 
throughout scripture (Erickson 1983:268-271). God is never referred to as “it” but always 
as “He”. In fact, that God has personhood is to most theists such a pivotal point that “if 
God were not personal, their entire idea of the religious life would collapse” (Peterson et  
al. 1998:69).   
Divine personhood also follows logically from the attribute of perfect goodness, 
when combined with the existence of evil. That both good and evil exist in this world is 
undeniable. But if God is an impersonal force then He (it) would necessarily be the direct 
cause of all things in the world, i.e. of both good and evil. All of it would automatically 
follow from this being’s existence, and the divine itself would thus have to be both good 
and evil, rather than all-good. Of course such a view simply reduces to pantheism and 
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denies what lies at the very core of theism: the belief in a personal creator God (Schaeffer 
1990:293).  
Apart from deduction from perfect goodness, there are other philosophical 
arguments for affirming the personhood of God. First, unless we embrace strict 
physicalism,P5 P we can affirm two types of causation, namely impersonal scientific causation 
and causation by personal agents. Since scientific explanations depend on an existing 
universe, they cannot explain the origin of such a universe. Therefore, if the world had a 
beginning, it can only have been caused by a personal cause (or causes). Secondly, a cause 
is always at least as complex as its effect. The cause of personal human beings therefore 
also has to be at least as complex as they are, and this means that human persons can only 
be caused by a being (or beings) with personhood.  
But if the personhood of God is such an undeniable doctrine, questions can arise 
about the nature of divine immutability and eternity.  The stronger forms of immutability 
may preclude that God is related in any way to his creatures. For instance, can a strongly 
immutable God be personal, and specifically, can He respond to his creatures’ changing 
attitudes and prayers as scripture teaches? Secondly, can a personal God be timelessly 
eternal? Many personhood characteristics—think of remembering, intending, planning or 
forgiving—seem to imply a certain level of temporality, and some find it counterintuitive 
to speak of an absolutely timeless God as personal (e.g. Lucas 1989). Again, we see the 
same connection with eternity emerge here that was already noted earlier in our discussion 
of immutability and omniscience.  
Finally, we need to ask again if perfect goodness and its implication of divine 
personhood can possibly shed any light on the nature of divine truth. The answer is clearly 
affirmative. If God is perfectly good then He is perfectly faithful, and faithfulness is the 
primary meaning of truth in scripture. Just as omniscience safeguards the factuality of 
God’s words,  perfect goodness guarantees the faithfulness of his character. Moreover, we 
saw that factuality could possibly even be rooted in faithfulness, a view we will have to 
explore further later on. So, perfect goodness promises to be quite helpful for our 
understanding of truth, and as was the case with omniscience, if the ontological status of 
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perfect goodness can be clarified this will also help us understand the status of divine truth. 
As for divine personhood, further exploration of this implied attribute may also be 
profitable, since we found in Chapter Two that one of the characteristics of divine truth is 
that it is closely connected with the notion of personhood and even identified with the 
living and acting person of God. 
 
3.3.8  Eternity  
This much debated divine attribute traditionally claims that God exists above and 
beyond time, in a timeless eternal present. Such an eternal existence is not to be 
understood as everlastingness without beginning or end. Rather, it is non-temporal, and 
God thus exists wholly outside of time. Both Augustine and Boethius have given classic 
descriptions of this view of divine eternity. Augustine wrote: 
“Nor dost Thou by time precede time; else wouldest Thou not precede all times. 
But in the excellency of an ever-present eternity, Thou precedest all times past, and 
survivest all future times, because they are future, and when they have come, they 
will be past; but “Thou art the same, and Thy years shall have no end.” Thy  years 
neither go nor come; but ours both go and come, that all may come. All Thy years 
stand at once since they do stand; nor were they when departing excluded by coming 
years, because they pass not away; but all these of ours shall be when all shall cease 
to be. Thy years are one day, and Thy day is not daily, but to-day; because Thy to-
day yields not with to-morrow, for neither doth it follow yesterday. Thy to-day is 
eternity … Thou hast made all time; and before all times Thou art, nor in any time 
was there not time” (1948b:190-91). 
The same view is expressed by Boethius’ famous description of divine eternity as “the 
complete simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life…” (1999:132). 
Scriptural support for God’s eternity is abundant. The prophet Isaiah proclaims God 
as “the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity,” and the writer of Hebrews 
explains, “In the beginning, O Lord, you laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens 
are the work of your hands. They will perish, … But you remain the same, and your years 
will never end” (Is 57:15, ESV; Heb 1:10-11). We see here that God exists without 
beginning or end: He never comes into or goes out of existence. But does this imply that 
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God’s existence is beyond time? The following verses strongly suggest a beginning of time 
and thus that divine eternity is indeed timeless: “A wisdom that … God destined for our 
glory before time began,” “this grace was given us in Christ before the beginning of time,” 
“the hope … which God … promised before the beginning of time” and “to the only 
God…be glory, majesty, dominion, and authority, before all time and now and forever” 
(1Cor 2:7, 2Ti 1:9, Ti 1:2, Jude 25). Some scholars also refer again to God’s crucial self-
description as “I AM” (Ex 3:14, cf. Jo 8:58). They view this expression as signifying not 
only God’s independent existence, but also that there is no beginning or end to his being 
(e.g. Bray 1998:39). Charnock, for instance, reasons “I Am is his proper name. This 
description being in the present tense, shows that his essence knows no past, nor future … 
I Am; I am the only being … he is therefore, at the greatest distance from not being, and 
that is eternal” (1979:278).  
Can we deduce this type of timeless eternity from any of the other attributes? 
Aquinas believed so. He wrote, “the notion of eternity follows immutability” (1952:42). 
This implication has come under attack, however, since it is argued that the fact that 
change requires temporality does not necessarily imply that being immutable makes one 
timeless (Wierenga 2003:173; cf. Shoemaker 1969). Two factors seem to complicate this 
issue. First, Aquinas’ reasoning apparently assumed a specific view of time that not all 
might agree with (Craig 1985), and secondly his view of immutability was intertwined 
with the debatable doctrine of divine simplicity.  
The influence of divine simplicity was also seen to play a role in Anselm’s 
understanding of immutability and eternity (locus 3.3.4); and we find the same tendency in 
Turretin’s thought. Turretin explains that God’s eternity simply cannot be the same as 
endless time, because the latter involves succession, and succession means change, but it is 
again simplicity that seems to play a key role:  
“The eternity of God cannot have succession because his essence … admits none. 
… it is perfectly simple and immutable (and therefore rejects the change of  former 
into latter, of past into present, of present into future, which succession involves)” 
(1992:203).  
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So, if the argument from immutability seems questionable, are there other attributes 
that support timeless eternity? We saw that a scriptural view of omniscience expressly 
included foreknowledge (locus 3.3.6), and if God is timeless this would seem to facilitate 
his knowledge of future events, in the sense that all events might then be equally present to 
him. But again, this understanding was seen to assume a specific view of time, a view that 
some might contest as unscriptural or even false. So, just like immutability, omniscience 
cannot be seen to simply support timeless eternity. 
Other promising attributes in support of timelessness are divine aseity or necessity 
and perfection or infinity. First, if God exists necessarily and a se, it is impossible that He 
would not exist; therefore He can never go out of or come into being and this was exactly 
the generally accepted description of eternity. Divine perfection also seems to fit well with 
timeless eternity. Perfection requires completeness in all aspects, and seems therefore 
hardly compatible with the incompleteness of a life lived in time, where both past and 
future are out of reach and all that is real is the fleeting present. Finally, Turretin deduces 
eternity from infinity: “after the infinity of God with respect to essence, the same is to be 
considered with respect to place and time by which he is conceived as uncircumscribed by 
any limits (aperigraptos) of place or time .… the latter [is called] eternity” (1992:196-97). 
But can we be entirely sure that these attributes require divine eternity to be absolutely 
timeless? Could an everlasting and thus temporal eternity also meet these requirements? 
If so, is there scriptural evidence for such a temporal interpretation? In fact, if we 
look at the Bible, we find many more verses that speak of God as everlasting and temporal 
than as existing beyond time (Padgett 1992).  Examples are “from everlasting to 
everlasting you are God,” and “God Almighty, who was and is and is to come” (Ps 90:2, 
Rev 4:8). One thing is clear, solving this question, and the related question of the exact 
nature of time, clearly has great potential for a better understanding of many of the other 
attributes.  
A temporal understanding of divine eternity also seems to accord quite well with 
several of the other attributes, so let us take a look at some of the arguments that have been 
presented.  
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Interestingly enough, though omniscience seemed to support timelessness because of 
the foreknowledge issue, it can also be called upon to support infinite temporality. For if 
God is completely timeless, the question again emerges how He can have knowledge of 
our ever-changing temporal reality. More specifically, can He have knowledge of 
propositions that express so-called ‘tensed facts’? Tensed propositions are those that have 
a built in time-factor, such as “I had two sandwiches for lunch today.” A timeless God 
would know the content of this proposition, but would his timelessness allow him to know 
if this event is currently past, present or future? A helpful example is that of a film 
producer, who knows a movie as it lies in the can. She may know the whole story-line by 
heart, but she has no idea what is at this moment being projected on the screen (Moreland 
2003:513). However, scripture teaches that God does know if certain events are past, 
present or future since He responds accordingly. Examples from both testaments are, “I 
have seen the misery of my people … So I have come down to rescue them,” and “Many 
will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord …’ Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you 
…’” (Ex 3:7-8, Mat 7:22-23, italics mine). The question thus becomes, how must we 
understand divine eternity in view of God’s apparent knowledge of tensed facts?  
Secondly, if God is timeless how can He stand in any relationship with temporal and 
changeable creatures? How can He be the creator and sustainer of a temporal universe with 
temporal human beings, respond to the actions and prayers of such beings, and intervene in 
the history of mankind? That the God of the Bible does all these things is abundantly 
attested. God’s creation of the heavens and the earth, his response to Abraham’s plea for 
his nephew Lot, and the dividing of the waters so Israel could escape the Egyptian army 
are three Old Testament examples among many (Gen 1:1, 18:22-33, Ex 14:15-31). In the 
New Testament, we find instances of direct divine intervention like Paul’s conversion and 
responses to prayer like Peter’s miraculous escape from prison (Acts 12). As we saw, such 
scriptural evidence seems to confirm the implied attribute of personhood, but it makes a 
strong interpretation of immutability difficult to understand and divine timelessness 
therefore fares no better. 
To sum up, we have found the following connections between eternity, either 
timeless or temporal, and the other attributes. Timelessness seemed to find support in 
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immutability, but the classic understanding of this attribute is so intertwined with specific 
views on the nature of time and with the doctrine of simplicity that it could not be used as 
a supporting argument. Omniscience fared no better. It seemed to point to timelessness as 
far as foreknowledge was concerned, but the question of tensed knowledge made it into a 
possible argument for the opposite view. Necessity and perfection looked like strong 
supports for timelessness, but we first have to make absolutely sure that they demand 
timelessness rather than everlastingness.  
In support of temporal eternity we found again the tensed knowledge issue and the 
question of how a timeless God can act and respond in time, as well as the fact of the 
personhood of God, which seems at first sight incongruous with timelessness. Attributes 
that seemed to have no direct connection with either view of eternity were perfect 
goodness, except via its implied doctrine of divine personhood, plus the properties of 
omnipotence and incorporeality.   
Finally, as with all the other attributes, we want to briefly look at conceptual 
connections between eternity and divine truth. Since eternity is so closely intertwined with 
immutability, omniscience and personhood, it comes as no surprise that its connections 
with truth also cannot be described without appealing to these attributes. Let us therefore 
look at the two views of eternity and see how each of them might possibly affect divine 
truth via the three attributes mentioned.  
If eternity is best interpreted as truly atemporal timelessness, how will this affect our 
view of divine truth in terms of factuality, genuineness or faithfulness? If eternity is 
timeless, this will affirm the attribute of immutability, and changelessness was seen as an 
important characteristic of truth in scripture as well as in much of philosophical thought. 
Moreover, a timeless view of eternity may strengthen factuality in terms of divine future 
knowledge, even though it might weaken factuality when it comes to knowledge of tensed 
facts. A similar picture emerges with regards to faithfulness. Faithfulness may be 
strengthened by enabling reliability and permanence, but weakened by hindering 
responsive relatedness to temporal creation.  
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On the other hand, if eternity is temporal in nature, this seems to affirm the attribute 
of personhood, and the effects on factuality and faithfulness are the reverse of the above. 
Factuality may be strengthened by enabling divine knowledge of tensed facts, but 
weakened by the problem of future knowledge. Similarly, faithfulness may be bolstered 
because responsive relatedness to temporal creation is facilitated, but it may also be 
threatened by  a possible lack of reliability and permanence, for if even God does not know 
the future, can He then really be relied upon to keep his promises? 
This is how the connections seem to lie right now, but a revision of our concept of 
divine eternity may of course change our current view of immutability, omniscience and 
personhood, and if that happens we will also see changes in the expected effects on the 
notion of divine truth.  
 
3.4  Conclusion  
In this chapter we have briefly looked at those predicates that in classical theism 
are generally regarded as divine attributes. We have surveyed the scriptural evidence and 
philosophical arguments for each of these, and have tried to determine if and how each is 
conceptually related to the divine attribute of truth. In terms of connections between each 
of the attributes and truth, we were able to conclude the following. 
Divine perfection and infinity were mostly seen to provide strong confirmation of 
divine truth. This attribute assured that there can be no shade of doubt and no exception 
to the faithfulness of God, the true factuality of his words and his genuine reality.  
Aseity stressed the need to solve the issue of the ontological status of the attributes, 
and thus of divine truth. God alone exists a se, but since his attributes must be essential to 
him they must also exist eternally. How can these two facts be reconciled? Since the 
factuality sense of truth was seen to be represented by omniscience, and faithfulness by 
perfect goodness, solutions to this question will also shed light on divine truth itself. 
Aseity also resonated with the genuineness sense of truth as it was found in scripture and 
early philosophy. The attribute of divine necessity, in its turn, alerted us to the fact that not 
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all divine knowledge should be deemed necessary, since this would lead to an 
unacceptable denial of divine free will.  
Incorporeality and omnipresence did not appear strongly connected to divine truth. 
One possible link might be that God’s being present at every event would facilitate divine 
knowledge. However, such a perceptual and mediate view of divine cognition would seem 
incongruent with divine perfection. 
Immutability, on the other hand, provided many rich links with divine truth, though 
it also became clear that this attribute might need to be revised before these connections 
can be further hammered out. At first sight, immutability seemed a perfect match for the 
sense of firmness and reliability that is basic to the biblical notion of truth. God’s perfect 
knowledge, however—the factuality side of divine truth—may actually require a certain 
amount of change in order to reflect changing temporal reality, and divine free will 
confirms this requirement. Moreover, divine faithfulness might well demand relatedness to 
temporal beings and the ability to respond to their choices. Immutability clearly does have 
great potential for a deeper understanding of divine truth, but this attribute will first itself 
need to be revised. 
Omnipotence, and especially the need to define this attribute carefully, alerted us 
again to the issue of the ontological status of divine truth. For if divine power is defined as 
above logic, both factuality and faithfulness become empty concepts; but if logic and other 
truths exist independently from God we again run the risk of denying aseity. If 
omnipotence is correctly defined, however, it can be seen to confirm divine truth in all its 
various uses.   
Omniscience was again a rich source of connections with truth—not surprising of 
course, since perfect knowledge and factuality are so closely connected. This means that if 
the two main issues in omniscience, i.e. knowledge of the future and knowledge of tensed 
facts, can be given plausible solutions, then these answers will also bring greater clarity to 
the notion of divine truth itself. Omniscience, like perfection and omnipotence, was also 
seen to affirm truth as faithfulness. 
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Perfect goodness of course includes faithfulness, and it is therefore this attribute that 
represents this specific moral meaning of truth, just as omniscience represents factuality. 
Faithfulness also took precedence over factuality in scripture and we will have to see what 
this means for the attribute of truth. Together with perfection, omniscience, and 
omnipotence, perfect goodness also provided clear affirmation of divine truth. Moreover, 
moral goodness implies personhood, and since truth in scripture was identified with the 
person of God, this implied attribute can function as a strong confirmation of this personal 
aspect of divine truth. 
Finally, eternity was seen to be bound up with divine truth in all kinds of ways, most 
of them involving three other attributes, namely omniscience, immutability and 
personhood. It is now clear that if we can bring clarity to the main debate in divine 
eternity, that of timelessness versus temporality, we  may also be able to clear up some 
important issues in these three attributes, and thus in the attribute of truth itself.  
To clarify divine eternity is therefore the next main task we have to turn to. 
However, we have also seen that views of eternity themselves make assumptions about 
the exact nature of time. Before we set out on our investigation of divine eternity, 
therefore, it will be profitable to have a sound understanding of time itself, and this is 
what we will do in the next chapter. 
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NOTES 
 
P
1
P Iranaeus confirms the same when he states, “…God is life, and incorruption, and truth. And these and such 
like attributes…” (1975:375).  
 
P
2
P Of the most used Bible translations, the New International Version has no instances of the English word 
‘infinite’ as applied to God, while the King James and New American Standard have one, Ps 147:5, where 
God’s understanding is called infinite.  
  
P
3 
PTurretin reasoned, for example, that God “can neither be changed for the better (for he is the best) nor for 
the worse (because he would cease to be the most perfect)” (1992:205). 
 
P
4
P John Miley also warns that interpreting infinity as infinite extension may lead to pantheism (1989:218). 
  
P
5
P So-called nonreductive physicalism falls under physicalism in this respect, because it sees mental 
phenomena as mere epiphenomena of physical states, and thus as causally impotent.   
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4 – THE NATURE OF TIME 
 
4.1  Introduction  
In our quest to uncover the nature of divine truth, we have in the preceding chapters 
laid a conceptual foundation, consisting of three parts: truth in philosophy, in scripture and 
in Classical Theism. Our philosophical investigation in Chapter One started off with a 
brief analysis of the notion of truth in its everyday usage. We found that in daily 
conversation in our own time the term ‘truth’ primarily denotes factuality, with 
faithfulness and genuineness coming as distant seconds. With this daily conception in 
hand, we then noted that major views in Greek and Medieval philosophy put the accent 
quite differently. It was the genuineness sense of truth that played a major role here, truth 
as grounded in an unchanging ideal reality, and even when views tended to favor factuality 
instead, it was factuality as grounded in an unchanging element within empirical reality.  
With the arrival of modern philosophical thought, we moved closer to our daily view 
of truth, with factuality firmly overtaking genuineness in first place. This new truth sense, 
however, was increasingly seen as dependent on man’s own ability to know, while the 
connection with extra-mental reality came under mounting tension. This new accent on the 
human knower was taken even further by contemporary thought, where the person has 
now moved into the central position—a development that might at first be seen as favoring 
the faithfulness sense of truth, but on closer investigation is something quite different. 
Rather, this move toward the left of our diagram seems to represent an all-out retreat in the 
battle for truth, as this notion is now increasingly regarded as a useless and empty concept.  
In Chapter Two we moved from the philosophical to the scriptural notion of truth, 
and this exploration yielded even greater differences with regard to the daily 
understanding. Not only did both the faithfulness and genuineness sense of truth emerge 
here as more important than factuality, but truth was also seen to have strong connotations 
of personhood and power. In comparing the scriptural truth notion with that in philosophy 
we found that scripture put the same accent on unchangingness as did early philosophy, 
with later philosophical views clearly moving away from the biblical stance.  
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Finally, in Chapter Three we looked at the divine attributes as formulated by 
Classical Theism, exploring conceptual connections between each of the attributes on the 
one hand and the concept of truth on the other. Four of the attributes showed potential for 
clarifying divine truth, namely eternity, immutability, the personhood that is implied by 
divine goodness, and omniscience. We also saw that among these four, divine eternity 
seemed fundamental to an understanding of the other three. It is for this reason that we will 
turn our efforts to the further analysis of divine eternity, and since eternity cannot be 
defined without clarifying the concept of time itself, the current chapter will explore both 
the philosophical and biblical evidence concerning the nature of time.  
Based on the insights gained here, in Chapter Five we will then explore the nature of 
divine eternity, which in turn should help us clarify how the divine attributes of 
immutability, personhood and omniscience should be understood. Finally, all this should 
equip us to return to divine truth with a better understanding of what it entails and how the 
various theories on time and divine eternity have affected views, not only on divine truth, 
but also on the notion of truth in general. 
 
4.2  Major debates in philosophy of time  
The nature of time has engaged thinking minds from the very beginning of Western 
philosophy. Five hundred years BC, the Greek philosopher Parmenides already declared 
that true reality is imperishable and unchanging, and all temporal becoming thus no more 
than a deceptive illusion (Audi 1995:646). However, his contemporary Heraclites 
disagreed. He saw reality instead as in continual flux, as dynamic and ephemeral 
(op.cit.:376).P1 P His famous example was that no person could ever step into the same river 
twice, since everything about the river would have changed the second time.  
In our day, an evolved version of this debate is known under the less imaginative 
nomenclature of that between the A-theory and B-theory of time, terms that are based on a 
ground-breaking article written about a century ago by philosopher of time John Ellis 
McTaggart (1908). 
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Though the A- or B-theory debate has been central to contemporary thought about 
the nature of time, another important question has been if time is finite or infinite in 
duration. In Western philosophy this question goes right back to Aristotle who argued that 
time must necessarily be infinite, a position that centuries later was strongly contested by 
theist philosophers. There are, moreover, two further issues in the philosophy of time that 
are closely related to the finite-infinite debate. First, there is the question if time is linear or 
not, and second, if it is best understood as a type of substratum in which events take place, 
the substantival view, or that it is nothing more than the relations between events, the 
relational view.   
Taking the two main debates as our guideline, our objective in following sections 
will be to discuss the concept of time from these two perspectives: 
• Time as a dynamic process or as a static event (4.3)    
• Time as finite or infinite (4.4). 
 
4.3  Is time dynamic or static? 
In his article The Unreality of Time (1908) McTaggart suggested that in daily use 
positions in time are distinguished in two ways. We either designate a moment in time by 
relating it to the ‘now’, using the terms past, present or future, or we relate it to any other 
moment, in which case we use the designations earlier than, simultaneous with or later 
than. McTaggart called the first group of moments in time the A-series, and noted that the 
distinctions in this series continually change as the ‘now’ itself changes, since an event in 
time that is future now may be present tomorrow and past the day after. The second 
category was named the B-series, and its distinctions were seen to be permanent, since an 
event X that is earlier than event Y will continue to be so even as the days, months and 
years pass.  
McTaggart also argued that the dynamic A-series was absolutely fundamental to 
time, and that its distinctions of past, present and future could not be ignored as actual 
parts of reality. However, since he also understood the A-series to lead to obvious logical 
contradictions, he deemed the conclusion unavoidable that time is simply unreal. This two-
97 
 
step argument is still known as McTaggart’s Paradox, and even though the paradox itself is 
currently regarded by many as solved, his distinction between the two ways of designating 
moments in time has been immortalized in the continued use of the terms A-theory and B-
theory of time. 
The A-theory is now also known as the dynamic theory of time, since in its view 
time is constantly changing. A-theorists believe that the passage of time is a very real and 
irreducible feature of reality. Another concept that belongs in the A-theory camp is ‘tense’, 
a term that indicates that they see the past, present and future tenses that are used in 
language as reliable reflections of what is happening in reality. A-theorists are often also 
presentists, meaning that they believe that only the present exists, while the past and the 
future are currently non-existent.  
By contrast, B-theorists believe that reality is essentially static. An event does not 
itself change from being future to present to past, but this seeming change is merely a 
feature of how our mind perceives the world. When I say that the year 2000 is past, for 
instance, all I really mean is that 2000 is earlier than the moment when I am writing this 
sentence, and it will always remain that way. In this view time does not really pass, and 
any appearance to the contrary is merely phenomenological, a mind-dependent 
perspective. Accordingly, language that uses tense merely reflects this illusion, and B-
theorists are therefore also called adherents of the ‘tenseless’ theory of time.  Many B-
theorists also call themselves eternalists, adherents of the view that objects and events in 
the past and future exist just as much as those in the present. 
 The B-theory has enjoyed increased popularity since the general acceptance in 
physics of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR). This theory developed by Albert 
Einstein at the beginning of the 20 PthP century implies the impossibility of absolute 
simultaneity. This means that two events can be simultaneous for one observer, but occur 
at different times for another observer. Of course, if this is so, the present-ness or past-ness 
of a certain event is not an objective fact, but rather a feature that is relative to a certain 
observer and thus merely subjective. All objects and events have equal ontological status, 
no matter if they are perceived as past, present or future, and this results in a static picture 
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of reality that is also known as the block universe. In this view, the passage of time is not 
an objective reality, nothing really changes, and the static view of time is correct.  
In the following sections, we will first look at the two most important arguments for 
and against the dynamic or A-theory of time. Next, we will look at the static or B-theory 
and again explore the two major lines of argument supporting and opposing this view. 
These eight lines of reasoning will then allow us to conclude which of these two is the 
most plausible view of the nature of time. 
  
4.3.1  The case for dynamic time 
As we saw earlier, the dynamic view of time is also called the ‘tensed’ view, since it 
believes that the tenses we find in human language are actually reflective of true reality. 
Even though there are languages that do not use tensed verbs, every known language 
allows its users to distinguish between past, present and future events, and this strongly 
suggests that tense is not just a linguistic feature but a hard ontological fact. The view that 
tensed language points to a tensed reality is also defended by such philosophers as Richard 
Gale and Quentin Smith (Gale 1968, Smith 1993). In response, proponents of static time 
first argued that sentences that use tense can be reduced to tenseless ones without a change 
in meaning. It soon became clear, however, that tensed sentences do provide information 
that their tenseless counterparts lack and vice versa, and this position is therefore no longer 
seen as tenable (Perry 1977:474-77). There have been more recent attempts to disconnect 
tensed language from tensed facts, but none have been able to show decisively that tensed 
facts are completely dispensable (Mellor 1981, 1998; Craig 2001a:126). The belief that 
tense in language is indeed a reflection of tense in reality thus continues to be a plausible 
position. 
A second argument for dynamic time is based on the undeniable strength and 
universality of our human experience of time as passing. This experience is so 
fundamental that it qualifies as a ‘properly basic’ belief, which can be accepted prima 
facie, unless and until a strong enough defeater to this belief is presented. A prime example 
of such a prima facie justified belief is, for instance, that of the existence of the outside 
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world—a belief so strong and universal that it is virtually impossible for it to ever 
encounter a proper defeater. However, we do not only experience that there is a world 
outside of our mind, but also that this world is in a continual process of becoming. In fact, 
even if we subject ourselves to prolonged sensory deprivation, we still experience change 
in the inner life of the mind, with thoughts and feelings following one after the other.  
The experience of change then, or of reality as becoming, is uncommonly strong. In 
fact, because change is also a universal feature of man’s mental experience, it can even be 
argued that the belief in change is more basic than that in the existence of the outside 
world. Thus, if our phenomenological belief in the outside world is prima facie justified, 
then our belief in temporal becoming can be deemed equally justified or even more so. 
Finding an adequate defeater for such a strongly justified belief could border on the 
impossible.  
Two other aspects of this phenomenological argument deserve highlighting. First, it 
is clear that we strongly experience certain events as now or present and others as not so, 
and this in itself points to the reality of tense. In response, Mellor has argued that what we 
experience as a present event is in reality a mere tenseless fact; we just tend to experience 
it as present (1981). However, since such reasoning involves the process of rational 
inference and is thus non-basic, it has little power to serve as defeater of a properly basic 
belief of the kind described above. Furthermore, even if we take the position that the 
presentness of our current reality, c. q. of typing this sentence, is not a feature of reality, it 
is still undeniable that the mental experience of typing this sentence has presentness and is 
therefore a tensed event.  
A second feature of the phenomenological argument for dynamic time that is worth 
noting is that we tend to have markedly different attitudes to events depending on their 
being past, present or future (Prior 1959, 2003). Even the same event, for instance a 
painful medical procedure, may first be dreaded when it lies in the near future, and later 
fill us with relief when it is past. On the static view, however, such attitude changes cannot 
be explained, and even though they are a universal feature of human experience they must 
be labeled as irrational, since events really are not past, present or future; they just are. 
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In the face of these considerable arguments in favour of the dynamic view of time, 
what are the main objections that have been raised against this view? As we saw earlier, it 
was McTaggart’s article on time that provided the terminology for the debate on whether 
time is in its very nature dynamic or static. McTaggart’s own view actually provides a 
measure of support for both camps in the debate, since he argued on the one hand that time 
must necessarily be dynamic, but on the other that dynamic time implies unacceptable 
contradictions. As we saw, his conclusion was therefore that time must be unreal. In our 
current quest for arguments in favor of the static or B-theory, we will focus here on the 
reasoning that led him to conclude that the concept of time is contradictory. For if 
McTaggart is right, this allegation will constitute a rejoinder that is indeed powerful 
enough to defeat the prima facie argument for the reality of temporal becoming. 
 McTaggart argues that each event in the A-series has a temporal characteristic, 
namely that it is past, present or future. He explains that this characteristic can be a relation 
or a quality, but in either case contradictions will inevitably result, because the temporal 
characteristic of the event changes. Thus, event A, say the Second World War, is an event 
in the series that changes from being future to being present and then past. But World War 
II cannot be both past and not-past, present and not-present, future and not-future because 
these are “incompatible determinations” (McTaggart 1908:467). Still, all three 
incompatible terms—being past, present and future—are predicable of each event in the 
series. His conclusion is therefore simply that each event in the series has contradictory 
attributes and thus this series cannot exist.  
However, on deeper analysis, McTaggart is not really describing a dynamic view of 
time with his A-series (Broad 1976, Prior 1970). A truly dynamic view sees only present 
events as actually existing. World War II is in existence from 1939 till 1945, but it does 
not exist before or after that time and consequently also has no temporal characteristics, 
namely being past or future, that are incompatible with its being present. Since the 
contradictions McTaggart finds do not apply to the true dynamic view of time, it appears 
that his argument here is inconsequential.  
A more serious objection to the dynamic view is that its literal conception of the 
flow of time is actually incoherent. It is argued that two questions in particular reveal it to 
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be so. First, if time really passes, we should be able to answer the question how fast it 
passes. But this is an unanswerable question because speed can only be defined in terms of 
time, and so we end up with a tautology, e.g., it takes one hour for an hour to pass. Since 
there is no coherent answer to this question we must conclude that time does not pass. 
How does the dynamic view answer this objection?  
Actually, we are dealing here again with a misunderstanding of the dynamic view. 
The misunderstanding is that those who support the dynamic view believe that future 
events literally become present and then past. Logician and philosopher Arthur Prior 
explained that the idea of time passing is merely a metaphor, and that it indicates neither 
motion nor change (2003). The concept of change requires that an object or event already 
exists before the change takes place. But dynamic time does not state that future events 
change into present ones but rather something much more radical, namely that present 
events come into existence and then go out of existence. Future and past events do not 
exist. In this light, the question how fast time flows is not applicable and the fact that the 
dynamic view cannot answer this question therefore does not prove it to be incoherent.  
The second question the dynamic view is presented with is that of the extent of the 
present. Though this question is not necessarily unanswerable it is certainly a thorny one 
and it has kept the best minds occupied since the very beginning of philosophical thought. 
The question is this: If indeed only the present exists, how long can this existence be said 
to last? Any duration, no matter how minute, would imply a possible division of that 
duration into past, present and future, and thus deny presentism. But if the present has 
mere zero duration, then how can it be said to ‘pass’? And how can the next zero-duration 
instant ever come into existence, since between the first and second instant there would 
always be an infinite series of similar zero-duration instants?  
Several solutions to this conundrum have been suggested. One popular view is the 
belief in the existence of minimal indivisible time intervals or ‘chronons’, but this solution 
has been shown to lead to some puzzling questions in its own right (Whitehead, 1978).  
Another promising route has seemed to be the introduction of a higher time dimension 
which sustains our own time. Even McTaggart entertained this solution, but soon 
concluded that it proved to be a dead end. Since such a ‘hyper-time’ would not be 
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qualitatively different from original time it would simply lead to the same problems at a 
higher level. Thus, such hyper-time itself would require an even higher level to sustain it, 
which itself would need a higher level and so on. Only a qualitatively different time 
dimension would be able to adequately sustain our own time and thus prevent a vicious 
infinite regress.  
A third solution, entertained by Henri Bergson among others, has been to see real 
duration as ontologically prior to any type of measureable concept of the present (1965). 
The present simply ‘is’, and this fact is irreducible; the question of its measurable extent is 
a secondary construction. Prior was also a proponent of this view. He argued that the 
notion of being present is simply equivalent to existing, making the present such a 
primitive notion that it is literally pre-metrical (Prior 1970). Of course, whether or not this 
solution can really hold the questions at bay has again been a matter of debate. It does 
suggest, however, that the concept of the present is not incoherent per se.  
Nevertheless, from a purely philosophical perspective, the question of the extent of 
the present has not been fully solved and this can be said to stand as an argument against 
the dynamic view of time. Of course, to put this one remaining problem in perspective, the 
static view faces some thorny questions of its own. An example of these is the issue of the 
asymmetry of time. If time is static, and all moments exist tenselessly, why does time have 
such an undeniably one-way direction? The dynamic theory can explain this direction as 
part of the process of temporal becoming, but the proponent of static time can only take it 
as an unexplainable fact.P2 P The reality of such unanswered questions in the static view thus 
diminishes the force of the question of the extent of the present as an argument against 
dynamic time.  
 
4.3.2  The case for static time 
The main argument that the static view has on its side is its compatibility with 
relativity theory, at least the most popular interpretation of it as proposed early on by 
mathematician Hermann Minkowski. Though Einstein’s original formulation of the 
Special Theory of Relativity (STR) presupposed dynamic time, it was Minkowski who 
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introduced the idea of the four dimensional space-time universe, which sees time as static 
and as an enduring fourth dimension next to the familiar three dimensions of space. 
Moreover, this space-time view proved superior to the original Einsteinian interpretation in 
several ways; so much so, in fact, that Einstein himself soon adopted it.  
 One reason why the space-time view became preferred is that in the original STR 
with its dynamic view of time there are no objective time facts, since such facts are 
dependent on observer position or his ‘inertial frame’. This means that the simultaneous 
occurrence of two events is relative, not absolute, and this has far reaching implications. 
For instance, reality is no longer one common unified world in which all persons live, 
objects exist and events happen; instead, reality becomes fragmented. According to 
Einstein’s original interpretation, an event which is present to one observer might be 
simultaneous with another event present to another observer, while the reverse would not 
be true. So, say I am eating lunch on a plane from Canada to South Africa and my friend in 
South Africa is eating dinner at home. According to the original Einsteinian interpretation 
of STR my lunch can happen simultaneously with my friend’s dinner, while her dinner 
does not occur simultaneously with my lunch. This in itself seems curious to say the least, 
but its logical implications are downright disturbing. According to Craig the Einsteinian 
view actually entails that two such events are not sharing the same reality (2001a:43). 
Moreover, this scenario is not a rare exception for it presents itself for every observer who 
is in motion relative to someone or something else, which is virtually everyone (ibid.). We 
are faced, then, with a great plurality of disconnected realities, each of them bound to a 
different inertial frame. Minkowski’s interpretation avoids this fragmentation since reality 
consists not just of events in the present, but of events in past, present and future, and all 
have equal ontological status. Nothing comes into or goes out of existence due to motion 
in the observer, because reality is more than just the present.  
 Another difficulty with the original view of STR is its relative understanding of 
physical objects. Objects have properties such as shape and duration, but these properties 
are merely relative to certain inertial frames, and therefore change with motion. An 
object’s length might be two meters long relative to one inertial frame and one-and-a-half 
relative to another and so literally change its length when in motion. Similarly, temporal 
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duration becomes relative, so that a clock is noted to actually slow down with motion. If 
such changes can be shown to have causal explanations, to result from causes intrinsic to 
the overall system,  then we have an adequate theory, but since they merely result from 
relative motion—motion with regards to something else—such causal explanations cannot 
be given (op.cit.:172). By contrast, Minkowski’s interpretation has a simple answer. It 
simply attributes these physical distortions to the fact that we as three-dimensional beings 
cannot sense what four dimensional space-time objects really look like. The objects do not 
literally grow or shrink or the clocks slow down, it is just our sense experience that is 
inadequate. 
Of course, if the Minkowskian view is superior as a theory, and it is based on a static 
view of time, then—unless we are ready to reject relativity theory altogether—we have 
here a strong argument for static time. However, there is a third interpretation of relativity 
that is also compatible with dynamic time but does not run into the difficulties described 
above. Another contemporary of Einstein, Dutch physicist Hendrik Lorentz, developed a 
theory of relativity that did allow for absolute time, absolute simultaneity and absolute 
measurements of space and time. This theory is generally acknowledged to be empirically 
equivalent to both interpretations of STR, and even though it implies the same strange 
effects of shrinking rods and clocks that slow down, the theory provides clear causal 
explanations for these phenomena (ibid.).  
Moreover, it can even be argued to be superior to the Minkowskian view with its 
tendency to unify space and time into one continuum and practically reduce time to a 
spatial concept. One argument against Minkovski’s reductionist view of time is, for 
instance, that it tends to either ignore mental events or deem them somehow unreal—a 
tendency that fits well with a ‘spatial’ view of time, since mental events are themselves not 
bound to space.  However, mental events do seem subject to time, at least in humans, and 
this strongly suggest that time can indeed exist apart from any spatial characteristics and 
transcend the boundaries of a space-time continuum (op.cit.:180). Moreover, recent 
developments in quantum physics may make the Lorentzian view the preferred paradigm. P3 P 
It is certainly beyond the topic of this study to explore the exact reasons why. But for us 
the most important factor in this debate is that since Lorentzian relativity represents on all 
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counts a viable alternative to the Minkowskian take on STR, the latter can no longer 
function as a decisive argument in favor of static time. 
This leaves just one more argument for static time that needs to be examined, namely 
the alleged mind-dependence of becoming. As we saw earlier, this argument states that 
temporal becoming is necessarily dependent on the existence of minds and mental states, 
and that it is not an attribute of events in extra-mental reality (Mellor 1981, 
Grünbaum1967). Thus, when we perceive events in the world around us we tend to 
mentally add temporality, but physical reality itself is not subject to becoming. I believe 
that this view cannot only be proven wrong, but also incoherent. If so, rather than 
providing an argument in favour of static time, it actually yields additional proof of the 
truth of the dynamic view. So let us explore this argument in some detail. 
We all mentally experience events—be they physical or mental—as subject to 
temporal becoming, and even those thinkers who argue for the mind-dependence of 
becoming clearly acknowledge this fact in their choice of words. Their main point is that 
we tend to add temporal becoming to those of our mental events that reflect the outside 
world, in other words to perception-events. However, if this is true, our first rejoinder can 
be that mental reality is more than just perception. We also experience purely mental 
events like creating a poem, constructing a logical argument or just thinking of one thing 
now and then another—what has been termed our “stream of consciousness.”  Such pure 
mental events are equally subject to a sense of becoming as are perception-events, since 
the thoughts I have right now are not identical to the ones I had yesterday and the latter 
may even be based upon or expand on those of the former. However, the temporal 
becoming of such pure mental events cannot be labeled as illusory on grounds that they do 
not accurately reflect physical events, because they exist separate from physical reality. In 
other words, such non-perception mental events seem to be undeniably subject to temporal 
becoming, and temporal becoming is thus real for a certain part of reality, namely the 
mental realm.  
If the temporal becoming of non-perception events cannot be denied, and the static 
proponent insists on keeping physical reality free from temporal becoming, she may be 
forced to deny the reality of the mental realm altogether—a radical step that will involve 
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her in countless difficulties. To avoid this she must postulate some kind of dualism, but 
that stance is also fraught with difficulties, as the Descartes chapter in the history of 
philosophy reminds us. If Descartes’ dualism already floundered on questions of the 
interaction between a non-spatial mind on the one hand and a spatial body on the other, 
this new dualism would be even more perplexing, because it would imply a temporal non-
spatial mind directing a non-temporal spatial body. For instance, my mind may want to lift 
my right foot, but how could it ever initiate such a movement when the lifted foot would 
already statically exist in past, present and future (Capek 1976)? It seems that any physical 
states that are directly connected with the mind would also be ‘infected with’ temporal 
becoming, and once this division between mind and body has been bridged, the rest of the 
physical universe might soon follow.  
Another puzzling question that needs explaining is why I experience the writing of 
this sentence as now, but the eating of lunch as past.  If both events are totally devoid of 
becoming in outside reality, how and why do I mentally experience only one of them as 
present? Equally mysterious, why do I not experience events in a totally random order, 
where at one moment I am 25 years old, the next only five and then 55, and why am I 
apparently no exception in my orderly experience of time?  It seems that only true 
temporality in the outside world can account for such phenomena. However, even if all 
these dualistic puzzles can be adequately solved, it needs to be remembered that dualism 
does nothing to render questionable the conclusion that temporal becoming for the mental 
realm is an undeniable fact. 
Maybe the static time theorist can maintain that the mental realm is real enough and 
so is our experience of becoming, but still discredit the temporal becoming we experience 
as mind-dependent in a higher sense. On this view, all my mental events, and thus also my 
experience of their now-ness, are equally real, so my now-awareness of eating yesterday’s 
dinner is just as real as my now-awareness of writing this paragraph. But in order to 
account for the fact that I do not experience these two now-awarenesses as equally present, 
I now need another mental source. If the feeling of temporality does not originate in my 
own mind, then a higher mental reality—a hyper-mind—is needed to ground this 
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distinction. But then the question can be asked where the temporality in this hyper-mind 
comes from and of course this road leads again to an infinite regress.  
Finally, a last option is to take the term ‘mind-dependent’ to simply mean unreal and 
illusory. However, even this maneuver does not provide a way of escape. The problem is 
that even if all temporal becoming is completely illusory, an illusion is itself a mental 
experience, and as such it is again subject to temporal becoming. If I experience the 
illusion of the temporal becoming of a mental event, I am having a mental event that itself 
is experienced as passing and changing—and with that the temporal becoming of mental 
events still stands. So, whatever I try to do to get rid of temporal becoming in the mental 
realm, what we see here is that it is simply impossible. Unless I flatly deny the reality of 
all that is non-physical, the reality of becoming seems an undeniable fact. The argument of 
the static time theorist that temporal becoming is mind-dependent can thus be turned into 
additional proof that temporal becoming is real, just as the dynamic view has been 
asserting all along. 
The static time view has already been shown to be in considerable trouble, but are 
there further arguments that can be brought against it? One allegation has been that static 
time theorists are making time into something that is simply too similar to space. We have 
seen this already in the tensions that result when the static theory is confronted with mental 
reality—a reality that is by definition not spatial. It also surfaces in their attempt to accept 
the reality of time on the one hand, while trying to deny the reality of becoming or tense on 
the other. Static time proponents argue that just as our human experience of space as ‘here’ 
and ‘not-here’ does not affect the ontological status of the not-here, so our experience of 
time as ‘present’ and ‘not-present’ does not imply that the not-present is somehow less 
real. More specifically, the static view would like to affirm temporal relations between 
events, such as ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’, without committing to actual temporal 
becoming. To see if such a stance is tenable we will revisit McTaggart’s Paradox and this 
time we will focus on the first part of his two-fold argument, the part where he states that 
time must be dynamic in nature.  
McTaggart first reasons that time always involves change even if such change is not 
immediately obvious:  
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“A particular thing, indeed, may exist unchanged through any amount of time. But 
when we ask what we mean by saying that there were different moments of time … 
through which the thing was the same, … we mean that it remained the same while 
other things were changing” (1908:458).  
Next, he argues that a B-series of events—one that runs from ‘earlier than’ to ‘later 
than’ without designating any event as past, present or future—can itself never involve 
change. The reason is that change necessarily implies the ceasing to be of an event and no 
event ever ceases to be in a permanently existing B-series. He concludes that there can be 
no B-series without an A-series, so no ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ without actual 
temporal becoming. Any attempt to disconnect the B-series from the actual temporal 
becoming inherent in the A-series only yields a C-series, an ordered series of events that is 
devoid of all temporality, like for instance the letters of the alphabet or of the natural 
numbers below one hundred (op.cit.:461).  
One attempt to preserve the temporal relations between events without having to 
accept the reality of becoming or tense is Mellor’s proposal to anchor such relations in 
causation. Because there is often a causal order between our perceptions of events, e.g., I 
hit my head and then feel pain, we perceive events as ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’. In 
other words, it is the direction of causation that gives us the direction of time (Mellor 
1981). In response to Mellor, however, we can argue that if all events in time are equally 
real, as the static view demands, we may not have a basis for the one-way directionality of 
causation either. In other words, can such a view truly exclude the possibility that 
causation proceeds backwards? In fact, static time seems to allow for a McTaggart-style C-
series, but it provides no grounds for a one-way direction in such a series. As McTaggart 
himself remarks,  
“If we keep to the series of natural numbers, we cannot put 17 between 21 and 26, 
but we keep to the series, whether we go from 17, through 21, to 26, or whether we 
go from 26, through 21, to 17. …  We equally keep to the series in counting 
backward” (1908:461).  
If this is so, then ‘earlier than’ could just as well be ‘later than’ and vice versa and 
the true temporality of these relations is therefore lost. 
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But arguably the most critical line of reasoning against the static view comes with its 
implications for the reality of consciousness and personal identity. This implication 
surfaces when we ask the millennia-old question of how an entity can maintain its identity 
while also undergoing change. Say, for instance, that I drop my coffee cup and as it hits 
the floor the handle breaks off. The cup has now undergone change, but it clearly retains 
the identity of being my coffee cup. Objects go through such changes continually, and the 
same is true of people, say for the person John who chooses to shave his moustache. But 
how can we say the cup or the person have retained their identity even though they 
underwent change? How can the entity be the same if the change-event has changed its set 
of properties, for instance from being a coffee cup with a handle to one without a handle, 
or a person with a moustache to one without? Doesn’t this lead to the same entity 
possessing contradictory properties—an implication that would suggest that our 
understanding of identity must be false? 
There are two main views on how an entity may keep its identity through such 
changes, known as Endurance and Perdurance (see Blackburn 2005:115). The endurantist 
sees time as dynamic and thus for him only the present entity exists, while the past or 
future version are not now in existence. The entity persists through time by existing at 
several successive times. This means that the changed entity never acquires seemingly 
contradictory properties, since such properties do not exist at the same time. For the static 
time theorist, however, change becomes problematic. She believes that the past, present 
and future versions of the object or person all have equal ontological status and this clearly 
leads to the entity possessing contradictory properties.  
To solve this problem the static theorist needs to opt for perdurantism. According to 
this view, my cup-plus-handle and cup-minus-handle are two parts of a four-dimensional 
space-time coffee cup, just as John-plus-moustache and John-minus-moustache are two 
parts of the same four-dimensional space-time John. Because our perception is necessarily 
limited to three dimensions, we see only one slice of the real entity or one temporal part at 
a time, but this is merely a distortion due to our limited perception. In this way 
perdurantism solves the problem of the same entity possessing seemingly contradictory 
properties and it thus enables the retention of identity through change. But perdurantism, 
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or the belief in temporal parts, has far-reaching implications for the nature of personal 
consciousness. Coffee cups and even John’s moustache are merely physical, but John 
himself is more than just his physical body. What does this theory do to the so deeply 
engrained sense in each of us that we are an enduring self, a person with thoughts and 
emotions, with a “stream of consciousness,” with memories of the past and anticipations of 
the future? 
On the perdurantist view, I myself and other persons I know are not self-conscious 
personal agents, but rather stages of persons or mere temporal parts of a four-dimensional 
person. The four-dimensional space-time John is simply a temporally extended entity 
without any consciousness. Now, as long as we are talking about John having a moustache 
or not this fact is not that earth-shattering. But we run into problems when we speak about 
anything involving consciousness, for instance about people having certain beliefs and 
maintaining or rejecting these later on. Thus, to use Peter Geach’s example, we cannot say 
that John (McTaggart) believed in Hegel’s views in 1901 and then later changed his mind, 
since John McTaggart is a merely a four-dimensional space-time object without any 
beliefs or thoughts (Geach 1972:310). We could argue that this consequence is not that 
detrimental, since my temporal parts at least have consciousness, so personhood is still 
preserved (Lewis 1983). But now another problem surfaces. The temporal parts which can 
still have personhood are each completely distinct from each other. So, the I that existed 
when I wrote the first word in this sentence is different from the I that writes the last word 
in it. In other words, I am reduced to a series of unconnected temporal person-parts, each 
with their own distinct personhood.  
Though the endurantist certainly cannot claim that his view is problem-free—as the 
issue of the extent of the present has shown—the implications of perdurantism seem to 
deny what is arguably the most primitive universal belief of humankind, the belief that I 
am a person with an enduring self and consciousness. Again, though proofs for the truth of 
such basic beliefs may be lacking, they are prima facie justified and can be accepted as 
true until a proper defeater is found. And perdurantism with its elaborate structure of 
rational inference certainly does not make a likely candidate for such a momentous 
defeater. 
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4.4  Is time finite or infinite? 
The second question that may shed light on our understanding of divine eternity is if 
time itself should be seen as finite or infinite. In his Summa Contra Gentiles (1955:93ff.), 
Thomas Aquinas masterfully reviewed the then existing arguments concerning this 
question, with the infinitude of time mostly being defended by Aristotle and its finitude 
championed by Christian philosophers such as Bonaventure and Augustine, as well as by 
Islamic thinkers in the Kalam tradition.P4 PAquinas himself regarded the question 
unanswerable by human reason. But, as we shall see, some of the early arguments 
reviewed by him are still playing a role in today’s debate. 
Before we get into the debate itself, however, the question might be asked if today’s 
scientific evidence for a beginning of the universe does not simply make the whole 
philosophical issue redundant. After all, contemporary Big Bang cosmology clearly points 
to an absolute beginning, and as physicist Paul Davies puts it, “Most cosmologists think of 
the initial singularity as the beginning of the universe. On this view the big bang represents 
… the creation of … spacetime itself” (1978). Seeing this general consensus among 
scientists for a beginning of time and thus its finitude, can we still speak of a debate? Is 
science able to settle the matter decisively?  
I believe not. Modern science deals uniquely with physical reality. To view the 
debate as settled by scientific evidence is therefore to assume that time is limited to the 
physical universe and thus cannot exist beyond it. But in the section on dynamic and static 
time above we saw that time can be argued to also exist in the absence of the physical, 
namely in the mental realm. If so, then it is not incoherent to think of mental events, and 
thus time, as existing ‘before’ the Big Bang. In fact, even Newton, as a theist scientist, 
firmly endorsed such a view. He saw time as emanating directly from God’s existence, and 
since God is infinite, time also had to be infinite in his view (1999). Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, the finite-infinite debate is intertwined with still unresolved questions 
about time’s topology (linear or not) and essential nature (substantival or relational). 
Consequently, the question regarding the finitude of time has not been decisively 
answered, and in the following sections we will therefore explore some of the fundamental 
arguments for both finite and infinite time. 
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4.4.1  The case for infinite time 
As we saw, Aristotle argued for the infinitude of time and his reasoning has been 
defended by contemporary philosophers such as Richard Swinburne and J.R. Lucas (1981, 
1973). Aristotle argues, 
“Since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the now, and the now is a 
kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a 
beginning of future time and an ending of past time, it follows that there must always 
be time .… Therefore, since the now is both a beginning and an end, there must 
always be time on both sides of it” (1984b:420). 
The argument here is that every instant of time necessarily implies an earlier and 
later instant and thus time must be infinite. Elsewhere the philosopher reasons that time 
cannot come into being or cease to be for “there could not be a before or an after if time 
did not exist” (1984a:1693). In other words, once you have an instant of time you are 
committed to an instant before it and after it and this ad infinitum. Swinburne defends 
Aristotle’s reasoning by arguing that for every time T there must be a time after T since it 
is true that “there will be swans somewhere subsequent to a period T, or there will not. In 
either case there must be a period subsequent to T, during which there will or will not be 
swans” (1981:172). Swinburne here uses the Law of Excluded Middle to argue that as 
soon as the presumed last instant of time arrives, we are confronted with certain statements 
regarding what comes after that time and such statements are necessarily true—i.e. “There 
will be swans or there will not.” But if something is true after time then a certain state of 
affairs exists after time and this means we still find ourselves in time.   
 But is this a necessary conclusion? As the founder of temporal or tense logic, Prior 
convincingly argues that it is not. He writes,  
“It is sometimes suggested that the idea that time will come to an end is essentially 
incoherent; and so it would be if we had to express this supposition by saying that at 
all times after a certain time there will be no time at all. We do not, however, have to 
put it in this way” (1968:98, italics mine).  
Applying tense logic to Swinburne’s statement “It is the case that (there will be 
swans or there will not be swans),” it can then be translated to read “Either it is the case 
that (swans will exist) or it is not the case that (swans will exist).” P5 P Swinburne’s 
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formulation may indeed entail the existence of future time since it requires a certain future 
event (that there will or will not be swans), but Prior’s proposal limits the future event to 
only one term of a disjunction (that it is the case that swans will exist). As with all 
disjunctions, this one term can be denied while the disjunction itself remains true. This 
makes the existence of time no longer a necessary presupposition and thus finite time at 
least logically possible. Prior’s proposal seems to show that finite time is not in itself an 
incoherent notion, so are there other arguments for time’s infinity? 
We saw earlier that Newton was a firm believer in infinite time, so let us take a 
moment to explore his reasons. Newton distinguished between two senses of time, namely 
absolute and relative time. “Absolute time” he wrote “flows equably without relation to 
anything external, and by another name is called duration,” while he described relative 
time as a “sensible and external measure of duration” (1999:408). In other words, absolute 
time exists independently of the events that occur in time, and can thus be seen as a type of 
empty container that continues to exist no matter if there are any objects or events to 
occupy it. Though time in this view is directly related to God, it is not related to events or 
change and is therefore most often classified as a substantival view of time. Newton 
defended this view against his contemporary the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, who saw 
all time as reducible to temporal relations between events and thus as relational.  
The assumption that undergirded Newton’s defense of the substantival position 
seems to be that anything that has ‘being’ must necessarily be in time, just as it would have 
to be in space (Craig 2001a:77). For Newton, as a theist, this in turn meant that since 
God’s existence is infinite, absolute time is also infinite. Unfortunately, Newton nowhere 
provides explicit reasoning to support his basic assumption that all being must be 
temporal, and thus we also find in his thinking no clear argument for the infinity of time 
(Craig 2001b:258). However, his thinking does provide us with the distinction between 
relational and substantival time, a distinction that in itself may shed some further light on 
the finite-infinite time question. For if time is substantival, it can exist independently from 
any objects or events. Such a view is clearly more conducive to the infinite stance in the 
finite-infinite debate. Even in the face of evidence for a beginning of the universe, the 
substantivalist can continue to support the view that time is infinite. By contrast, the 
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relationist who believes that the universe had a beginning will tend to support the finitude 
of time, unless, of course, she explicitly acknowledges the existence of non-physical 
events.  
Next to the substantival-relational controversy, another question that plays a role in 
the finite-infinite debate is the question of the structure of time, or time’s topology. The 
common sense answer here seems to be that time is linear, and should thus be represented 
by a continuous straight line. But could it be true that there are multiple time lines, or that 
the line of time could be branched, or could even form a closed loop and thus be circular? 
In all the linear scenarios mentioned here, we could be dealing with either an infinite or a 
finite line. But if the structure of time forms a closed loop or circle, time would necessarily 
be infinite. What we see here, then, is that both the substantivalist stance and the circular 
view of time create room for the view that time is infinite. Their opposites, the relational 
view and the idea that time is linear, especially when combined with the notion of a finite 
physical universe, tend to support an understanding of time as finite. 
  
4.4.2  The case for finite time 
We saw that the arguments for the infinity of time were in no way conclusive. Let us 
therefore explore the reasons that have been presented to support the finitude of time. The 
most famous of these find their origin in theist thought, of both the Christian and the 
Islamic variety. The Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God, for instance, 
argues that if the universe had a beginning it must have had a cause (see Zalta 2008). In 
support of the premise that the universe began to exist it is then argued that there cannot 
have been an infinite regress of past events because such a series would represent an actual 
infinite, and an actual infinite cannot exist. The problem with the idea of an actual infinite 
is that it leads to logical absurdities, e. g. the conclusion that a whole is not always greater 
than its part.P6 PBut if an actually infinite number of things cannot exist, then an infinite 
series of events in time cannot exist, and this leads us to the conclusion that time must be 
finite. 
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The main criticism of this argument has been that the absurdities that accompany 
transfinite calculations simply are defining characteristics of infinite sets. However, the 
question must be asked if purely theoretical entities that entail logical absurdities can ever 
be taken as representative of actual reality. Infinite set theory may be strictly logically 
consistent, but that does not imply its broad logical possibility or that infinite sets can exist 
in the real world (see locus 3.3.2). It is interesting to note, for instance, that transfinite 
mathematics must prohibit subtraction or division in order to maintain its consistency, 
while an actual infinite existing in the real world could not simply avoid such actions in 
order to guard reality against absurdity.   
A related line of argumentation for time’s finitude is that if time is infinite it 
becomes impossible to explain why it currently is now, why the current moment is 
occurring presently and not five days or two centuries ago. If time is infinite, an infinite 
amount of time has already elapsed today. But that would suggest that today has already 
come and gone—yet it hasn’t. In order to explain why the current moment has only arrived 
now, what seems to be needed is a firmly anchored first moment in time and thus a finite 
past rather than an infinite one. In fact, if time were infinite, would it even be possible for 
the present day to exist? Kant, who with Aquinas believed the finite-infinite issue to be 
one that cannot be determined by human reason, explained in his first antinomy,  
“If we assume that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every given 
moment an eternity has elapsed, and there has passed away in that world an infinite 
series of successive states of things. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact 
that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus follows that it is 
impossible for an infinite world-series to have passed away and that a beginning of 
the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world's existence” (1933:397). 
A final argument in favour of finite time is again based on a theist conception of the 
world. If God created the world a finite time ago, but time itself is infinite, then an infinite 
amount of time had passed before the moment of creation. But this position creates some 
difficult questions. First, we are again confronted with the question how a certain moment 
could ever arrive, in this case, how could the moment of creation ever come to be if 
infinite time preceded it? Secondly, it becomes unexplainable why God would choose one 
116 
 
moment in infinite time over another in order to create the world—an issue that the 
philosopher Leibniz raised in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke (1956:27).  
As Brian Leftow explains, a perfectly rational God needs a sufficient reason to 
choose moment t for creation rather than any other moment (1991:157). However, in 
infinite time before creation, moment t is no different from any other moment. Leftow’s 
own solution is that God’s reason for delaying creation to moment t is his joyful 
anticipation, a pleasure which at a certain point starts to wane and then provides a reason 
for creating right at that moment. But this solution solves nothing. Since the period of 
anticipatory joy is linked to nothing else but the problematic moment t, the question simply 
resurfaces with different wording, namely why did God’s anticipation peak at moment t ? 
(Craig 2001b:264). Thus the view that time is infinite entails some real tough questions to 
which no satisfactory answers have been given.  
In the preceding sections we have seen that the dynamic conception of time has some 
strong arguments on its side, while the static time view was seen to run into considerable 
problems. We also have seen no decisive arguments in favor of infinite time, and several 
considerations that point in the direction of time being finite. With these philosophical 
reflections in place, let us now explore the biblical view of the nature of time.  
 
4.5  The nature of time in the Bible 
As is the case with most philosophical questions, the Bible does not present an 
explicit answer regarding the correct view of the nature of time. Rather, such a view is 
assumed or implied by other biblical doctrines. One of these biblical doctrines, and one 
that counts among the most basic, is the belief that God created all that exists and that He 
did so ex nihilo, or out of nothing. The Bible begins with the words “In the beginning God 
created the heavens and the earth” (Gen 1:1). This verse strongly suggests that nothing 
physical pre-existed physical creation, and the uniqueness of this act is further accentuated 
by the use of the term bara’ (creating), which is only used with God as its subject and 
differs from yasar (making) “in that yasar primarily emphasizes the shaping of an object 
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while bara’ emphasizes the initiation of an object” (Harris, Laird, Archer & Waltke 
1980:127).  
Moreover, that the later biblical writers understood creation to be comprehensive, ex 
nihilo and caused by God alone, is amply confirmed. For instance, the Old Testament 
declares “I, the Lord, am the maker of all things … by myself,” “before You gave birth to 
the earth, even from everlasting to everlasting You are God” (Isa 44:24, Ps 90:2), while in 
the New Testament we find, “All things came into being by Him, and apart from Him 
nothing came into being,” “Who calls into being that which does not exist,” and “From 
Him and through Him … are all things” (John 1:3, Rom 4:17, 11:36). All this implies that 
the universe had a clear temporal beginning, that it stands in causal relation to God and 
that God existed before or rather without the universe. P7 P  
Now, the point here is that the universe’s actual coming into existence is hard to 
combine with a static or B-theory view of time. Again, in the static view the past, present 
and future all have equal ontological status, just as the spatial locations of here and there 
are equally real, even though one of these may seem more real to the perceiver. All 
temporal becoming is seen as merely mind-dependent, not an objective feature of the 
physical world. This means that, according to the B-theory of time, there is in the actual 
physical world no state of affairs of God existing before or without the universe. If there is 
a God, then the universe as a whole timelessly co-exists with Him, but there is no room in 
such a view for the universe actually coming into being or God existing on his own before 
or without creation.  
What static time theorists can confirm is that the universe is ontologically dependent 
on God, that He continually sustains it in existence. Such sustaining activity is indeed 
explicitly taught in scripture (Col 1:17, Heb 1:3). But the verses that speak of God bringing 
the world into existence in the past outnumber these ‘sustaining’ passages at a rate of at 
least 200 to one.P8 P After studying the scriptural data, systematic theologian George Hendry 
concluded that, “Creation in the language of the Bible unquestioningly connotes 
origination …, the bringing into existence of something that did not previously exist” 
(1972:420). It seems clear, therefore, that the biblical view of time favors the dynamic or 
A-theory of time.  
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The same doctrine of creation ex nihilo points strongly in the direction of finite time. 
In fact, Aquinas, who as we saw believed that none of the rational proofs for or against the 
finitude of the past were decisive, stated that this is nevertheless what the Christian must 
believe “by faith alone” since the doctrine is clearly scriptural (1952a:253). This is not to 
say that time was necessarily created when the physical universe was created, but if “All 
things came into being by Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being,” time was 
created at some point, and thus finite (John 1:3).P9 
The two other facets of time we have considered in our discussion of the finite-
infinite debate seem to lend additional support to the finite time position. The Bible does 
not explicitly point to time as either substantival or relational, but there are several reasons 
to regard the relational view as more fitting. First, biblical scholars point to the Hebrew 
sense of time as content-oriented and clearly linked to events (e.g., Jenni:1962). Secondly, 
if time is substantival, like an empty container that exists independently from any objects 
or events, then it is an eternally existing entity. But if it is eternal we run into all the 
problems discussed in the previous chapter, namely those connected with Platonic thought 
and its incompatibility with divine aseity (locus 3.3.2). Therefore, a view of time as 
dependent on the existence of other entities, and thus relational, is clearly more compatible 
with the biblical view.  
The issue of time’s topology is more explicitly addressed in the Bible. Though the 
contrast between so-called Greek cyclical time and Hebrew linear time may have been 
overstated by someP10 P, it is clear that the Bible as a whole portrays time as linear (Cullmann 
1964:23). From Genesis’ “In the beginning” to Revelation’s “Come, Lord Jesus” the 
message is that of a historical progression from creation and fall, through Jesus’ ministry, 
to the Day of Judgment and eternal life. On the way to this end point, we also find ample 
historical narratives and genealogies, helping people not to lose sight of the inevitable 
progression to the fulfillment of God’s plan. Moreover, events occur at a specific point in 
time, when “the time has been fulfilled” (e.g., Mark 1:15, Gal 4:4, Eph 1:10), and the 
crucial events of this history also happen “once and for all” (Heb 10:12, Jude 3). Finally, a 
cyclical view of time would create significant tension with the doctrine of free will and 
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moral responsibility, since events would tend to be predetermined rather than affected by 
human decisions.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter we have looked at the most important philosophical and 
scriptural arguments regarding the nature of time, focusing specifically on two questions: 
whether time is dynamic or static, and whether it is finite or infinite.  
Support for the dynamic view was found in the linguistic argument, with its 
reference to tense as a universal and irreducible trait of human language, as well as the 
phenomenological argument that points to our experience of becoming as so extremely 
basic that the view that tense is a real becomes prima facie justified. Two lines of 
reasoning opposing the dynamic view were the serious allegations that it implies 
contradictions, and that the concept of becoming is somehow incoherent. However, the 
former objection was found to rest on a wrong interpretation of the dynamic view, and the 
same turned out to be true for part of the latter one. The problem that did remain on the 
table was the age-old question of the extent of the present. It remained unanswered, though 
not necessarily unanswerable and thus leading to incoherence.  
We then focused on the static or B-theory of time and found strong support in the 
theory of relativity as formulated by Einstein and interpreted by Minkowski, since 
Minkowskian relativity clearly implies that time is static. It was noted, however, that the 
Lorentzian interpretation of relativity actually works with a dynamic view of time. Since 
this view is empirically equivalent and even preferred by some for resisting the temptation 
to “spatialize” time and practically ignore mental reality, the argument for static time from 
STR stands defeated. A second line of reasoning for static time was the idea that becoming 
is necessarily mind-dependent. It was shown that no matter how we interpret this 
allegation, qualifying it as mind-dependent does nothing to deny the actual reality of 
becoming. Indeed, we saw that temporality stands as an undeniable fact in mental reality, 
and that this fact makes it highly probably that time also exists in physical reality.  
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Mental reality thus emerged as the stumbling stone for the static or B-theory of time, 
and this finding was confirmed in the final two arguments explored in this section. First, 
there was the allegation that the static view “spatializes” time, reducing time to a 
necessarily physical concept and thus again practically denying the reality of the mental 
realm. Occam’s Razor demands the preference of the more simple theory as true, but such 
a pragmatic principle should not hold sway when there are good arguments to the contrary. 
Secondly, it was shown that static time must deny the one crucial part of mental reality that 
arguably forms an even more basic human experience than that of the passage of time, 
namely that we human beings have an enduring consciousness or self. In a static view of 
time, personhood cannot be anchored in the true four-dimensional space-time object but 
can possibly be relegated to the temporal slices of the object. But this leads to the 
counterintuitive notion that our consciousness does not endure through change but is a 
mere series of consciousness-instants without any interconnectedness. Such a view flies 
directly in the face of one of the most basic universal beliefs of mankind—a belief that 
again can only be defeated by an even more basic belief to the contrary or by allegations of 
incoherence. Until such a solid defeater is found, the dynamic view of time seems to stand 
as philosophically the most plausible of the two theories on the nature of time. 
We then looked at the question if time is finite or infinite and saw no decisive 
philosophical arguments for the infinity of time and several considerations against this 
view. The infinite time view implies the notion of an actual infinite, a notion that may 
possess strict logical consistency but that seems to be metaphysically impossible. In 
addition, this view of time is also confronted with the need to answer Leibniz’ question 
why God did not create the world sooner than He did. 
These same two debates in the philosophy of time were then explored from the 
biblical perspective and here we found our philosophical intimations strongly confirmed. 
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo demands that time be understood as dynamic and thus 
that becoming and change are real features of extra-mental reality. Moreover, the verses 
that confirm this doctrine also teach that all that is not God is created and thus finite, at 
least in the sense of having a beginning. Finally, we saw the relational view of time lend 
further support to this position, as did time’s linear topology as taught in Scripture. We 
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conclude, then, that we have solid reasons to think that time is both dynamic and finite, 
and our further exploration of divine truth will therefore be based on this particular view of 
time. The next step in our investigation will be to explore what dynamic and finite time 
exactly entails for a correct understanding of divine time and eternity. 
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NOTES 
 
P
1
P Audi mentions that Heraclites himself may have been less radical in his view of reality, but that Plato and 
Aristotle were influenced in their understanding of Heraclites' thought by the more extreme Heracliteanism 
of Cratylus of Athens (Audi 1995:376). 
 
P
2
P Proponents of static time have tried to ground time’s asymmetry in physical processes. For a critique of 
such attempts, see Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time and Space-Time. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976:403-404. 
 
P
3
P In his Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (1982) well-known philosopher of science Karl Popper 
remarks, “If we now have theoretical reasons from quantum theory for introducing absolute simultaneity, 
then we would have to go back to Lorentz’s interpretation” (p. 59). Moreover, John Kennedy, in his paper 
delivered at the 1997 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, speaks of a “sea change” in the 
attitude among physicists toward Lorentzian relativity (quoted in Craig 2001a:54n). 
. 
P
4
P Islamic philosophical theology. 
 
P
5
P Brackets added by me for clarity. 
 
P
6 
PAn example is the infinite series of integers (both odd and even), and the infinite series of integers that are 
even. For every member of the latter there would be two of the former, but still the latter would not be a 
‘part’ of the ‘whole’ of the former. 
 
P
7
P Philosophically speaking it is of course debatable if anything can exist ‘before’ time, since the term ‘before’ 
locates the existence in time. However, the biblical authors used ordinary language rather than philosophical 
terminology. The term ‘before’ can be replaced by ‘without’ to avoid unwarranted philosophical 
complications. 
 
P
8 
PCounting only the occurrence of “Creator,” “created,” “creating,” “made the world” and “Maker” in the 
NIV Bible. 
 
P
9 
POn a relational view of time it can be argued that the term ‘thing’ in this verse does not apply to time, since 
time is a mere abstract relation. However, if time is merely relational it would be dependent on the existence 
of  ‘things’ and events and thus again be finite. 
 
P
10 
PSee James Barr 1969:143ff. 
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5 – THE NATURE OF DIVINE ETERNITY 
 
5.1  Introduction 
We ended the previous chapter with the conclusion that time is dynamic and finite. 
Not only is this the scriptural understanding, but philosophically speaking it also seems the 
most plausible position to take. In this chapter we will explore the implications of this 
view of time for our understanding of the divine attribute of eternity. We saw in Chapter 
Three that there are two main interpretations of divine eternity, namely the view of 
classical theism that eternity is atemporal timelessness, and the view that eternity must be 
temporal or everlasting. Both views were seen to have scriptural and philosophical 
support, though both also ran into significant problems.  
First, the atemporal view of divine eternity was confronted with three puzzling 
questions, namely: (1) how can a timeless God be related to temporal beings, (2) how can 
such a God be truly omniscient, and (3) how can He have real personhood?  The 
interpretation of divine eternity as temporal ran into another set of problems, namely: (1) 
how can He be perfect and (2) how can such a God have necessary existence?  
Our task in this chapter will be to explore if our newly gained understanding of time 
can help us progress toward solving these difficulties. Before we do so, however, we need 
to make sure that the two views of eternity mentioned so far are the only possible options. 
Some of the proposed solutions to the problems mentioned above assume the viability of a 
middle position between a-temporal timelessness and temporal eternity. We therefore need 
to address the question: Could such a middle position be a valid third option? 
Probably the most well-known effort in this direction is that by Eleonore Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann. In their article Eternity they defend the position that the classical 
view of eternity was in fact that of ‘atemporal duration.’ Taking Boethius’ classic 
definition of eternity as “the complete possession all at once of illimitable life” (Stewart, 
Rand & Tester 1973), Stump and Kretzmann simply posit that the most natural 
understanding of the phrase here translated as “illimitable life” is that of infinite duration 
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(1981:432). They further support this stance by appealing to other passages in Boethius 
and to “the weight of tradition both before and after Boethius” (ibid.). Based on this 
durational view of eternity, they then attempt to craft a way for an atemporally enduring 
God to be related to temporal creatures, a relationship which they call: eternal-temporal 
simultaneity, or ET-simultaneity for short.  
Brian Leftow, though one of the few who agree with the assessment of the classical 
notion of eternity put forward by Stump and Kretzmann, does not support ET-simultaneity 
and instead offers his own rather unusual account of divine timelessness. He believes that, 
next to their time-bound mode of existence, temporal beings also exist in eternity and as 
such they actually share God’s mode of existence. He first argues that, based on God’s 
omnipresence, the distance between Him and everything in space is zero. Next, he posits 
that all temporal beings exist in space, and since for spatial beings all change is spatial 
change, it follows that all temporal beings in fact exist changelessly and thus timelessly 
relative to God (1991b). 
Both proposals for a durational interpretation of timelessness have been widely 
criticized. To begin with Stump and Kretzmann’s view, not only is their definition of ET-
simultaneity deemed unclear and even circular (Davis 1983:20; Leftow 1991b:173), their 
reinterpretation of the classical view of eternity has also been vigorously contested. In his 
extensive study of time and eternity in Neo-Platonic and early Christian thought, Richard 
Sorabji, for instance, concludes that Boethius, like his Neo-Platonic forbears, saw eternity 
as a timeless state which excludes duration (2006:120). Katherine Rogers also critiques 
both Stump and Kretzmann’s as well as Leftow’s interpretation of the loci classici for 
timelessness in Plato, Plotinus, Boethius, Augustine and Aquinas. She writes, “It is 
unlikely that Boethius and his intellectual confreres accepted the concept of an extended 
eternity” (1994:6, italics mine).  
But even if we allow the “unlikely” and accept that classical theism’s concept of 
divine eternity was indeed durational, the question remains if such a concept of atemporal 
duration can even be a coherent one. Does it render a middle position between timeless 
and temporal eternity a viable option? I tend to agree with Rogers when she writes, “Since 
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‘duration’ ordinarily means ‘extension in time’, a ‘timeless duration’ is, prima facie, quite 
a puzzling notion” (1994:7).  
In response to the various critiques of their work, and hoping to clarify their puzzling 
view, Stump and Kretzmann have offered the following analogy. Imagine two parallel 
lines, one for time, the other for eternity. On the temporal line, the present moment is like a 
continually moving point of light, while on the eternal line the present is represented by 
the whole line being lighted up in its entirety (1987:219). This method of picturing 
atemporal duration seems simple enough. But as Rogers points out, when we look more 
closely, all that the analogy of the two lines accomplishes is that it further exposes the 
impossibility of atemporal duration. For if the two lines are truly parallel, then each point 
Tn on the ‘time line’ is equidistant from a certain point En on the ‘eternity line’. 
Moreover, the distance between Tn and any non-corresponding point on the eternity-line, 
say En+1, will be greater than that between Tn and En. This being so, En is closest to Tn, 
“while Tn+1, if not temporarily ‘later’ than Tn with respect to En, must nonetheless be 
‘farther’ in some sense” (1994:8). However, this conclusion directly denies Stump and 
Kretzmann’s assurance that “an eternal entity or event cannot be earlier or later than… any 
temporal entity or event” (1981:435). Rogers concludes, “Eternity as duration can be 
described without contradiction only so long as ‘duration’ is stripped of any meaning by 
which to distinguish duration from the lack of it” (1994:12).  
What about Leftow’s account of atemporal duration? Does his proposal succeed? 
Leftow’s basic premise was that the distance between an omnipresent God and everything 
in space is zero. This statement seems wrongheaded right from the start since it simply 
reduces God to a spatial being. If God were indeed spatial, due to his omnipresence, the 
distance between him and everything else in space would of course be zero. But God is 
spirit and thus emphatically not physical or spatial. What we mean when we say that God 
is omnipresent and there is no distance between God and creatures is that the term 
‘distance’ in itself is just not applicable. I therefore agree with William Craig when he 
states that Leftow’s first premise is based on a category mistake (2000:211).  
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In addition, Leftow further rests his argument on the questionable assumptions that 
all temporal beings exist in space, and that all change is spatial change. Concerning the 
former, we saw in Chapter Four that time is not necessarily limited to space, and if the 
biblical account is correct there are indeed non-spatial creatures, such as angels, who may 
very well be subject to temporality. Similar objections arise concerning the view that all 
change is spatial change. Granted that spatial beings are indeed subject to continual spatial 
change, it still seems highly unlikely that our mental changes, for instance to suddenly 
remember one’s 8 Pth P birthday, can be exhaustively described in spatial terms. Leftow would 
first need to present extensive proof for these unsupported and implausible positions 
before his actual argument can proceed. Based on these objections, we need go no further 
to see that Leftow’s hybrid account of eternity is also flawed. 
So far, no viable middle position between divine temporality and timelessness has 
been found, and Rogers’ apt critique of Stump and Kretzmann’s proposal strongly suggests 
that temporality and timelessness are actually mutually exclusive. This being so, let us now 
proceed to explore if our newly gained understanding of the nature of time can solve some 
of the issues that we saw existed with each of the two main interpretations of divine 
eternity.   
 
5.2  Divine eternity as atemporal timelessness 
As we have seen, the classical view of eternity is that God is atemporal and thus that 
He completely transcends time. Philosopher Thomas Morris aptly expresses this utter 
transcendence when he writes: 
 “Theirs is a conception of timeless or atemporal fullness of being. According to 
them, God does not in any way exist in time. There is no temporal location or 
duration in the life of God. He undergoes no temporal succession whatsoever. There 
is no past, present or future in God’s own unique form of existence or within the 
divine experience. On this picture, God does not exist throughout the eternity of 
time; he exists wholly outside of time. The whole temporal realm is a creation of 
God and does not contain him as a part. As he transcends space, he also transcends 
time” (1991:120). 
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 Let us now see if we can understand how God, if He is indeed timeless, can stand in 
any relationship to temporal beings, how He can be truly omniscient and how He can have 
the personhood that is such an essential characteristic of the God of the Bible. 
 
5.2.1  Can God be related to temporal beings if He is timeless?  
That God is related to temporal beings is beyond dispute. The Bible teaches that He 
is the creator and sustainer of temporal creation, that He acts in time and responds to the 
attitudes and prayers of humankind and even that He became human and lived among us. 
The question that remains, however, is if his interaction with temporal creation necessarily 
implies that He himself is temporal.  
Let us look at these different ways in which God is related to the world in turn. First, 
do his acts—his creating and sustaining the universe and his acts in human history—
necessarily imply that He is temporal? It seems so, for even if we view God as timeless 
without creation, as soon as He creates the world He changes, and change always implies 
temporality. How exactly does the act of creation change God? As Craig explains, God 
now “stands in a relation in which he did not stand before,” namely the relation of 
“sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe” (2001a:87).  
It is often argued that Aquinas has offered an effective solution to the problem of 
how God could remain timeless even as creator and sustainer of the universe. Aquinas 
argued that God could timelessly will his effects (creation, sustaining, guiding) as well as 
the times at which those effects appear in a temporal sequence (1955:102-104). In modern 
words, he could “pre-program” the temporal unfolding of events as part and parcel of the 
creative act itself. This solution seems effective in that it prevents God needing to act in a 
temporal sequence and thus becoming temporal. However, it does not answer the charge 
that God now stands in a new relationship, and thus changes as a result of acquiring that 
relationship. In order to circumvent this specific kind of change Aquinas actually posits 
that God does not stand in any relationship whatsoever. Aquinas of course advocated the 
divine attribute of simplicity, as well as the view that God’s essence is his existence 
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(1952a:16-17). Consequently, no accidental properties can be attributed to God, and this 
rule includes the accident of relation. In Aquinas’ metaphysics, relations can inhere in both 
of the relata, but also in only one relatum, and God’s relation to the world is of the latter 
kind. Therefore, “while the temporal world does have the relation of being sustained by 
God, God does not have a real relation of sustaining the temporal world. This latter 
relation… signifies only a conceptual relation” (Craig 1998b:225). This of course implies 
that God can remain utterly unchanged by the temporal world and thus that He can remain 
timeless. 
Is this account of God and creation credible? I tend to agree with Craig that it is not 
(1998b:228). If the relation of a certain cause (God) to its effect (the world) is conceptual 
only, with the ontological accident of relation inhering only in the effect, then the cause 
has no ontologically based relation to its effect. And if that is so, then it simply cannot be 
the cause of that effect. Since the God of the Bible did in fact cause the world, this view is 
unacceptable, and we have therefore not been able to counter the conclusion that God must 
indeed be temporal.  
A possibly even greater enigma is the question of the incarnation: Given that God is 
timeless, how could He enter time and be born into this temporal world without thereby 
becoming temporal himself? It is for this reason that Kierkegaard called the Incarnation the 
“Absolute Paradox”, the mystery of how God can enter the space-time world without 
ceasing to be eternal (1985). Aquinas would of course have the same answer here as to the 
question of creation. If God sustains no real relation to creatures, then the human nature of 
Christ is related to the second person of the Trinity, but not vice versa. But this 
construction seems just as unconvincing and unbiblical as that of the creator who is not 
really related to his creation—this time even bringing into question the divine identity of 
Christ. For those who do not want to accept the extensive metaphysical system that 
undergirds Aquinas’ solutions, the temporality of God again comes into view as a 
conclusion that seems hard to avoid. 
A third way in which God interacts with temporal creation is by responding to the 
prayers, acts and attitudes of human beings. Such responsive acts seem somewhat different 
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from other divine acts in that their rationale is more closely connected with the specific 
human actions to which they are a response. God spares Nineveh because the city repents 
and He destroys Sodom and Gomorrah because they do not. Philosopher Nicholas 
Wolterstorff states it this way: “Some of God’s actions must be understood as a response 
to the free actions of human beings .… I think it follows, given that all human actions are 
temporal, that those actions of God which are ‘response’ actions are temporal as well” 
(1975:197). Based on this distinction between responses and other divine acts, Wolterstorff 
then argues for divine temporality as follows: 
“… every case of knowing about some temporal event that is occurring itself either 
begins or ends (or both). Hence the act of knowing about e that is occurring is 
infected by the temporality of e. So also, the act of knowing about e that it was 
occurring, and the act of knowing about e that it will be occurring, are infected by 
the temporality of e” (1996:125). 
The argument here is that in order for God to respond to a human action He must know 
when it is taking place. In other words, God must literally know what time it is, and in 
order to know that He must be in time. The question of responsive action seems therefore 
intricately connected with the question of divine knowledge, and since the very next 
section deals extensively with the issue of God’s knowledge, or omniscience, we will defer 
its further exploration till that time.  
What we have seen so far is that the concept of a timeless God who is related to 
temporal beings in very real ways seems to lead to serious problems. The acts of creating 
and sustaining the universe, and being born as a temporal beingP1 P into a temporal world 
already seem to define God as temporal, while the deferred question of divine responses to 
human actions can only add further strength to the case for temporality. Let us now see if 
the conclusions we reached in Chapter Four regarding the true nature of time can offer us a 
possible solution.  
Our conclusions about the nature of time were that the dynamic view or A-theory of 
time is the correct one and that time is finite. Time being finite does not seem to directly 
affect God’s ability to relate to temporal beings. However, our conclusion that time is 
dynamic does. In fact, embracing the static or B-theory of time would significantly 
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diminish our problems, while the dynamic view only strengthens the case against the 
timelessness of God! If time is static then the world simply exists timelessly together with 
a timeless God. The universe does not come to be, so God cannot be its creator in the 
common sense understanding of the word. He is only its creator in the sense that the world 
depends on God for its existence. This means that God does not acquire a new relationship 
by creating and He can thus remain unchanged and timeless. The same goes for God’s 
sustaining action. Since every event is equally real no matter if we call it past, present or 
future, God can be conceived of as sustaining it without any problem. Even the Incarnation 
becomes less of a mystery, at least  as far as the time-factor is concerned. However, the 
static view brings us to the position of reducing creation ex nihilo to a mere ontological 
dependence of the universe on God, a stance we decisively rejected in Chapter Four (locus 
4.5).  
Another way in which the static view would seem helpful is by alleviating the 
difficulty of how God can know tensed facts. For if time is static there are no tensed facts. 
Tense is only a subjective feature of language, while reality itself is static and tenseless. So 
the question of how a timeless God can know tensed facts is simply beside the point. In 
short, the dynamic view affords possible answers to the stated problems, but to those who 
believe the arguments against static time are decisive, none of these solutions are available. 
It seems then, that we have to conclude with even more conviction that if God is really 
related to the world, as the Bible confirms, He must also really be temporal.  
 
5.2.2  Can God really be omniscient if He is timeless? 
Another thorny question concerns a timeless being’s ability to be truly omniscient. 
Are there certain types of knowledge that would be unattainable for God if He is wholly 
outside of time? As we saw in Chapter Three (locus 3.3.6), one specific kind of 
knowledge, namely foreknowledge or knowledge of future contingents, might actually be 
facilitated if the knower is outside of time. The circle analogy found repeatedly in classic 
theism illustrates this point (e.g. Boethius 1999:105, Aquinas 1955:219). P2 P If we picture the 
time-line of temporal beings as a circle, and God’s timeless eternity as its center-point—a 
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mathematical point without extension—we see how a timeless being could have cognitive 
access to events that to us still lie in the future. Since the point is related to all temporal 
events on the circumference of the circle in exactly the same way, for such a being there 
would seem to be no difference between events in the past, the present or the future.  
However, the type of knowledge that was specifically seen as problematic for a 
timeless view of eternity was time-bound or ‘tensed’ knowledge, and this brings us back to 
the deferred question of Wolterstorff: Can God, if He is timeless, really know what time it 
is now? Stephen Davis is among those who agree with Wolterstorff in denying this 
possibility. He argues, “Since a timeless being can never know at what temporal stage the 
world is (all time is ‘simultaneously present’ to such a being), a timeless being cannot be 
omniscient” (1983:29). Craig agrees. He first explains that tensed propositions convey not 
only tenseless facts but also tensed ones. While tenseless facts describe the content of an 
event, tensed facts are facts about “how far from the present” an event is, for instance 
tensed verbs or words like ‘yesterday’ and ‘next week’ (2001a:99). Of course, since the 
present is continually changing, the body of tensed facts is also in continual flux. If, as we 
saw in Chapter Three, omniscience is defined as knowing all true propositions, the 
implication is of course that God’s knowledge would be changing, and since change 
requires temporality, God cannot be timeless.  
But is this necessarily so? If God is timeless and knows everything about all states of 
affairs, does it not follow that He also knows at what time they take place? Since God 
knows the content of our minds, of course He knows what the date and time is according 
to human calendars and watches (Ps 139:2). But could He not also know how much time 
has elapsed since the beginning of the universe? According to the Bible the physical 
universe is finite; it came to be at a certain point in time and will come to an end at another 
point in time and between its origin and its end the universe continually changes. At point 
t, for instance, one galaxy will be in existence but another not yet. Since God knows every 
single fact about an event, He also knows which galaxies are in existence during that 
event, and based on this knowledge He would truly know what time it is, even in ‘galactic’ 
terms.P3 P   
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Actually, what Craig is referring to lies deeper than such minutely detailed but 
tenseless knowledge of what the state of the universe is at every moment. He writes, “A 
being which only knew all tenseless facts about the world, including which events occur at 
any date and time, would still be in the dark concerning tensed facts …. He would have no 
idea which events are past and which are future” (2001a:99). The problem is that a 
timeless being would know what time it is, but he would know this for every possible 
instant in time. In other words, he would have no way to distinguish the real now from the 
vast multitude of other nows; every instant in time is known by such a being in the exact 
same way. And if this is so, such a being “cannot be timeless, for his knowledge must be in 
constant flux, as the tensed facts known by him change” (ibid.). In other words, if God is 
essentially atemporally timeless, He cannot be omniscient! 
This is a serious set-back to the view of God as timeless, and some have therefore 
suggested that the definition of omniscience itself should be revised (e.g., Wierenga 2003). 
However, such revisions imply that normal human beings know an incalculable multitude 
of true propositions of which a timeless omniscient being would be ignorant. Temporal 
persons know that World War II is over, but a timeless being has no idea whether it has 
even occurred yet or not. But if God’s knowledge is by definition so much more excellent 
and extensive than ours, this seems a rather questionable view. Not only that, such a 
restricted view of God’s knowledge fails to explain how God can actually respond to the 
attitudes, choices and prayers of his creatures. That God does respond to our actions is 
biblically well attested. So, it seems then that Wolterstorff’s objection to divine 
timelessness still stands.  
We have not considered yet, however, if and how this view might be affected by 
what we learned in the previous chapter about the true nature of time as being dynamic and 
finite. Do these conclusions offer any solutions to the above problem?  Again,  just as with 
the question of God’s relatedness to creation, we see that time’s finitude does not directly 
affect the issue, but time’s being dynamic does have an effect. And just as with 
relatedness, we must concede that it is the static view of time and not the dynamic one that 
would have resulted in fewer complications. Since the static view grants past, present and 
future all equal ontological status, there really are no tensed facts that cannot be translated 
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into tenseless ones. So, it is again the dynamic view we have adopted that actually causes 
the problem to emerge.  
How do our conclusions about the nature of time affect the other issue with divine 
omniscience, namely, how God can know future contingents? We saw (locus 3.3.6) that 
the classical view of timeless eternity actually seemed to facilitate divine foreknowledge, 
but we also cautioned that the classical understanding was based on a very specific view of 
time. Classical theism mostly held to a perceptualist model of divine cognition, or scientia 
visionis as Aquinas called it, whereby God knows events by means of some form of 
perception comparable to our own physical sense of vision (1952a:83). But this suggests 
that all events that God knows must already be in existence, and thus future and past must 
have the same ontological status as the present (Craig 1988:116 ff). So, the perceptualist 
model actually goes hand-in-hand with a static view of time.  
Now, if we have good reason to reject the static conception, then the classical 
solution to the problem of God’s foreknowledge is also lost. How do we now explain the 
scriptural position that God does have knowledge of future contingents, even if He would 
be timeless? Craig brings up an interesting point in this regard, namely that the whole 
perceptual model of divine cognition is questionable to begin with. It suggests that God, 
like us, can only acquire knowledge in a mediate manner. By contrast, on a conceptualist 
model God’s knowledge is “more like a mind’s knowledge of innate ideas” (ibid.). God 
does not acquire knowledge, but as an omniscient being simply has the property of 
knowing all truths, including truths about future events. Clearly, such a view of divine 
cognition could not only be argued to be more perfect than the rather anthropomorphic 
notion of perceptual cognition, but it also makes divine foreknowledge much less 
problematic, even if we adhere to a dynamic view of time.  
In sum, to the question whether God can be omniscient if He is timeless, we have 
given a negative answer, just as we did with the question of God’s relatedness to the 
temporal world. While divine foreknowledge continues to be plausible from a timeless 
perspective, the question of tensed knowledge seems to point inevitably in the direction of 
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divine temporality. Let us now turn to our third and final problem with divine 
timelessness, the question of divine personhood. 
 
5.2.3  Can God be a person if He is timeless? 
The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is clearly a person with a mental life, and not 
an impersonal force, power or principle. But can a being with personhood really be 
timeless? Atemporal personhood seems a difficult concept to grasp, possibly so because 
the only persons we can appeal to as examples are all very much temporal. In human 
persons, thinking, imagining, verbalizing and other mental acts seem to require a process, 
and since processes imply temporal succession, such events take place in time. Richard 
Swinburne has argued that a timeless God would be lifeless, and J.R. Lucas writes, “If we 
are to characterize God at all, we must say that He is personal, and if personal then 
temporal, and if temporal then in some sense in time, not outside of it” (Swinburne 1977; 
Lucas 1989:213). So, can a being really have personhood without being in time? Our 
answer to this question will depend on how we define personhood. Which characteristics 
are essential to an entity we call a person? 
The first characteristics of personhood that come to mind are cognitive: 
consciousness and rationality. Philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett confirms this notion. 
He has identified six views of personhood in philosophical thought that all center around 
these two characteristics (1976). Furthermore, that God is a conscious and rational being is 
clearly a biblical fact (e.g., Isa 1:18). But do these aspects of personhood make him 
temporal? This question gains clarity when we consider God’s mental life in the absence 
of a created world. Since God was always free to create or not create, as the Bible clearly 
teaches and the attribute of aseity confirms, the existence of creation is not a necessary 
reality. But, if God had chosen not to create, his mental life would be changeless rather 
than discursive and therefore, given a relational view of time, it would also be timeless 
(Craig 1998a:111). It seems therefore possible to conceive of the scenario of God without 
creation simply being conscious of or knowing tenseless truths such as “2+2=4” and “all 
triangles have three sides.” This argument gains strength from the realization that even for 
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temporal beings the act of knowing—as opposed to ‘getting to know’ or ‘learning’—does 
not necessarily require time (Pike 1970:124). I believe we have no good reason, then, to 
stipulate that consciousness and rationality are only possible for a temporal being. 
Some thinkers have proposed that the ability to relate to other persons is also 
essential to personhood (Pike 1970:128). As we saw above, responsive inter-personal 
relations with human beings may require knowledge of what time it is and thus, plausibly, 
temporality. But what about the scenario of God-without-creation described above; how 
would such timelessness affect his ability to relate to persons?  From the fact that God-
with-creation indeed does relate to created persons we can deduce that God-without-
creation would still be able to do so, even though He would not actually be relating to us. 
Could it be argued that a being who never actually relates to another cannot be a person? I 
think this is extremely doubtful, but even if so, this situation in no way applies to the God 
of the Bible, who, though one in essence, exists in three persons: the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit. Moreover, these three persons indwell one another, and enjoy loving 
communion with each other, also without creation (John 14-17). We will thus have to 
conclude that this further characteristic of personhood is also present in God, even if He 
would be timeless. 
One last major characteristic of personhood is of course free will, so we need to ask 
if a truly free person can be timeless (Yates 1990:169-171). Our earlier arguments have 
shown that for God to act and to know in a timeless manner is not impossible, so why 
would the act of willing be different? One suggestion has been that free will involves 
desires and purposefulness, and since these traits tend to be future-oriented they are only 
possible for a temporal being. As William Kneale puts it, “To act purposefully is to act 
with thought of what will come about after the beginning of the action” (1961:99). But is it 
necessarily so that what a person wills is always in the future? Craig gives some believable 
counter-examples that apply even to temporal beings: “A man dangling from a cliff wills 
to hold on as tightly as he can; … a sunbather desires the feeling of relaxation he presently 
enjoys” (1998a:118). So, with the objects of the human will not necessarily being located 
in the future, we have no compelling reason to assume that future-directedness is an 
essential feature of a divine will either. Thus we can conclude that God can indeed will 
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that which He wills in a timeless manner. Moreover, the God-without-creation scenario 
again clearly confirms this conclusion. God freely created and could therefore just as 
freely have refrained from creating. If He had done so, He would have been free even 
though timeless.  
Does our view of time as dynamic and finite affect our conclusions regarding 
timeless personhood in any way? Well, as long as the notion of a timeless personal God 
itself does not lead to significant problems, then time’s exact nature and its finitude or 
infinitude do not add any relevant information. Our conclusion for this section can 
therefore be that the fact that God has personhood does not in any way preclude his being 
timeless. 
Our review of the arguments against divine timelessness has shown that plausible 
solutions can be found to some of the objections. However, two significant problems 
remain, namely how a timeless being can really be related to a temporal world, and how he 
can have tensed knowledge. In other words, we must conclude that God must be temporal 
in some sense of the term. Let us now turn to the arguments against divine temporality and 
see if plausible solutions can be found on that side of the divine eternity issue.  
 
5.3  Divine eternity as temporal everlastingness 
Those who have found the objections to divine timelessness insurmountable believe 
that eternity must be understood as inherently temporal. Morris describes this view as 
follows: 
“By the claim that God is eternal, many theists mean that God is everlasting: He 
always has existed as God and always will … It is a temporal notion, a conception 
of God’s eternity in terms of time: God’s existence is temporally infinite in 
duration, unbounded in the past and future. On this conception, there is in the life 
of God a past, present and future, as in the life of his creatures. But unlike any of 
his creatures, God is everlasting, and necessarily so” (1991:120).  
The most commonly cited objections to this view are two-fold, namely that such a 
view cannot be combined with God’s perfection and with his necessary existence. Let us 
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again look at each in turn and see if the conclusions we arrived at in Chapter Three about 
the nature of time can help clarify these issues. 
 
5.3.1  Can God be perfect if He is temporal? 
We saw that divine timelessness is a well-established tenet of classical theism and 
there are several ways in which this view of divine eternity is connected with the doctrine 
of divine perfection. The idea is that temporality implies limitations, and limitations do not 
fit with a perfect God. Augustine, for instance, wrote in his Confessions: 
“…Thou Thyself art being and life in the highest? Thou art the highest, Thou 
changest not, neither in Thee dost this present day come to an end, though it doth end 
in Thee, since in Thee all such things are; for they would have no way of passing 
away unless Thou sustainedst them. And since Thy years shall have no end (Ps 
102:27), Thy years are an ever present day” (1948b:7). 
A limitation of all temporal existence is that it entails succession or sequence. For a 
temporal being only the present moment is within reach—and even that is arguable—while 
both past and future are mostly inaccessible. This type of existence is clearly quite 
restricted and therefore not compatible with “being and life in the highest” as mentioned 
here by Augustine. God’s life must be free from such limitations. 
The same point is of course found in Boethius’ formulation of eternity as “that which 
embraces and possesses simultaneously the whole fullness of everlasting life, which lacks 
nothing of the future and has lost nothing of the past” (1999:133). So, divine perfection 
prescribes perfect fullness of life, a life without the restrictions that temporal succession 
seems to imply. 
We all know the experience of loss when we contemplate the past, the years of our 
childhood or maybe our children’s childhood that are now only a fading memory. The 
Dutch have a term for such a feeling of loss, which comes in handy for our discussion: 
heimwee.P4 P Now, for a timeless being things would be different. Living all his life “at 
once”, and having no past or future, such a being would also know no heimwee. However, 
the question we need to ask is if timelessness is the only solution to the incompleteness of 
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temporal life. Grace Jantzen has suggested an interesting alternative (1984). She starts with 
the notion of the specious present, our subjective human awareness of what constitutes the 
current moment. Even though in reality the present consists of a potentially infinite series 
of very brief time-events, to our consciousness it constitutes only one time-event: now. She 
then suggests that God could also have a specious present, but that his divine ‘now’ could 
encompass all of time. If so, God could be temporal while suffering none of the 
fleetingness of life we experience.  
In his analysis of this proposal, Craig argues that such a construct will not do. He 
explains that our experience of a specious present is actually due to a physical limitation, 
namely the finite speed of neural transmissions from our sense receptors to the brain 
(1997:167). It is this limitation that necessitates the gathering of a multitude of minute 
time-events into one experienced interval which we call ‘now’. Needless to say, if the 
specious present is indeed a limitation it would not fit a perfect being, especially since 
divine perfection includes maximum cognitive excellence. Another problem with Jantzen’s 
model is that if God’s specious present would encompass all of time, He would only 
experience his ‘now’ at the very end of that time-interval, which in his case would be at 
the literal end of time. This would suggest that He has no awareness whatsoever until the 
end of time, which is of course even less compatible with the biblical view of God. 
Craig then proposes to interpret God’s specious-present model as merely analogous 
to ours, so that these physical limitations no longer apply. But even the analogous view 
does not allow for a temporal God without heimwee. The problem Craig identifies here is a 
familiar one. If God has at every moment in time a specious present that encompasses all 
time, He can be said to have the same ‘now’ every moment of time. This means that He 
cannot distinguish between times and thus cannot know what time it is, a scenario that we 
have already seen to raise serious problems for divine omniscience (locus 5.2.2).  
It seems therefore, that the heimwee argument continues to stand against a temporal 
interpretation of divine eternity. Of course, God’s temporality would be a lot different 
from ours, since his access to past and future would be much less limited. But, the 
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limitation entailed would still seem serious enough to create tension with the doctrine of 
divine perfection.  
Another way in which perfection may necessitate divine timelessness is proposed by 
Leftow. He states that unlimited duration is a perfection, and therefore God must have the 
least limited duration. He then reasons that infinite duration is more limited than 
timelessness, since infinite duration can have a beginning or end if time itself is finite, but 
timelessness can have neither beginning nor end (1991b:201-202). In other words, the 
accepted definition of eternity as existence ‘without beginning or end’ can still be met by 
both infinite duration and timelessness, but the latter is just that little bit more perfect than 
the former. But the question here is if we can really compare these two interpretations of 
eternity. If timelessness is literally the opposite of temporality (even if unlimited), then 
there seems to be no common ground that allows us to compare the two notions. I must 
therefore again agree with Craig when he calls this move by Leftow a category mistake 
(2001a:11). Therefore, if the timelessness view cannot claim to fit better with divine 
perfection, and eternity merely stipulates that the entity exists without beginning or end, 
both interpretations of eternity  seem compatible with divine perfection. 
However, even if Leftow’s argument fails, because of the heimwee argument we 
must still concede that divine perfection does seem to favor timelessness. But how is this 
possible? In our section on God’s relations with the world (locus 5.2.1) we concluded that 
God must be temporal, because as creator He acquires relatedness to creation and thus 
undergoes change. This argument for divine temporality was strengthened by our 
conclusion in the omniscience section (locus 5.2.3) that true omniscience also requires the 
knower to be temporal. But now the heimwee argument seems to point us in the direction 
of divine timelessness. It seems we have a dilemma here, and our first task will be again to 
focus on our conclusion that time is both dynamic and finite and see if this view can ease 
the tension that has now emerged. 
When we consider the dynamic nature of time, the opposite view would again seem 
more promising in solving the problems. The heimwee issue, for instance, would seem less 
acute—at least theoretically—for if the past actually still exists then we don’t need to 
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regret its passing. In reality, however, the experience of loss is not tempered in the least by 
the past being as real as the present, because we still have no direct access to that past. The 
famous story of Einstein comforting the relatives of his deceased friend by telling them 
that “the distinction between past, present and future is only an illusion” illustrates this 
point well (quoted in Craig 2001a:69). The relatives were not comforted; and heimwee 
remains, even if time is believed to be static. Of course, access to past and future might be 
much more extensive for a divine being, but divine temporality would seem to preclude 
such access to be equal to that of the present. 
What about time’s finitude, how does this aspect of time affect the compatibility of 
divine perfection with temporality? This time we see that the finitude of time is actually a 
factor of great significance. For if time is finite, then a temporal God is necessarily limited 
in terms of time. But divine perfection does not allow for any such limitations. As Turretin 
reminds us, God should be deemed “uncircumscribed by any limits (aperigraptos) of place 
or time” (1992:196-97). So, time being finite necessitates God being somehow beyond 
time, and that simply implies He is timeless. In fact, we already saw this strong connection 
between divine perfection and finite time when in Chapter Four we looked at Leibniz’ 
question why God did not create the world sooner. The reasoning was that God is 
cognitively perfect and therefore has sound reasons for all He does, be it creating or 
delaying creation. But if God exists in infinite time it is impossible for him to have a sound 
reason for delaying creation. Thus, divine perfection demands time to be finite and, 
consequently, God to be timeless.  
In sum, our conclusion that time is dynamic and finite has shown that there are 
decisive reasons to believe that a perfect God simply cannot be temporal, and this means 
that our dilemma does not only remain unresolved but becomes increasingly inescapable. 
Before we return to this matter, toward the end of the chapter, we will first have to see if 
the attribute of divine necessity can be combined with temporality or if it will make the 
problem we have now encountered even more severe. 
 
5.3.2  Can God be a necessary being if He is temporal? 
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If God is a necessary being his non-existence is impossible, meaning He cannot 
come into or go out of existence, and this clearly implies He is eternal. But is this eternity 
necessarily timeless? Even if divine necessity is interpreted in the strong sense of 
Anselm’s ontological argument, it still seems possible for a necessary being to be 
temporal, as long as the duration of that temporality is infinite. So, the attribute of 
necessity just by itself may not give us sufficient reason to believe that God could not be 
temporal.  
It is again Leftow who disgrees with this conclusion. He first postulates the 
assumption that time is contingent (1991b:36). He then reasons from the necessity of God 
to his timelessness as follows: If a necessary God would be temporal He would be 
necessarily temporal, and since this would make time itself necessary rather than 
contingent, God cannot be temporal (Craig 2001b:12). It seems to me that we again have 
some questionable premises here. First, is time necessarily contingent? Such a view cannot 
be blindly accepted, since Newton, for instance, regarded time as an absolutely necessary 
requirement for any being to exist (locus 4.4.1). We may disagree with Newton on biblical 
grounds, but if Leftow wants to dismiss this position on philosophical grounds he will 
have to provide sound reasoning. Second, does a necessary being’s temporality imply that 
this temporality must be necessary? This second assertion is reminiscent of the extreme 
interpretation of necessity of Spinoza which we warned against in Chapter Three. 
Craig takes on this second premise by asking why a God who exists necessarily 
could not be contingently temporal. He appeals to the basic doctrine of the Christian faith 
that God has free will and that the event of creation was therefore contingent and not 
necessary. If this is so, then—using possible world semantics—there are possible worlds 
where God would exist alone without creation. Given a relational view of time, in such a 
world an unchanging God would be timeless, and this possibility refutes the claim that a 
necessary being, if temporal, must also be necessarily so. Of course, without this premise 
there is no ground to argue that God’s temporality would lead to the conclusion that to 
Leftow is so unacceptable, namely that time itself is necessary. In other words, divine 
necessity by itself does not necessarily imply that God must be timeless.  
145 
 
However, we have not yet looked at this conclusion in the light of our findings that 
time is dynamic and finite. Does our view of the nature of time affect our result? Yes it 
does, and by now we see a familiar pattern emerge. Time being static or dynamic does not 
significantly affect matters, but the decisive difference comes again with our view of time 
as finite. A necessary being can only be temporal as long as time is infinite. But if time is 
finite the possibility is introduced of such a being ceasing to exist. Thus, it is again the 
finitude of time that leads us to the conclusion that if God is a necessary being He must 
somehow be timeless. 
 
5.4  Solving the dilemma: William Craig’s theory of divine eternity  
In the previous sections we have reviewed objections to the timeless and temporal 
views of eternity in the light of our earlier conclusions that time is both dynamic and finite. 
That review has now revealed an apparent stalemate, for neither view of divine eternity 
can actually apply to the God of the Bible. On the one hand, since time had a beginning 
and God did not have a beginning, God must transcend time and thus He evidently cannot 
be temporal. On the other, as creator of a temporally finite universe God undergoes at least 
one change, and as all-knowing and responding to his creatures He must know what time it 
is, and these two requirements stipulate that He cannot be timeless. This is our dilemma, 
but is there no way that God can be both beyond time and still causally related to and fully 
omniscient of temporal creation?  
We already rejected theories that try to accommodate a timeless God’s relation to the 
universe by interpreting divine eternity as atemporal duration. Such theories make changes 
to the commonly accepted notion of divine timelessness in the hope of resolving the issue, 
but yield no real solutions, and the idea of atemporal duration itself was found to be 
problematic. However, if a reinterpretation of the concept of timelessness is not the 
answer, maybe a reexamination of our interpretation of divine temporality is needed. Can 
divine eternity be seen as fully temporal, but in such a way that God’s time has no 
beginning and is thus radically different from time as we humans know it? This is the 
solution suggested by Alan Padgett, among others.  
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Padgett proposes a view of time that is able to withstand the philosophical arguments 
against the finitude of time that we presented in Chapter Four. The crucial element in his 
theory is that he, like Newton before him, distinguishes between two types of time (1992). 
On the one hand there is time itself, which he sees as everlasting duration, and on the other 
there is metric time, time as we measure it with clocks and calendars. He argues that while 
God is in time, He is not in any measured or divisible time. In fact, God’s time is 
indivisible, non-metric and thus amorphous; it is what Padgett calls ‘relative timelessness’ 
(1989). The significance here is that such amorphous time is not divisible into intervals, 
while the arguments for the finitude of time only proved that divisible time cannot be 
infinite. Padgett argues that the way we measure time is purely conventional; it is not 
intrinsic to time. And since there are no measures in God’s time, there are also no 
objective facts about the respective lengths of distinct time intervals. As Padgett’s 
colleague Richard Swinburne asserts, such amorphous time is beginningless without being 
infinite—or finite for that matter (1993a:218-19).  
If this proposal is sound, then God’s time, time itself, can be beginningless even 
though our time, divisible time, is finite. But does it work? Unfortunately it doesn’t; the 
problem being that such amorphous time would still be linear in topology, and that fact 
necessarily entails certain truths. One such truth is that even though distinct intervals in 
amorphopus time cannot be compared to each other in terms of length, an interval that is a 
proper part of another interval must still be deemed shorter than the encompassing interval 
(Craig 2001a:269). Now, as long as this basic comparison between the part and the whole 
can still be made, God before creation can be seen as having existed through a 
beginningless and thus infinite series of longer and longer intervals—a conclusion that re-
opens the door for all our familiar arguments against infinite time (ibid.). 
So we are back at square one, with both the temporal and the timeless view of divine 
eternity presenting an impossible scenario. Is there another way in which divine eternity 
can be both temporal and timeless, and, if so, can such a view be maintained without 
presenting us with logical contradictions? Amazingly, we actually have one really solid 
piece of evidence that such a hybrid solution is not impossible. As we saw, the God of the 
Bible is above all a person, and one of the most basic characteristics of personality is free 
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will. It is indisputable that scripture teaches that God is a free-willing agent and that 
creation was the result of his free sovereign choice. This means that creation itself is a 
contingent event and if this event entails that God is temporal, such divine temporality is 
clearly not a necessary attribute of God. Simply put, God would still be God if He had 
chosen not to create. Thus, being eternal may itself be an essential attribute of God, but the 
exact form that this eternity takes is not, and in this sense God can coherently be held to be 
both temporally and timelessly eternal.  
This basic insight leads us to the solution to our conundrum that William Craig has 
proposed. In view of all the evidence we have looked at, I believe his theory to be the most 
plausible interpretation of divine eternity so far. Craig’s view allows for an understanding 
of God as transcending finite time on the one hand and as truly related to and 
knowledgeable about his temporal creation on the other, and as such it certainly seems 
closest to the biblical portrayal of God. Not only that. His view also allows for a 
reinstatement of the notions of absolute time and absolute simultaneity, which have come 
under such tension with the general acceptance of the Minkowskian take on Relativity 
Theory. So, let’s see how Craig defends this hybrid view of eternity.  
Craig sees God as truly timeless without creation and truly temporal or everlasting 
from creation onward (2001a:269-280). Acknowledging that time could well have been 
created before physical creation, for simplicity’s sake he assumes that time began with the 
universe. So, without creation God exists timelessly, but as soon as He creates the 
universe, time begins, and God becomes temporal in virtue of his real relations with the 
created world. In this view God’s timelessness is not the amorphous-but-linear time of 
Padgett and Swinburne, but a state that is truly atemporal. This timelessness is the form 
that divine eternity takes before or without creation. So what happens once God creates the 
world? Let us look at two aspects of the theory more closely, namely the link Craig 
proposes between the two modes of eternity, and the exact nature of God’s relation to time 
after He has become creator of the universe.  
First, how should we conceive of the connection between divine timelessness and 
divine temporality? At face value, Craig’s view seems to imply that God’s life has two 
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phases, a timeless one and a temporal one, with the former somehow preceding the latter. 
But to precede something in itself implies temporality, so how can timelessness precede 
temporality without there being time? Brian Leftow has formulated this objection as 
follows: 
“If God is timeless, there is no before or after in his life. No phase of his life is 
earlier or later than any other phase… So, if God is timeless and a world of time 
exists there is no phase of his life during which he is without a world or time or has 
not yet decided to create them, even if the world had a beginning. For a life without 
phases cannot have one phase that is without the world or time and another phase 
that is with it. The whole of God’s life is identical with the ‘phase’ of it during which 
the universe or time exists…” (1991b:290-91).  
Leftow argues here that if God is timeless and does indeed necessarily become 
temporal by creating, then his entire life must be temporal; it cannot have another phase 
that is timeless. In response, Craig explains that we may be tempted to visualize the two 
phases of God’s life as two segments of a line, joined at the moment of creation. But on a 
dynamic theory of time, such a view is simply false. We need to realize that God without 
creation is entirely alone, without any temporality whatsoever, not even in what might be 
thought of as his ‘future’.  
“There is no before, no after, no temporal passage, no future phase of his life. There 
is just God, changeless and solitary. Now the only possible reason we could have for 
calling such a static state temporal is that temporal states of affairs obtain after it. But 
insofar as the state of the affairs of God existing sans the universe obtains, there are, 
of course, no temporal states of affairs, not in the future or anywhere else” 
(2001b:271).  
The picture Craig is conveying here becomes even clearer when he invites us to 
think of God as changeless and alone, existing in a possible world W where creation and 
time will never exist. It is evident that in such a world we would understand God to be 
timeless. But this scenario describes exactly the timeless phase of God. The temporal 
phase that may or may not obtain through a free willed act of God cannot affect this 
timeless phase in any way. To let it do so would be “to posit some sort of backward 
causation,” which on a dynamic view of time is utterly impossible since the future does not 
exist and thus cannot cause anything (ibid.). Of the two phases of God’s life, then, only 
one is temporal, and the phases are not related to each other as earlier and later than. As 
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such, God’s atemporal phase is not temporally prior to his temporal phase. Instead, 
suggests Craig, we could perhaps envision the timeless state as “a boundary of time, which 
is causally, but not temporally, prior to the origin of the universe” (op.cit.:272). 
But now Leftow raises another objection. How can a timeless God create anything, 
including time, without time being in existence first? Craig responds that time is in fact 
logically posterior to any event coming into existence, while God’s acting is explanatorily 
prior (2001b:21). For some this may seem backward, but on a relational view of time it is 
fully coherent: While God acts and creates events, time is generated as a consequence. It 
comes into existence with the event that is created. Moreover, in current philosophical 
thought on causality, it is generally acknowledged that cause and effect can be 
simultaneous, and a case can even be made that this is indeed always the case (2001b:276). 
It seems that the notion of two phases of God’s life, one temporal and the other non-
temporal has not been proven to be incoherent. Let us therefore turn our attention now to 
God’s being in time with creation. How are we to picture this phase of divine eternity? 
As soon as God creates the world, the first event, time comes into being and God 
now endures throughout time from that moment on. But wait, we defined divine eternity as 
existence without beginning or end; in other words, God never comes into or goes out of 
being and his existence is permanent. But if God has a first moment of existence can He 
then still be eternal? Yes, He can, because God’s having a first moment of existence does 
not entail that He came into existence. It just means He came into time. Even Leftow 
agrees with Craig on this point: 
“Even if he [God]… had a first moment of existence, one could still call God’s 
existence unlimited were it understood he would have existed even if time did not. 
For as long as this is true, we cannot infer from God’s having a first moment of 
existence that God came into existence or would not have existed save if time did” 
(1991b:269). 
So, we can continue to affirm God’s eternity even after He enters time, but what does this 
divine temporality exactly look like? 
The time that God enters is not our human clock-and-calendar type of time. In fact, 
at this stage Craig asserts something very similar to what Newton (and Padgett) had in 
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mind. Like Newton, Craig distinguishes between real time and measured time (locus 
4.4.1), but then applies this distinction only to the temporal phase of God’s life and thus 
not to all of divine eternity. The temporal phase of God’s life brings God in time, but this 
time is ‘real time’ and it is absolute. “From God’s perspective in real, A-series time, there 
is an absolute present in which He is now conscious of what is happening in the universe, 
and He is now sustaining the events in the universe” (1990:342). But this scenario will 
only work if this absolute time properly connects with our down-to-earth human time. In 
other words, is there a measured time that can be said to correspond with God’s real time? 
Can we humans in some sense really know what time it is now? Craig amazingly answers 
‘yes’.  
For those who firmly believe in Einstein’s Relativity Theory as it was interpreted by 
Minkowski, this is where Craig’s theory must derail. For, as we saw in Chapter Four, the 
commonly accepted version of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) does not allow for 
absolute simultaneity. Events which are present for an observer in one inertial frame may 
very well be past or future for an observer in another frame. Observers in relatively 
moving frames therefore experience different ‘nows’ and none of these perspectives is 
preferred or can claim to be the true now. Therefore, if God’s time is absolute, how can it 
ever be connected with our relative time as understood by STR? For God’s time to 
correspond in any way to ours, his time would have to be associated with one single 
inertial frame, a situation which would restrict Him to the same extent that we humans are 
restricted and thus make him less than God. Alternatively, his time could be said to 
correspond with the ‘now’ of every possible inertial frame in the universe, but this would 
yield a vast plurality of time perspectives, most of which would also contradict each other. 
Clearly, if we adhere to the most popular version of STR, we see no way to make God’s 
time connect to ours and thus to make His relatedness to the universe comprehensible.  
However, as explained earlier, the Lorentzian interpretation of relativity allows for a 
preferred reference frame with absolute simultaneity. We also saw that this view is not 
only deemed empirically equivalent to STR but it also seems to fit better with certain new 
findings in quantum physics. Taking a neo-Lorentzian approach to Relativity Theory as his 
basis, Craig now suggests that there is a preferred reference frame within the universe that 
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can be said to coincide with the series of events as they are present in God’s time. In fact, 
he even points to a likely candidate for this universal time, namely the ‘cosmic time’ of the 
General Theory of Relativity, the reference frame of the steady expansion of the universe 
itself. “It is my contention” he writes, “that the moments of God’s real, A-series time, 
while not perhaps identical with the moments of measured, cosmic time, are nonetheless 
coincident with them” (1990:343). Thus, in God’s time the universe has ‘now’ a certain 
density, temperature etc. and in our measured cosmic time it has the exact same properties. 
Our ‘now’ in terms of cosmic time actually coincides with God’s now, and God’s 
sustaining the universe and even responding to his creatures now become understandable 
notions. To sum up the above,  
“Real time is the A-series time in which God thinks and acts and in which things 
come into being; the moments of this time coincide since the beginning of the 
universe with the moments of cosmic time determined by ideal clocks stationary 
with respect to the expansion of space itself” (1990:346).  
 
5.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have looked at the main objections that have been raised to both 
the timeless and temporal interpretations of divine eternity. We had hoped that our 
exploration of the nature of time in the previous chapter would provide us with the insights 
needed to solve some of these problems and so select the most plausible view of divine 
eternity. However, this was not to be. Instead, we found both eternity views to be 
incompatible with the God of the Bible. On the one hand, if God is causally related to 
creation, if He responsively intervenes in the affairs of men and is fully cognizant of 
everything that happens as it happens in time, then He must necessarily be temporal. On 
the other, the nature of time as dynamic and finite clearly entails that the God of the Bible 
must be timeless.  
After rejecting several solutions to this predicament that were based on a view of 
timelessness as atemporal duration—a notion we concluded was incoherent—we found 
that Craig’s hybrid theory of divine eternity presents an amazingly plausible view that 
allows for full divine relatedness and omniscience, while continuing to affirm divine 
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perfection and necessity. This view of eternity required the Minkowskian interpretation of 
STR to be replaced by the Lorentzian view of relativity, but such a switch did not seem to 
encounter insurmountable objections. 
Our next task will be to take the findings of this chapter and explore their 
implications for those divine attributes that are conceptually connected to the notion of 
divine truth, namely: immutability, omniscience, divine personhood, perfection and 
neccesity.  
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NOTES 
 
 
P
1 
PThe accepted doctrine states that Christ was both fully God and fully man, and thus temporal in his human 
nature. 
P
2
P Aquinas uses both the watchtower analogy we referred to in Chapter Three (locus 3.3.6) and the circle 
analogy.  
P
3
P This idea that knowledge of how much time has elapsed since creation would solve the problem of tensed 
knowledge has been my own position, which is why a reference to other philosophers of time is missing 
here. Only recently did I understand Craig’s argument in its full force, and I now agree with his position. 
P
4
P Heimwee is often translated into English as ‘homesickness’ (and may even have that restricted meaning in 
the original German), but its meaning in Dutch is much deeper and clearly encompasses the loss of the past. 
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6 – CRAIG’S ETERNITY VIEW AND THE QUESTION OF DIVINE TRUTH  
 
6.1  Introduction 
In order to gain deeper insight into the notion of divine truth, we looked in Chapter 
Three at the divine attributes as they have been formulated by classical theism. We were 
able to identify five attributes that showed specific potential to help us clarify divine truth, 
namely perfection or infinity, necessity or aseity, immutability, omniscience, and the 
personhood implied by divine goodness. We also found, however, that every one of these 
properties of God was conceptually connected with the question of God’s relationship to 
time—a question that has been the subject of intense debate in contemporary philosophy. It 
seemed therefore expedient to first explore the main interpretations of divine eternity and 
their underlying views of time, before returning to these other attributes and their potential 
to enlighten us concerning truth.  
This task has now been accomplished. We were able to conclude in Chapter Four 
that on both philosophical and scriptural grounds time can best be understood as dynamic 
and finite, relational and linear. Chapter Five led us to conclude that the two major 
interpretations of eternity, namely as essentially temporal or timeless, were both 
inadequate. In an effort to avoid the serious problems entailed by either of these views, 
several thinkers have presented a type of hybrid view, most notably Stump and Kretzmann, 
and Brian Leftow. We felt compelled to reject these views, however, due to their reliance 
on the apparently incoherent notion of atemporal duration. We found another type of 
hybrid view, namely Craig’s view of eternity, that not only avoided this faulty notion but 
also offered plausible solutions to many of the philosophical questions while still 
remaining true to the biblical account of God’s nature.  This theory defines God’s 
relationship to time as both timeless and temporal—thus avoiding the problems connected 
with essential timelessness and temporality—but manages to combine these two modes of 
eternity without generating internal contradictions.  
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In the current chapter our task will be twofold. First, we will take Craig’s view of 
eternity and explore its implications for the divine attributes, and especially for those that 
were seen to be time-related. The attribute of immutability, for instance, was seen to be 
intricately connected with certain views of time and eternity, and we can therefore expect 
Craig’s eternity approach to have definite implications for our understanding of divine 
immutability. Secondly, once the attributes have thus been clarified, we will return to the 
main topic of this study, namely divine truth. We will look at the full set of divine 
attributes again and see what they can now tell us about the nature of divine truth. Armed 
with this information, we will then revisit the biblical conclusions reached in Chapter Two, 
and from these two sources we hope to construct a coherent view of the divine attribute of 
truth. Finally, we will end this chapter by returning to the history of human thought as 
reviewed in Chapter One and see what the insights we have gained mean for man’s 
ongoing quest to answer the question of the nature of truth. 
 
6.2  Craig’s eternity view and the time-related attributes  
 The attributes of perfection and infinity, necessity and aseity, immutability, 
omniscience and personhood have been identified as conceptually intertwined with views 
of time and eternity. We will now revisit these divine properties and see how each of them 
can be elucidated when considered from our proposed new view of eternity.  We will begin 
with the three properties that would seem least affected by changes in the interpretation of 
eternity, namely perfection, necessity and personhood, and then spend some more time on 
the two that are affected more profoundly, namely immutability and omniscience.  
 
6.2.1  Implications for divine perfection and necessity  
The two divine attributes that seemed to argue most decisively for a timeless 
interpretation of eternity were perfection (infinity) and necessity (aseity). On further 
analysis, however, we found that we can continue to affirm both attributes, even if eternity 
is seen as temporal. All that was needed was the assurance that such temporality be infinite 
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in duration, since on such an account of God’s relationship to time God does not come into 
or go out of existence and can thus still be regarded as truly eternal. 
However, it was exactly the infinity of time that had been decisively rejected in 
Chapter Four. It became quite clear on both philosophical and biblical grounds that time as 
we know it cannot be regarded other than finite. This fact brought us back to the 
conclusion that eternity must be timeless. Since finite time entails a limited duration to all 
temporality, it would also make temporal eternity finite, and thus preclude a view of God 
as the true creator ex nihilo of the universe, and as having the type of existence prescribed 
by the biblically non-negotiable attributes of perfection and necessity. In other words, if 
time is finite, eternity simply cannot be temporal in any sense of the word—at least not 
essentially so. 
As we have seen, Craig’s view of eternity stipulates both a timeless and a temporal 
phase to divine eternity. But how can we affirm any such temporal element in divine 
eternity if there are such strong arguments against it? Craig’s solution involved a sharp 
distinction between two senses of time, namely absolute time and our own familiar 
measured time. While our time is undeniably finite, absolute time or ‘God’s time’, was 
understood as having no beginning, at least not in the temporal sense. The timeless phase 
was seen not to precede the temporal one, but rather to form a type of ‘boundary’ to time, 
comparable to the spacetime singularity as proposed by Big Bang cosmology (2001b:272). 
The temporal phase of God’s life was therefore understood as without beginning or end, 
and that meant that both attributes of perfection and necessity could again be affirmed.  
From this new view of eternity, divine perfection is not limited in any temporal 
sense, either in the timeless or the temporal phase of God’s life. One type of limitation that 
remains unsolved, however, is that of the inaccessibility of the past and future. If God in 
his temporal phase lives in the actual present of absolute time, then his past and future are 
not available to him in exactly the same direct manner as is the present. It must be 
understood though that this inability to directly experience the past or future may be quite 
different from our own temporal limitations and the accompanying experience of heimwee. 
Divine cognition being absolutely excellent, God remembers the past completely and 
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knows the future perfectly. Moreover, it should be remembered that God is omnipresent, 
and thus in no way separated from the people He loves. Finally, a consideration Craig 
alerts us to is that human beings live on after death and that those who have died are thus 
never truly absent to God, as they are for us. If our heimwee, even of certain events, is 
mostly generated by our feelings about people, then this experience would also be much 
less acute for God (2001a:73).  
What about divine necessity? We already saw that if the temporal aspect of God’s 
life is indeed beginningless, we can continue to affirm this attribute just as strongly as if 
God were completely timeless. Unlike perfection, then, necessity does not generate any 
points of tension with Craig’s view of eternity. The same can be affirmed for the closely 
related attribute of aseity. God’s manner of existence must be a se, but this aspect is not 
contrary to the temporality of one of the phases of eternity. If God would have been 
deemed essentially temporal, this could possibly have led to inconsistencies. But God is 
only contingently temporal, since his temporality is only the result of his own free choice 
and thus not inherent to his nature. 
 
6.2.2  Implications for divine personhood  
What can we conclude regarding the personhood of God if divine eternity has both a 
temporal and a timeless phase? In fact, our view of divine personhood is not deeply 
affected by this new understanding of eternity, since neither temporality nor timelessness 
were found incompatible with personhood (see locus 5.2.3). All we need to do in this 
section, therefore, is formulate clearly what we now know about the personhood of God 
and how this attribute applies in both his temporal and his timeless phase.  
As we saw in Chapter Five the characteristics we commonly associate with 
personhood fall into three categories, namely rationality and consciousness, interpersonal 
relationships and free will or intentionality; traits that seem closely associated with the 
more common terms of knowledge, love and will. Let us therefore look at these three 
marks of personhood for both phases of divine eternity. 
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In his timeless phase there is no problem with God being fully rational and 
conscious. Since all truths are simply changeless and tenseless at this point, God knows all 
truths in a timeless manner, without any hint of process or sequence. He is also related to 
other persons who nevertheless do not exist outside himself, as He is not only Father, but 
also Son and Holy Spirit. These persons within the Godhead relate to each other in mutual 
unchanging love. Finally, God is fully free and his will or intentionality exists in an 
unchanging manner, not directed to any future state, since there simply is no future state in 
timelessness. At this stage of God’s existence then, his conscious life—his knowledge, 
love and will—simply are, without change, while his character also remains changeless in 
its perfect goodness. 
In his temporal phase, God is fully aware of and connected with what is happening in 
the actual present moment—the absolute present—at every single point in the universe. 
This means that the content of the divine consciousness can now change. His rationality 
and consciousness hold not only all that is tenselessly knowable, but also a constantly 
changing set of past, present and future-tense truths. However, such changes clearly do not 
entail changes in his rationality per se. 
Concerning the second characteristic of personhood, interpersonal relatedness or 
love, God’s love toward the persons in the Godhead simply continues to exist timelessly, 
but it is now joined by his love for creation and for the temporal human beings He has 
made. Based on his direct knowledge of the present, God interacts with his creatures and 
lovingly responds to their actions, attitudes and prayers in the actual now. Again, such 
responses do not affect the essential love that defines his character.  
Finally, the divine will is also unchanged regarding all that is timeless, but it is now 
joined by his specific will for all of creation and for every human person currently living 
on earth. Though his will remains unchanged in that it is always directed toward what is 
good, righteous and just, his specific will can change in response to man’s free will 
decisions and behavior.  
We anticipated in Chapter Three (locus 3.3.7) that divine personhood might not be 
fully compatible with the divine attributes of immutability and eternity.  We can now see 
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how any such tensions are actually fully resolvable even for God’s temporal phase. By 
replacing the radical immutability of classical theism with changelessness, God’s 
conscious life can be understood as changeable, even though neither his character nor any 
of the other divine attributes actually change. Thus, as we shall see below (locus 6.2.3), 
even in his temporal phase God remains unchanged in his perfection and infinity, aseity 
and necessity, omnipotence, incorporeality, omniscience, goodness and eternity .  
Regarding possible tensions with the attribute of divine eternity, we have concluded 
that the objection that a timeless God cannot be personal was groundless. Not only that, the 
personhood of God is in fact the very bedrock on which our hybrid view of eternity has 
been established. For a being with personhood must have free will. God’s act to create 
temporal reality is therefore affirmed as a free will decision. This fact makes the result of 
that decision, namely creation, necessarily contingent, changing and temporal, and the 
same therefore applies to God’s conscious life as it refers to this changing reality.  
In sum, God is fully personal in his timeless phase even though He is changeless in 
every way, including in the content of his conscious life. In his temporal phase his 
personhood continues to be evidenced in timeless ways, but this is now joined by his 
specific knowledge, love and will for the temporal world and its denizens. 
 
6.2.3  Implications for divine immutability 
How does our new understanding of eternity affect our view of divine immutability? 
In Chapter Three we identified several issues that surround divine immutability, namely 
those posed by creation and sustaining the created order, incarnation, his responsive 
relationship with temporal human beings, and his perfect knowledge or omniscience. Due 
to our findings on the nature of divine eternity, these issues can now be identified as 
representing two of the three objections that are commonly raised against divine 
timelessness, namely that a timeless being cannot relate and respond to a temporal world, 
and that such a being cannot be omniscient because He does not know what time it is now.  
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Since both issues only emerge in the context of an actually existing temporal world, 
they both are solved by appealing to the nature of divine eternity in the temporal phase. 
Accordingly, since God is temporal He can be the creator and direct ontological cause of 
the temporal universe and He can sustain this world in existence at every single moment in 
time. Indeed, since the future simply does not yet exist, God can now be understood to be 
fully present in the now and to create each new moment that comes into existence. In the 
same way, He is fully able to respond to the decisions and petitions of temporal men. 
Moreover, such human decisions can now be recognized as truly free, while our prayers 
become really able to affect God’s will and the future He will create. Even the incarnation 
becomes more understandable. God can take on temporal humanity and enter human 
history because He is not ‘locked out’, somehow isolated in a hermetically sealed timeless 
eternity. Finally, since God really knows what time it is now He also can have all the 
continually changing tensed knowledge required to guarantee his perfect omniscience from 
one moment to the next. 
Of course, Craig’s two-phase solution does have major implications for our 
understanding of divine immutability. God’s timeless phase naturally poses no problem, 
since on a relational view of time timelessness and changelessness go perfectly hand in 
hand. But if God has a temporal phase in which He relates to continually changing 
creatures and has changing knowledge of tensed propositions, then the radical or strong 
immutability of classical theism can no longer be maintained. Strong immutability required 
God to be unchanging and unchangeable, and to be so both extrinsically and intrinsically. 
But if God becomes temporal with creation, then even though He is unchanging in his 
timeless phase He is clearly not unchange-able. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Five, if 
He is related to temporal creation as creator and sustainer, it is clear that at the very least 
He undergoes extrinsic change (locus 5.2.1), and if He has direct knowledge of tensed facts 
and of what time it is now, then his knowledge is in continual flux—a change that can no 
longer be seen as merely extrinsic (locus 5.2.2). In fact, Craig concedes that God’s 
relatedness to temporal creation brings not only changes to divine knowledge, but also to 
the other areas of his conscious life, such as his will and his love. He writes,  
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“If God had not chosen to create a universe at all, He would surely have a different 
will than that which He has (for He would not will to create the universe);…  He 
would not love the same creatures He actually loves (since no creatures would 
exist)” (2001a:89).  
Using Possible World Semantics again, it becomes clear that in any possible world we can 
imagine the content of God’s will, knowledge and love would differ, depending on the 
creatures He would have created and—provided they have free will—their particular free-
will attitudes and decisions.  
It is evident, then, that radical immutability must be abandoned, but does this mean 
that God is as changeable as we humans? By no means! As the Bible confirms: “God is not 
a man that he should change his mind” (Num 23:19). Craig makes clear that his view 
implies that the content of the divine consciousness changes, but that God’s character 
remains unchanging in its perfect goodness (Moreland 2003:527).  
Moreover, divine immutability in the sense of changelessness can also be confirmed 
as it applies to all the other attributes of God. God remains changeless, Craig writes, in his 
“existence (necessity, aseity, eternity) and his being omnipresent, omniscient and 
omnipotent” (ibid.). This listing of attributes corresponds closely to our own list in Chapter 
Three, with two exceptions: perfection and goodness. Perfection has been omitted because 
Craig formulates the attributes using perfection—or Perfect Being Theology—as his basis 
rather than as one of the attributes (op.cit.:501), while divine goodness has of course 
already been addressed above when we affirmed the changelessness of God’s character.  
How can we say that God remains immutable in his eternity, and believe at the same 
time that He becomes temporal with creation? These two beliefs are not incompatible, 
because God indeed remains eternal, even though the mode of this eternity is timelessness 
without creation and temporality with it. Similarly, God’s omniscience remains intact, even 
though at the moment of creation the content of his knowledge starts changing. As Craig 
writes,  
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“He is immutable with respect to his omniscience because he always knows only and 
all true propositions; but precisely because he is omniscient the content of what he 
knows is constantly changing as tensed truths change. So, his conscious life is 
not immutable, even though it is changeless in the atemporal ‘phase’” (2011).  
When we first looked at divine immutability in Chapter Three (locus 3.3.4), we saw 
that two attributes in particular seemed to make radical immutability a necessary attribute 
of God, namely perfection and eternity. We have now been able to establish that eternity 
does not imply radical immutability, but neither does perfection. In our new understanding 
of immutability, divine perfection is safeguarded because God remains changeless with 
regards to all the essential attributes, including the goodness of his character, and because 
the changes that do occur in certain aspects of his life in no way imply a move away from 
perfection. Even though perfection entails that God be unlimited in every way, when such 
limitations are the result of a voluntary divine choice they fail to diminish his perfection. In 
fact, they rather accentuate the perfection of his character. As Craig writes, “God could 
have remained changeless had he wished to; the fact that he did not is testimony to both his 
love and his freedom” (2003:527). In short, this revised view of immutability affirms 
God’s perfection, without “freezing him into immobility” (2011).  
Even though the question if a changeable God can still be perfect has now 
satisfactorily been addressed, I do want to respond here to a deeper, maybe Platonic 
connection that some perceive between perfection and immutability. Isn’t it intuitively 
clear that what is absolutely and exhaustively immutable just has to be greater than that 
which is partially changeable, just like what is necessary outranks the contingent? This 
certainly seems to be the case in mathematics and logic, in fact in any study that has the 
impersonal as its subject. Even in philosophy many thinkers love the order that comes with 
unchangeability and necessity. But where we study the personal this rigid type of order no 
longer applies. Just as psychological theories that tend to reduce man to an impersonal 
object simply miss the mark, so do philosophical theories about a personal God that reduce 
the divine to the impersonal. Within the realm of the impersonal, immutability and 
necessity mean greater perfection, but in the realm of persons we have to account for 
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something even greater, namely free will. It is always the personal that is greater than the 
impersonal, and in its wake inevitably follow both contingency and change.  
Divine eternity also does not necessitate radical immutability. Eternity in the sense of 
classical theism meant exclusively atemporal eternity. On a relational view of time, such 
eternity does indeed imply changelessness, but on closer inspection it does not necessitate 
unchangeability. As long as there is no de facto change, timelessness does not require 
immutability (2001b:278). Moreover, with our revised understanding of eternity as having 
a timeless and a temporal phase, a certain level of change can be accommodated, and a 
more life-like view of the God of the Bible now emerges: a changeless personal being, who 
freely chooses to engage with the changeable world He freely choose to create. 
In sum, our new understanding of divine eternity informs our view of divine 
immutability as follows. God is de facto changeless but not unchangeable in his timeless 
phase. In his temporal phase, He retains most of this changelessness, but He does change in 
two ways. He changes extrinsically due to his real relatedness to creation, and intrinsically, 
due to changes in his conscious life, namely the specific content of his knowledge, will and 
love. In both phases God’s character and other attributes remain utterly unchanged.  
 
6.2.4  Implications for divine omniscience 
Divine omniscience was seen to be connected with views on eternity in two ways. 
On the one hand, eternity as timelessness was believed to facilitate knowledge of future 
events, while on the other hand a temporal interpretation of eternity seemed to enable 
knowledge of tensed facts. The first idea, however, that timelessness would enable future 
knowledge, was later recognized to be based on a faulty view of time and a overly 
anthropomorphic perceptualist understanding of divine cognition (locus 5.2.2). This means 
that the issue of divine foreknowledge is still in need of an explanation, even if we now 
have a view of eternity that accomodates both a timeless and a temporal phase. The second 
issue, however, seems adequately solvable by the temporal aspect of Craig’s theory.  
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In particular, our proposed new view of eternity affects our understanding of the 
following three issues in current debates concerning omniscience: 
(1) How can God know tensed facts or what time it is now? 
(2) How can He have knowledge of future contingents without this leading to fatalism? 
(3) How can a temporal God have knowledge of events in the past and future? 
We will now look at answers to these questions for both the timeless and the temporal 
phase of divine eternity, while keeping in mind, however, that these issues are intricately 
connected with each other and therefore tend to overlap here and there.  
In God’s timeless phase, his existence without creation, all three questions are easily 
answered, since at this stage there simply are no tensed facts or future contingents to know 
(questions 1 and 2) and God is not restricted to the present moment because He is not in 
time (question 3). There are only tenseless truths, all of which are fully known by God, 
guaranteeing his absolute omniscience. Regarding the second question one might be 
tempted to think that creation and temporality would be a future event for God, thus 
possibly generating the need for future contingent knowledge; but, again, this would be to 
misunderstand Craig’s view. As we saw in Chapter Five (locus 5.4) the two phases of 
God’s life should not be visualized as two segments of a line, joined at the event of 
creation. Rather, as far as the timeless phase of divine eternity is concerned “There is no 
before, no after, no temporal passage, no future phase of his [God’s] life” (2001b:271). 
It is of course for God’s temporal phase that our questions require more detailed 
discussion. To start with our first question: How can God in his temporal phase know 
tensed facts or know what time it is now? For many thinkers in the field of divine eternity, 
the commonly accepted Minkowskian version of relativity theory (STR) has become a 
mainstay of reasoning for the timelessness of God. For according to STR there is no unique 
absolute time and no worldwide ‘now’; each observer experiences his own now from the 
viewpoint of his own inertial frame and all frames are relative. So the question becomes, if 
God is in time, whose time is He in (Craig 2001a:43)? Any inertial frame we might select 
to be God’s frame would lead to a serious limitation of God’s knowledge, leaving him 
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ignorant of what is going on in any other frame. From the viewpoint of omniscience, this is 
clearly unacceptable. But the alternative is no better. We can assert that God must exist in 
the time of every one of the infinitely many inertial frames, but this would lead to a total 
fragmentation of the divine consciousness. Thus, if God is temporal, it is impossible that 
He should know what time it is now, first because there simply is no unique universal now, 
and secondly because temporality would make him subject to all the limitations entailed by 
STR.  
Craig’s answer to this reasoning is twofold. First, we need to carefully distinguish 
our time, measured time, from God’s time or real time. God is in an absolute present in 
which He now knows all that is happening in the universe, but this answer will only help 
us understand how God can know tensed facts if his absolute time somehow connects with 
our own time. There must be one preferred reference frame that can be associated with the 
succession of events in God’s time, but how can there be any such preferred frame if all 
frames are relative according to STR?  
Graig’s theory solves this second predicament by championing a Lorentzian 
interpretation of relativity theory, a model that allows for absolute time and simultaneity 
and proves to be empirically equivalent, if not preferable to STR. Thus God’s absolute 
time is connected with our time and there is one absolute present rather than an infinite 
number of relative nows. In this way it becomes clear how God can truly know what time 
it is and thus know the tensed fact that I am now writing this sentence, and not three days 
ago or three thousand years from now.  
The second item in our threefold list was how God can know future contingent truths 
without this leading to the position of fatalism. The doctrine of human free will is central 
to biblical truth,P1P and if divine knowledge of future contingents truly entails its denial this 
would pose a serious threat to a strong view of divine omniscience. No wonder then that 
some philosophers have chosen instead for a revision of the definition of omniscience. 
William Hasker, for instance, has suggested that divine omniscience should be limited to 
those truths which are such that it is “logically possible” for God to know them (1994:104). 
He then asserts that future contingents are simply impossible for God to know, and thus 
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divine omniscience can be saved. P2 P We have seen, however, that such a watered-down view 
of God’s knowledge belies the biblical teaching. So, does a strong view of omniscience 
really entail fatalism? 
Craig’s response to this issue is insightful. He formulates the argument for fatalism 
as follows: 
1. Necessarily, if God foreknows event X  then X will happen 
2. God foreknows X  
3. Therefore, X will necessarily happen (2001a:256-57, italics mine). 
Since this conclusion states that “X  will necessarily happen” it is not a contingent event, 
and fatalism has been vindicated. But wait, this argument constitutes a logical fallacy. In 
any logically sound argument the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, but 
that simple fact does not make the conclusion itself necessary. As Craig explains, “The 
fatalist illicitly transfers the necessity of the inference to the conclusion itself” 
(op.cit.:257). The correct conclusion should be: “Therefore, X  will happen,” and this result 
is in no way incompatible with X  being freely done. Indeed, logically speaking, X  could 
fail to happen, but God knows it will not. Therefore, we can be sure that X  will occur, but 
it will still happen contingently.  
One response to this insight has been to revise the argument by adding “necessarily” 
to the second premise, so that: necessarily, God foreknows X . This seems, at face value at 
least, to make the deduction valid, but premise 2 now denies another biblical doctrine, 
namely that of divine freedom. If God necessarily foreknows event X  then this world, with 
event X  in it, is the only one He could have created, and He would thus no longer be free 
to create a world without event X  or to not create at all (op.cit.:259). P3 P However, fatalists 
believe their ‘necessity’ is of a different kind, namely temporal necessity. Of course, since 
the necessity used in premise (1) is logical necessity, this results in an argument featuring 
two different types of necessity, making its validity rather doubtful. But worse, how do we 
know that this particular type of necessity is incompatible with subject S performing X ? In 
fact, it is plausible that so long as S’s choice is causally undetermined, it is a free choice, 
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even if S is unable to choose otherwise. Craig gives the following example of such a 
causally undetermined, and thus free choice that still only allows for one outcome: 
“Imagine a man with electrodes secretly implanted in his brain who is presented with 
the choice of doing either A or B. The electrodes are inactive so long as the man 
chooses A; but if he were going to choose B, then the electrodes would switch on and 
force him to choose A. If the electrodes fire, causing him to choose A, his choice of 
A is clearly not a free choice. But suppose that the man really wants to do A and 
chooses it of his own volition. In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even 
though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at 
all and so have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the 
absence of any causally determined factors of his choosing A” (op.cit.:261). 
According to Craig, temporal necessity remains a vague notion, and any attempts to 
clarify it have shown it to be simply reducible to “either the unalterability or the causal 
closedness of the past,” neither of which imply fatalism (op.cit.:262). Moreover, “On 
analyses of temporal necessity which are not so reducible God’s past beliefs always turn 
out not to be temporally necessary” (op.cit.:263). Therefore, the argument for fatalism 
seems unsound and it thus provides no valid objection to a strong view of divine 
omniscience which includes knowledge of future contingents.  
If the most popular argument against divine foreknowledge has thus been removed, it 
still needs to be explained how a temporal God can foreknow the future, especially if time 
is dynamic and the past and future thus do not have equal ontological status with the 
present. And that, of course, constitutes the third question we had set out to answer in this 
section. There are two facets of this question that need to be addressed, namely the 
temporal nature of divine eternity and the dynamic nature of time. 
First, if God is temporal and time dynamic, God exists now in the present, but even 
though He has existed at every moment in the past, He does not now exist in the past; and 
even though He will exist at every moment in the future, He does not now exist in the 
future. But if God is not now present in the future how then can He now have knowledge 
of future events? This part of our question has already been answered by Craig’s 
distinction between a perceptualist model of divine cognition and a conceptualist one 
(locus 5.2.2). If divine knowledge is conceptual, like a mind’s knowledge of innate ideas, 
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then God’s current presence in the future is not a necessary requirement for 
foreknowledge.  
Secondly, since on a dynamic view the future does not exist, there simply is no future 
state of affairs for God to be present at anyway. This fact of the future’s non-existence has 
opened up another line of reasoning against divine foreknowledge, namely that since the 
future does not exist, there also can be no true (or false) propositions about future events. 
The idea is that a proposition is true if it corresponds to what exists, but if future events do 
not exist, then there is nothing for any future-tense proposition to correspond to. On closer 
inspection, however, this view misrepresents the concept of truth as correspondence. 
Correspondence theory stipulates that a statement is true if what it states to be the case 
really is the case. For present-tense propositions this translates into a presently-existing 
event. But for future-tense propositions this means only that the corresponding event must 
exist in the future. In other words, the fact that the event does not exist now provides no 
basis to argue that the corresponding future-tense proposition cannot have any truth value 
(op.cit.:253).  
It looks like there are no good reasons to deny the possibility of divine 
foreknowledge, but can we somehow explain where God in his temporal phase would 
actually ‘get’ this knowledge? Craig suggests that there are two plausible answers to this 
question. The first is that God simply has omniscience as an essential attribute. He does not 
in any way acquire his knowledge; it is simply an essential part of his nature to know all 
truth. The second plausible answer is the view of divine knowledge known as Molinism, 
after the 16 Pth P century theologian Luis de Molina (Moreland 2003:521).  
Very briefly, this view distinguishes between natural and middle knowledge. Natural 
knowledge is knowledge of everything that could happen, while middle knowledge is 
knowledge of all that would happen given certain circumstances. In other words, by middle 
knowledge God knows what every free creature would freely do in any circumstances God 
might place him in. Based on these truths and on knowledge of the decree of his own will 
to create certain circumstances and place certain creatures in them, God then knows 
everything that will happen. P4 
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In sum, in his timeless phase God is omniscient in that He knows all tenseless truths. 
In his temporal phase, his omniscience is preserved due to his knowledge of all truths, both 
tenseless and tensed. Though the set of tensed truths constantly changes due to the 
temporality of creation, this does not in any way diminish God’s perfect omniscience—in 
fact, it facilitates it. Tensed truths include those that are future-tensed without this leading 
to a denial of human free will. Finally, there are plausible theories that can explain how 
God, even while temporal, can possess such foreknowledge. 
 
6.3  What the attributes can now tell us about divine truth  
Our new understanding of divine eternity has enabled us to clear up much of the 
confusion surrounding several of the other attributes. The time has now come to return to 
the complete set of attributes and see what they can teach us about divine truth. Let us 
look, as usual, at each in turn, starting this time with those attributes that were seen to be 
most strongly associated with divine truth, then considering the less affected ones, and 
finally ending the section again with what our proposed new view of eternity itself can tell 
us about the nature of divine truth. 
 
6.3.1  Immutability and divine truth 
The classical understanding of divine eternity as atemporal timelessness had 
encouraged a view of God as absolutely immutable, a being so transcendent that any real 
relation with the temporal world became utterly impossible. This view of God made it very 
hard to see how He could be the true cause and creator of the universe, personally involved 
with and responding to his creatures, and knowledgeable about the actual present moment 
in time. Our new understanding of divine eternity opened the way to solve each of these 
issues and led us to replace classical immutability with a view of God as changeless with 
regards to his character and attributes, but undergoing change within the content of his 
conscious life. What does this new view of immutability—or better: changelessness—
teach us about the notion of divine truth? 
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The first implication is of course, that truth itself is not as strongly immutable as it 
would have been in classical theism. But how can truth be truth if it is allowed to change? 
We learned that the very root of the term truth in scripture was firmness and permanence, 
and thus changelessness. Even in philosophy, the idea that truth must be changeless has 
been assumed by many of the best minds in history. The answer seems to lie in the fact that 
truths come in different varieties, namely those that are timelessly eternal and those that 
are connected with time. If it could be shown, first, that these two truth types are vitally 
related, and second, that this relatedness does not undermine the permanence of timeless 
truth, the problem of truth and change seems solvable. And the first step in showing how 
the changelessness of truth can be preserved while still allowing a certain level of change 
is to have a closer look at two of our main uses of truth: factuality and faithfulness. 
The attributes themselves are essential to God’s nature, and we have seen that even 
with our new understanding of divine eternity we can continue to confirm their basic 
changelessness. Omniscience and perfect goodness are two of these attributes, and they are 
therefore also essentially changeless. Looking now at factuality and faithfulness, we 
recognize that omniscience is closely linked to the factuality aspect of truth and that perfect 
goodness includes the meaning of faithfulness. It seems then, that the general 
changelessness of these two facets of truth can already theoretically be affirmed, though a 
more detailed account of how such changelessness can be maintained in relation to 
changing reality will have to wait for our sections on omniscience and goodness below.  
Furthermore, if we agree that factuality and faithfulness are embedded in 
omniscience and perfect goodness, what can this tell us about the kinds of true propositions 
held by each of these attributes? Since omniscience has to do with divine rationality and 
knowledge, it would seem that the timeless truths it guarantees include primarily those of 
logic and mathematics—next to the spiritual truths found in the Bible of course. In short, 
this would mean that omniscience guarantees divine truth as factuality, and that this truth 
comprises both timelessly true propositions, such as those of scripture, logic and 
mathematics, as well as changeable propositions about temporal events. 
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Similarly, perfect goodness was linked to truth as faithfulness. This attribute gives 
assurance of God’s moral character and will, and it can therefore be understood as 
somehow grounding all changeless moral truths as well as the changeable outworking of 
the divine will in response to the actions of temporal creatures. We will have to see if these 
connections can be hammered out in more detail, but this is best done when we look at 
how omniscience and perfect goodness on the one hand, and eternity on the other, relate to 
divine truth. For now we can conclude that our revised understanding of immutability is 
still able to provide the firmness and reliability that must characterize truth if it is to line up 
with scripture.  
 
6.3.2  Aseity and necessity, and divine truth  
Divine aseity and necessity singularly stressed the difference in existence between 
God and his creation. God’s existence is uncaused, independent, a se and necessary, and 
none of these terms can ever apply to creatures; He alone is the great I AM of Exodus 3:14. 
However, as we saw in Chapter Three, the philosophical problem that this assertion evoked 
was that of the ontological status of the attributes, including omniscience and perfect 
goodness (locus 3.3.2). Following the idea suggested above that these two attributes form 
part of divine truth, aseity requires that these properties and the truths contained in them do 
not share the same level of existence that can be ascribed to God. In other words, 
omniscience and perfect goodness are then not really timeless and necessary, and they can 
no longer guarantee the changelessness of spiritual, logical and moral truth.  
Moreover, if omniscience and goodness do not share God’s supreme level of 
existence then these attributes become dependent upon God, and this implies that God is 
somehow supra-logical and supra-moral, that He exists above all the truths of logic and 
morality, making these types of truth merely arbitrary. God could simply have decreed that 
“a part is always at least as great as the whole” and it would have been true. He could also 
have chosen to make the killing of innocent people a morally praiseworthy act, and thus 
make this into a moral truth. Even worse, in this scenario the divine existence and nature 
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themselves become arbitrary, so that both existence and non-existence, good and evil, 
omniscience and ignorance, and so on, can be ascribed to him. 
Such an interpretation is clearly unacceptable. But so is its apparent alternative, the 
denial of God’s unique mode of existence. If the truths of logic and morality are timeless 
but not dependent on God, then it seems to follow that they exist in their own right, and 
God’s unique aseity is then shared with a virtually infinite number of timeless and 
necessary abstract entities, including numbers, propositions and properties. P5 P To resolve this 
dilemma, it is clear that a third solution had to be found, and classical theism therefore 
mostly affirmed a conceptual view like that of Augustine, who regarded such entities as 
rationes aeternae, or Ideas in the mind of Christ (Nash 1983:96). Augustine’s solution 
stated that timeless truths are neither dependent upon God nor independent from him, but 
that they “subsist” in God, and thus that “If God did not exist, they would not exist” (ibid.).  
A contemporary version of a conceptual view of timeless and necessary truths has 
been suggested by Plantinga. In his lecture Does God Have a Nature, he explains how 
divine aseity can be fully compatible with the existence of such abstract entities (1980:140-
146). He starts by explaining that since God is omniscient He believes every true 
proposition, be it a necessary one or not. In other words, if  God believes proposition A, 
then A is true. But it is also the case that if A is true, then God believes A. This means that 
A and God believing A are in fact equivalent. Now, in the case of necessary truths, 
Plantinga goes a step further. For each necessary proposition the property of believing A is 
actually part of God’s very own nature. The necessary proposition A thus depends on God 
“even though necessary truths about these objects are not within his control” (op.cit.:146).  
Both Augustine and Plantinga thus argue that necessary truths are somehow 
grounded in God’s very nature. In this way we can assert God’s truth, both moral 
(faithfulness) and logical (factuality), without this leading to either horn of the dilemma 
described above. Moreover, the fact that coherent forms of conceptualism have been 
formulated implies that the changelessness of timeless truths can indeed be maintained by 
grounding them in God himself. And this means that our third sense of truth, genuineness, 
now also seems assured. God’s aseity confirms his ontological primacy, and if truth is 
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grounded in him then we have a guarantee of the genuineness of moral and logical truth. A 
key question is of course, if our proposed new view of divine eternity, which sees God’s 
existence as partly temporal, can continue to safeguard truth as it is grounded in God—an 
issue we will address further on in this chapter. Let us first look a little more closely at the 
two attributes of omniscience and perfect goodness.  
 
6.3.3  Omniscience and divine truth 
It seems at this point that omniscience and the timeless truths it entails can be 
securely grounded in God. But omniscience entails divine knowledge of all true 
propositions, and many true propositions are not timelessly eternal. Let us investigate what 
different types of truth can be distinguished and how these types relate to each other within 
the divine knowledge.  
First, what types of truths does God know in his timeless phase? Here another form 
of conceptualism can provide us with more details, namely Molinism, a view we briefly 
touched upon earlier (locus 6.2.4). According to this view, before creation, and thus in his 
timeless phase, God possesses three types of knowledge, namely natural, middle  and free 
knowledge. The first category consists of truths about everything that could happen, and 
this means knowledge of all possible worlds He could create (Moreland 2003:521). Such 
worlds might include, for instance, one in which Mrs. Jones wins a prize of ten thousand 
dollars and freely gives it all to charity, and another one in which she freely spends it on a 
luxury cruise.  
The second type of divine knowledge, middle knowledge, consists of all contingently 
true propositions, or counterfactuals, including propositions about future contingents. 
Counterfactuals state what would happen under certain circumstances, for instance that “If 
Jones wins a prize of ten thousand dollars, she will spend it on a luxury cruise.” Of course, 
this second group of truths delimits the first one, in this case by the free choice of Jones on 
how she wants to spend her money. Based on both types of knowledge, God creates certain 
free creatures in certain circumstances, and because He knows all about this world He 
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creates, He also has free knowledge, or what we would call foreknowledge of everything 
that will happen.  
Next to providing a plausible explanation of how divine foreknowledge is possible 
and  how it need not be incompatible with human free will, this view provides one possible 
scenario of how God’s knowledge can consist of both timeless and temporal truths. In his 
timeless phase all Gods knowledge is changeless, but once God creates the universe 
change is introduced and temporal knowledge is added. However, even though this is an 
intrinsic change in God, the timeless truths safeguarded by his omniscience are not 
affected, and omniscience itself is actually affirmed by the addition of corresponding 
temporal truths. How we can be sure that the temporality and change inherent in tensed 
truths do not ‘infect’ timeless truths with their temporality must be further explored under 
our treatment of the attribute of eternity (locus 6.3.8).   
 
6.3.4  Perfect goodness and divine truth 
Just as omniscience can be linked with the factuality sense of truth, so perfect 
goodness with the meaning of truth as faithfulness, though there also seem to be other 
aspects to divine goodness such as justice, love, compassion etc. We saw that 
conceptualism provided a coherent scenario of how rational truths can be grounded in God 
himself, so that these truths can be regarded as eternal without this creating tension with 
divine aseity. Is there also a plausible description of how perfect goodness and the moral 
truths it entails can be grounded in God?  One view that provides such an explanation is 
Divine Command Theory (Moreland 2003:531). 
According to this theory, moral truths are grounded in God’s commands, so that if 
God commands A, then A is good. But this suggests that these moral truths are dependent 
on God, and that God himself is therefore not bound by these truths—a conclusion that 
would result in God’s goodness being essentially arbitrary. Divine Command Theory also 
stipulates, however, that God’s commands are a direct reflection of his character. This 
means that his commands are defined by who He is, and thus not arbitrary. Moreover, God 
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himself always acts in accordance with perfect goodness, not because He obeys a rule, but 
because it is his nature to be good. God is essentially compassionate and just, kind and 
faithful. All morality and moral truth is thus simply a reflection of who He is.  
If omniscience is uniquely concerned with God’s rational knowledge, perfect 
goodness seems more focused on the divine will. Accordingly, just as God knows all that 
is true and nothing that is false, so He wills all that is good and nothing that is evil. 
However, creation of the temporal changeable world brings certain additions, and thus 
changes in God’s will, for He now also wills certain events in response to the actions, 
attitudes and prayers of his changeable creatures. When Moses teaches the Israelites God’s 
way, for instance, he says “I command you today to love the Lord your God … then you 
will live and increase …. But if your heart turns away … you will certainly be destroyed” 
(Deut 30:16-17). Such destruction in response to man’s actions may apparently be used by 
God to bring about what is good. The prophet Isaiah confirms this when he writes, “I form 
the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the LORD, do all 
these things” (Is 45:7).  
The same responsiveness to changeable man explains those Bible passages that some 
have taken as proof that divine omniscience is limited (Pinnock et al. 1994). When God 
saw how evil man had become He was “grieved that he had made them,” and decided to 
bring the flood and start human history over again with Noah (Gen 6:7). In the story of 
Jonah we see a similar change. When Jonah was sent to Nineveh it was to deliver a 
message of divine destruction, but when the Ninevites repented God “had compassion on 
them and did not bring upon them the destruction he had threatened” (Jon 3:10). In these 
examples, we see no changes in what God wills to be brought about, namely that which is 
good. We only see changes in how this end goal will eventually be accomplished, in 
response to free human actions and decisions.  
Finally, such ‘changes’ in God’s will can also be the result of prayer. Scripture 
teaches us to pray and promises that God hears and responds to our petitions. It is helpful 
to keep in mind here that by our prayers we are not really ‘changing God’s mind’ so that 
He will now change an already existing future reality. On our proposed new view of 
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eternity the future simply does not exist and it is thus not changed by our attitudes and 
prayers. Instead, our current actions, attitudes and words are ‘added’ to God’s counsel as 
He decrees what future to create. 
Do such responsive wills decisions change the fact of God’s perfect goodness in any 
way? It seems not. In fact, just as with omniscience, the responsive element in God’s will 
actually facilitates and confirms his perfect goodness. We know, for instance, that God’s 
goodness includes absolute justice. But would it have been just if God had allowed 
Nineveh to still be destroyed after its people had genuinely repented? So, we can affirm 
that divine perfect goodness and the timeless moral truths it entails remain in essence 
unchanged, even though in his temporal phase there are also changes in God’s conscious 
life, resulting from his genuine relatedness to the temporal world.  
 
6.3.5  Personhood and divine truth  
We have seen so far that among the attributes, omniscience and perfect goodness are 
closely related to divine truth, representing the factuality and faithfulness sense 
respectively, while aseity seems connected to genuineness. When we now look at the 
attribute of personhood we see another part of the picture emerge.  
Our study of scripture made clear that the two senses of truth as faithfulness and 
factuality somehow converge, and this becomes undeniable when both God’s word and 
God himself are described with the noun form of truth, and in John’s gospel are directly 
identified with each other (Ps 119:160, Jo 14:6, Jo 1:1). It also became evident that 
personhood plays a very central role in the biblical notion of truth, and this finding was 
further confirmed by the fact that faithfulness, the personal sense of truth, is found much 
more often than the factuality sense, which has mostly dominated extra-biblical views on 
truth. 
Seeing this close connection between the two notions, and the clear precedence of 
the personal sense of divine truth, could it be that factuality is somehow grounded in 
faithfulness? One contemporary philosopher who confirms this view is Arthur Holmes. He 
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explains that the Old Testament’s ’emeth is “first a matter of inner character and only 
derivatively a quality of words and deeds” (1977:34). In the New Testament this 
understanding is still prevalent, an example being Matthew 22:16 where the Pharisees 
precede their attempt to trap Jesus with the words, “Teacher, we know you are a man of 
integrity and that you teach the way of God in accordance with the truth” (ibid.). We see 
here that the factuality of Christ’s words is based in the moral quality of his character. 
Hebrews 6:18 shows the same reasoning, by stating that we can be absolutely certain of 
eternal life, because it is impossible for God to go against his own promise, and his 
faithfulness thus grounds his words. 
Since in scripture God is emphatically a person and truth is inherently personal, the 
factuality of God’s word seems guaranteed not primarily by correspondence to reality, but 
by divine faithfulness, which signifies agreement between every aspect of his being, a 
fundamental oneness or integrity. The factuality of God’s word is thus in essence his 
personal veracity, here a moral quality that is included in the attribute of perfect goodness. 
God cannot lie, not primarily because He is omniscient and his knowledge is completely 
factual, but above all because He is faithful and to not be so would be to disown himself 
(2Ti 2:13). It seems plausible therefore to see faithfulness as not only taking precedence 
over factuality, but as forming its actual ground.  
Could the fact that truth is such a personal notion in the Bible take us even further? 
We saw that divine aseity seemed to reflect the genuineness sense of truth, the idea that 
truth requires an ontological foundation that is stronger than empirical reality. If truth is 
essentially personal and God is truth, it seems that God as a person is the actual ontological 
ground of all truth.  In other words, just as the faithfulness sense of truth seems to form the 
ground for factuality, the genuineness sense may actually ground both faithfulness and 
factuality. This means that factual truth is not only rooted in divine faithfulness, but also 
that this grounding in the person of God is absolute—there simply is no other ground 
beyond him.  
We see evidence for this position in John 8, where the Pharisees discount Jesus’ 
words as not valid because He is 1T“appearing as his own witness” (8:13). Jesus responds 
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that they judge by human standards, but that his words are true because they are based in 
those of the Father who is his witness (Jo 8:15-18). God’s promise to Abraham mentioned 
in Hebrews 6 also points in this direction. This passage speaks not only of faithfulness, but 
also seems to affirm God as the only ultimate ground of truth: “When God made his 
promise to Abraham, since there was no one greater for him to swear by, he swore by 
himself” (6:13). Later in the chapter this promise to Abraham is then compared with the 
hope of the believer, which is “as a sure and steadfast anchor” because it is grounded in 
“the inner place behind the curtain” or God himself (Heb 6:18-19). P6 P Finally, the familiar 
name of God 1T“I AM WHO I AM” also seems to confirm such a notion of the person of 
God as the absolute ultimate ground. 
 
6.3.6  Omnipotence and divine truth 
What can the attribute of omnipotence add to the picture of divine truth that is 
gradually unfolding here? First, the obvious. Omnipotence guarantees truth as factuality, 
faithfulness and genuineness. It confirms that God is fully able to speak and know all 
truths, be faithful in every aspect of his being, actions and words, and sustain himself—and 
thus Truth itself—in existence. But we also saw that omnipotence touches upon another 
issue, namely the ontological status of divine truth.  
If omnipotence is wrongly understood to include power to do the impossible we run 
into absurdities. Questions provoked by such a view are: Can God go against the laws of 
logic and morality? Can He create a square circle or a stone He cannot lift, or can He 
choose to sin? P7  PWe saw that such a broad view of omnipotence leads to truth being 
emptied of its content (locus 3.3.5). The very distinctions between truth and falsehood on 
the one hand and good and evil on the other inevitably fall away, and the picture of the 
divine that results may fit well with pantheism but in no way resembles the God of the 
Bible.  
Our answer to such questions must therefore always be: No, God cannot go against 
the law of non-contradiction, and He cannot choose to sin. Not because He is actually 
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subject to the laws of logic or morality, but because these truths are grounded in his very 
own nature—a coherent notion, as conceptualism and Divine Command Theory confirmed. 
Just as moral truths are rooted in the character of God so that his moral commands are 
direct expressions of his nature, so the divine mind and knowledge operate only in 
accordance with logical truths.  
 
6.3.7  Perfection and incorporeality, and divine truth 
Before we come to the final attribute in our list, divine eternity, let us look briefly at 
divine perfection and incorporeality. These two attributes do not seem to add significant 
insights to our developing concept of divine truth. Perfection simply confirms again that 
divine truth in all its senses will be absolutely flawless. Incorporeality and omnipresence 
can provide confirmation that God is really present. From our proposed new view of 
eternity, omnipresence actually seems to become a stronger notion. For He is not only in 
attendance at all places, but also eminently present in the current moment, since this 
moment is also the actual present for him. The implication for divine truth is that God is in 
no way out-of-touch (factuality) or irresponsive (faithfulness) but continually aware of and 
causally active in the present moment. Does this limit his knowledge to the present? No, 
because He does not ‘acquire’ his knowledge by perception, as a corporeal being might 
have to do, but He simply knows all truths because omniscience is part of his nature.  
 
6.3.8  Eternity and divine truth 
In the sections above we have seen some of the indirect effects that our new eternity 
view has on the notion of divine truth. But how does eternity itself now affect our 
understanding? Throughout our investigation two issues have come to the fore repeatedly 
and we can now see these two as indeed pivotal: first, the uses of truth as factuality, 
faithfulness and genuineness, and secondly the notion that truth, as a biblical notion at 
least, must in essence be unchanging.  
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Truth as factuality, faithfulness and genuineness all seemed to be compromised in 
different ways by the two main views of eternity. The timelessness view seemed deficient 
because it weakened truth as factuality by hindering tensed knowledge, truth as 
faithfulness by impeding responsiveness, and truth as genuineness by compromising on 
creatorship ex nihilo. But the temporal view had its own problems. It seemed to weaken 
factuality by questioning foreknowledge, truth as faithfulness by precluding permanency, 
and truth as genuineness by taking divine perfection and sovereignty too lightly.   
Regarding the question of genuine truth requiring permanence, the impact of the two 
views was more straightforward. Overall, the timeless view of eternity was better able to 
ensure such changelessness, even though it seemed to entail a view of God as so 
transcendent that it was virtually impossible to envision any relatedness to his creation and 
to present reality. Everlastingness, on the other hand, enabled a view of God as deeply 
involved with reality and with the personal lives of men, but in deeming God fully 
temporal his existence and nature became subject to change to such an extent that truth 
might well be compromised. 
These issues with both eternity views had been known for centuries. For instance, 
even though classical theism always championed the timeless view, some scholars within 
this tradition, such as Duns Scotus, argued for a less detached view of God (Craig 
2001a:77). Only in the 20PthP century, however, when views of the nature of time started 
changing did the question of eternity become truly controversial. It was the general 
acceptance of Einstein’s relativity theory that turned the issue into a stark dilemma. We 
saw that Newton believed in absolute time, a view that still allowed for an understanding 
of eternity as not completely detached from our own temporal world. But by its complete 
denial of absolute time and simultaneity, relativity theory forced the two views apart and 
created a seemingly unbridgeable chasm. 
The problem that emerged was that without absolute time or simultaneity, a temporal 
divine being is either confined to one single reference frame, and thus knows no more truth 
than an ordinary human being, or to a plurality of frames, implying a complete 
fragmentation of consciousness. And the implications of the timeless alternative also 
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changed. This view now entailed an understanding of God as hermetically sealed in 
timeless eternity, absolutely isolated and out-of-touch, a divine being who had no longer 
any relevance for the world of men and their temporal day-to-day reality of life.  
For divine truth the new view of time meant that the temporal interpretation of 
eternity did not only make truth subject to change, for that issue was nothing new, but that 
truth also became relative. Contradictory statements could from now on be seen as true ‘at 
the same time’, P8 P simply depending on the reference frame of the speaker. As Craig 
explains, 
“Einstein’s theory tells us to substitute for absolute space an infinite number of 
different spaces, each associated with a different inertial frame, and for absolute time 
an infinite number of different times, each associated with a different inertial frame. 
Reality thus is radically fragmented on Einstein’s view … It is, I think, no 
exaggeration to say that on Einstein’s theory relatively moving observers literally 
inhabit different worlds which may intersect only at a point” (2001a:43, italics mine). 
Clearly, if STR really implies an infinite number of different worlds, then in this view of 
reality truth as a universal notion is also compromised. Truth is only what is true in my 
specific inertial frame, and that simply reduces truth to that which is “true for me.” 
Of course, these implications only follow for the temporal view of eternity, and the 
timeless view should thus still be able to provide a firm basis for truth. But the timeless 
view was also affected by the new understanding of time, because it now implied utter 
transcendence and complete detachment from the temporal world. Any relationship 
between timelessness and temporality had become impossible. As such, timelessness could 
no longer provide the underlying stability required to keep temporal reality from 
fragmentation. And with no way out of the eternity dilemma, truth also seemed reduced to 
these two irreconcilable, mutually exclusive alternatives. 
So, how does Craig’s eternity view solve these issues and thus reconfirm the notion 
of divine truth?  First, this view restores absolute time and simultaneity via Lorentzian 
relativity theory, and with that change the relativity of temporal truth no longer follows. 
Though temporal truths are still changeable, they are all related to one and the same 
universal reference frame, namely God’s absolute or real time.  
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Secondly, even though Craig’s view confirms the essential nature of eternity itself, it 
understands both the timelessness and the temporality of God as non-essential properties. 
God’s temporality is not essential to his nature because it is based in the divine free will 
decision to create a temporal world. In this way, the changelessness of God’s character 
(perfect goodness) as well as his nature (perfection, necessity, incorporeality, omnipotence, 
omniscience and eternity) is assured, while still allowing temporality and change in those 
aspects of the divine consciousness that are necessarily related to the temporal world. In 
other words, temporal reality can now be ultimately grounded in timelessness, and 
temporal knowledge in timeless truth.  
Finally, Craig’s view also solves the problems that both temporal and timeless 
eternity brought to our three truth-senses of factuality, faithfulness and genuineness. 
Divine factuality or omniscience now features both future knowledge as well as tensed 
knowledge, faithfulness or perfect goodness guarantees both responsiveness and 
permanence, and the genuineness of God is assured in ascribing to him all due aseity and 
sovereignty while at the same time showing him to be the creator and very present 
sustainer of all that is. We see, then, that our revised view of eternity is key in restoring a 
biblical view of divine truth.  
 
6.4  What, then, is divine truth?  
Craig’s eternity view has enriched our understanding of the divine attributes and this 
in turn has led to several new insights into the notion of divine truth. We now want to 
return to the conclusions we reached in Chapter Two, and see if the biblical view of truth 
agrees with these new insights and if it can help us add some more pieces to the puzzle.  
We summarized what the Bible says about truth in a 5-point list which we repeat 
below. We found that the term truth as it is used in scripture has the following 
characteristics:  
(1) it has a strong connotation of reliability and permanence, especially when 
attributed to God or his word 
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(2) it is primarily used in the sense of faithfulness rather than factuality, and 
genuineness also plays a more important role than in our daily use 
(3) when applied to God in its noun form, it carries a strong sense of personhood, of 
personal agency and power  
(4) it is not just a relationship of agreement but also an entity in itself. When used in 
noun form of God or his word, it defies the ‘daily view’ diagram in that the distance 
between person and word practically collapses, while the link between word and 
reality becomes markedly stronger.  
(5) when applied to God in noun form, it strongly suggests that God is the source 
of  all faithfulness, genuineness and factuality wherever it is found and no matter 
how variable or mundane.  
As this list shows, the first thing we discovered about truth in scripture was its strong 
focus on firmness or permanence, and this ties in, of course, with the whole issue of truth 
and change. Radical immutability was classical theism’s way of safeguarding this 
permanence, but this led to a view of God as totally isolated and out-of-touch with his own 
creation, especially after the acceptance of Einstein’s new view of time. Craig’s theory of 
eternity was able to resolve this tension by accomodating both timelessness and 
temporality—and thus changelessness and change. Since temporality was found not to be 
an essential property of God, it did not generate an unacceptably restrictive view of his 
nature. Accordingly, we found that the level of permanence that truth requires was 
adequately guaranteed by the changelessness of both God’s character (perfect goodness) 
and his nature (the other divine attributes). Moreover, by replacing Einstein’s relativity 
theory with that of Lorentz  the temporal and thus changeable aspects of God’s conscious 
life no longer led to relativism, because true statements connected with varying reference 
frames ultimately all found their universal reference point in the absolute time of God.    
Scripture was also clear in its preference of the faithfulness sense of truth over that of 
factuality. In terms of the divine attributes, this suggested that perfect goodness could be 
regarded as the ground for divine omniscience. The truth of God’s words is thus seen to be 
primarily due to their origin in the divine, and it is this fact that guarantees their 
correspondence with reality. Secondly, the unusual importance of genuineness in scripture, 
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as evidenced for instance by the root meaning of aletheia, seemed to resonate with the 
attribute of aseity and its crucial role in providing an ultimate ontological ground for all 
truth, both changeless and changing, timeless and temporal. So, we see that the attributes 
confirm what our study of scripture already seemed to suggest regarding the three senses of 
truth.   
Our third discovery was that divine truth in scripture was seen to be deeply personal 
and powerful. This undeniable fact of the personhood of God became increasingly clear 
when we explored the nature of God via his attributes, and we can now see that it plays a 
crucial role in our understanding of divine truth. Rather than necessitating a temporal view 
of eternity, divine personhood opened the way for a view of eternity as both timeless and 
temporal without generating contradictions. For it is the fact that God is a person that helps 
us see that radical immutability and timelessness are not properties that God absolutely 
must have in order to be God. If God were an impersonal entity, immutability and 
timelessness might have been essential, but as an eminently personal being God is rather 
characterized by free will, and it is only his free will acts that have resulted in a reality that 
features time and change. Personhood thus allows for non-essential temporality in divine 
eternity and non-essential change in God’s conscious life, without this forming any threat 
to his perfection, infinity, necessity and aseity. 
The next characteristic of truth we found in scripture was that it often denotes a 
specific entity or content rather than a mere relationship of correspondence, and this of 
course is especially true when God and his word are described with the noun-form of truth. 
We encountered this same point briefly in our study of the attribute of omnipotence. When 
omnipotence is interpreted as absolutely unlimited it first leads to contradictions and 
finally to a concept of God that is contentless and empty. Instead, God in all his 
omnipotence does not go beyond the boundaries of logic and morality, not because He 
cannot, but because truth is his very nature and is grounded in him.   
The attribute of personhood also argued against such an overly mystical view, since a 
person always has a character and can be described as possessing certain traits and 
consequently not possessing their opposites. For instance, the Bible calls God slow to 
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anger and impartial, and we therefore also know that He is not quickly angered and partial 
(Ex 34:6, 2Ch 19:7). More importantly, the primary name of God is “I AM WHO I AM,” 
indicating that He ‘is not who He is not’ and that He therefore does not unite in himself 
any contradictory traits—an insight further confirmed by the truth sense represented by 
divine aseity. 
The last point in our list, that all truth is God’s truth can now also be confirmed. God 
is truth and He alone exists a se and is the ground of all that is true. Since eternity can be 
understood as both timeless and temporal, the person of God is not only the ground for 
eternal truths, but also for changing and temporal truths. With morally charged truth this 
insight is not that controversial. If “none is good but God alone,” as Luke 18:19 has it, then 
any faithfulness or genuineness finds its ultimate source in God. But the same can now be 
said of factual truth, no matter how trivial. In our new understanding of omniscience, even 
a simple temporal truth like “Today it is Tuesday” is ultimately rooted in the person of 
God, enabling him to know all that is happening at each moment and to respond literally 
right now in the universal present.  
In sum, the notion of divine truth as it emerged from our revised understanding of the 
attributes helped us significantly deepen our understanding of the notion of truth in 
scripture. I believe this shows that Craig’s view of eternity plays a crucial role in a more 
correct understanding of divine truth and of God himself. By providing a coherent scenario 
of how God can be both timeless and temporal, this theory allowed us to develop a view of 
divine truth as deeply rooted in the person of God, without this leading to a loss of divine 
transcendence and of the absoluteness of truth without which it can no longer be truth. 
If we attempt to visualize how the new understanding of divine truth would change 
our ‘daily view’ diagram, we need to make some major adjustments. First, because God is 
truth and all truth is grounded in his person, the diagram needs to be rotated 90 degrees, 
with the Person (God) now taking the place of the Ideal reality of early philosophy. 
Secondly, the distance between Person and Word becomes practically non-existent, 
making genuineness and faithfulness also closer in meaning as facets of the essential truth 
of God. Finally, the distance between Word and empirical Reality clearly still exists, but 
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since all temporal truth is ultimately rooted in God this link can now also be seen as 
fundamentally reliable.  
 
6.5  What our findings mean for truth in general  
We started out this study with a review of the understanding of truth throughout the 
history of philosophy, and I would like to return to that starting point in this final section. 
If from a biblical perspective all truth is indeed rooted in God, as the last point on our 5-
point list suggested, then all truth is ultimately ‘divine truth’. For those who accept the 
biblical notion of truth, then, this means that our findings also apply to the philosophical 
quest to understand truth in general. So, how would such a biblical view see the various 
theories of truth that have been developed throughout philosophy’s history? 
In Chapter One we kept track of the various views on truth by means of our ‘daily 
use’ diagram, and what we saw happening through the centuries could thus be visualized 
as first a move downward and then a move from the right toward the left:    
         
Ideal reality      
          I 
          I       Genuineness 
                 I         
Person    (thought)/Word/(action)    Reality 
   [___________________]   [__________________] 
 Faithfulness   UFactuality 
 
In Plato, truth was closely linked to the notion of being, a kind of ‘being’ moreover 
that was more full and permanent than mere empirical reality. Truth needed to be grounded 
in an eternal reality, and Plato’s primary understanding of truth was therefore one of 
genuineness. In Plato’s contemporary Aristotle we already saw the first steps downward 
toward locating truth in empirical reality. His sense of truth thus replaced genuineness with 
factuality, though he still sought to anchor truth in unchanging elements within the 
temporal world.  
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Augustine and Aquinas were seen to stay close to the positions of their earlier 
counterparts, though these were now understood from a Christian perspective. For those 
first two millenia of philosophical thought, therefore, the search for truth continued to stay 
firmly on the right-hand side of our diagram. 
During this earlier segment of its history, philosophy’s quest to elucidate the notion 
of truth stayed firmly focused on solving the one problem of how truth can be properly 
grounded and still accommodate change. Approaching this problem from the perspective 
of Craig’s understanding of time and eternity, we have seen in this study that absolute 
immutability is not a necessary requirement for truth. Truths can be both changeless and 
changing, timeless and temporal, as long as the connections between these types of truth 
are firmly established and the temporal is ultimately grounded in the timeless. 
Having said this, it is still clear that the picture of truth that has emerged from our 
investigation is closer to that of Plato and especially Augustine than to Aristotle and 
Aquinas’ views. If temporal reality is purely contingent upon a free will act of God then 
timeless reality is primary. And since without temporal creation God is the only entity in 
existence, God himself is the ultimate reality that grounds every other existence and truth.  
Descartes’ new way of thinking brought more drastic change than maybe even he 
himself had fathomed. The new location of the realm of ideas now became the mind of 
man—a humble abode that soon proved unsuited to the task. The shift meant a sudden 
move toward the left in our diagram, where truth was in danger of becoming purely 
subjective and even relative—as the following centuries bore out. Descartes’ attempt to 
build a bridge from the mind of man to reality via the idea of God was less than successful, 
since God’s existence was made dependent on being found a clear and distinct idea in the 
mind of individual man. It was simply too easy for other thinkers to deny the lack of such 
an idea in their own mind. With Descartes, therefore, the question of change and truth that 
had characterized philosophy till now was promptly replaced by the more urgent matter of 
restoring the failing connection between man’s mind and material reality.  
Kant managed to remedy one weakness in Descartes’ ‘house of cards,’P9 P namely the 
threat of subjectivism, by postulating  universal mental categories. But the price to be paid 
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was a further move away from reality, while it did not take long for subjectivism to make a 
come-back in thought about truth. It is clear that with modernity, the quest to ground truth 
had been permanently dislodged from the right side of our diagram, with no way to retrieve 
the link with reality and the assurance of the past. 
Even though truth in the modern tradition thus moved toward the personal side of the 
diagram, this did not mean a shift toward faithfulness. Modern thought simply increasingly 
lost its grip on factuality and thus moved away from reality to the only place left to go: the 
mind of man. Whereas truth in scripture could find a real anchor in personhood, because 
the person in question is supra-human and exists a se, philosophy had only the individual 
human mind to fall back on, by definition too weak a ground to carry the weight of truth.  
The same can be said of the focus on authenticity and genuineness of existential 
thinkers like Kierkegaard. When genuineness can only be applied to human persons it loses 
most of its power. It can only signify a personal authenticity that—as we have seen—is not 
even strong enough to guarantee faithfulness in our dealings with others, let alone being 
capable of grounding truth. Of course, to be fair, existentialism never sought such a lofty 
role for authenticity, having resigned itself fully to the idea that objective truth is simply a 
myth.   
Arriving at our day and age, postmodern thought is merely reaping the harvest of 
what was sown in modernity. Truth needed a firm ontological anchor, and not finding it in 
an impersonal ideal reality, in unchangeable elements in the empirical world, or in the 
mind of man, philosophy has finally run out of options. As such it has simply, and 
sometimes happily, given up the fight. Relativity theory, moreover, made sure such an 
anchor could not be retrieved by further widening the chasm between divine timelessness 
and temporality, changelessness and change, bringing with it all the consequences we 
discussed above.  
With no further options to explore, man’s quest for truth is faced with two 
alternatives: either simply give up, or look to the past for answers. The former will be the 
end of philosophy, unless poetry or other forms of mere verbal expression can qualify as 
such. But those who wish to continue the search seem to have no alternative but to retrace 
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their steps. One thing is certain, if we have been correct about our findings in this study, 
then truth can only be founded in a personal ultimate reality that is voluntarily bound by its 
own nature and that does not share its ontology with man but exists a se.  
Moreover, for such truth to be both a guiding principle for temporal man and really 
related to us, the Einsteinian theory of relativity and Minkowskian block universe must be 
replaced by a view of relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity and a dynamic theory 
of time. As we saw, it is Einstein’s theory that implies that “relatively moving observers 
literally inhabit different worlds which may intersect only at a point,” as Craig put it 
(2001a:43). But if we humans most of the time inhabit infinite different realities, then truth 
would indeed seem different for each of us, and if there is no absolute simultaneity then 
my truth is simply no longer translatable into yours, and relativism reigns. What we can 
conclude then at the end of this chapter is that the factor of time has indeed proven to play 
a crucial role in providing a deeper understanding of divine truth and of truth in general. 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
Since the attribute of eternity was seen to be intricately connected with several of the 
other properties of God, our new approach to eternity enabled us to solve some of the 
thorny issues that have plagued these attributes also. The five attributes that showed  
relatedness to time and eternity were: perfection, necessity, immutability, omniscience and 
the personhood implied by divine goodness, and we started out this chapter by looking at 
each of these from the viewpoint of our proposed new view of the nature of eternity. 
After clarifying the divine attributes in this way, we returned to our main concern, 
namely the question of divine truth. We first explored what each of the attributes can now 
tell us about truth, and found that with our proposed new understanding of time and 
eternity they became rich sources of new understanding concerning divine truth. With 
these findings in hand we then returned to our conclusions regarding the notion of truth in 
scripture. These conclusions had stipulated truth to be reliable, content-filled and above all 
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personal, with the truth senses of faithfulness and genuineness both playing a more 
prominent role than they do in the factuality-dominated view of our own time.  
From these two sources we then attempted to construct a coherent view of the divine 
attribute of truth. Recognizing the three truth senses of genuineness, faithfulness and 
factuality in the attributes of aseity, goodness and omniscience, we were able to apply our 
philosophical understanding of these attributes to the biblical truth findings. In addition, 
the revision of the attribute of immutability and the pivotal role of personhood were 
instrumental in showing how divine truth can be both grounded in the eternal and still 
relevant for the temporal everyday life of man. We were also able to conclude that both the 
Bible and the divine attributes agree that all truth, no matter where it is found, is rooted in 
God and can thus, in the final analysis, be called divine truth.  
Finally, based on that last conclusion, we revisited the various notions of truth that 
philosophy has proposed throughout the centuries and noted that, from the biblical 
perspective on truth, the only way forward seems to lead back to the insights of earlier 
centuries, this time under the guidance of a view of time and eternity such as the one 
proposed by Craig. 
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NOTES 
 
 
P
1 
PWithout human free will there is no responsibility and thus no sin. Such a view therefore makes redundant 
the very core message of the Bible: salvation from sin and its consequences through Christ. 
 
P
2 
PThis position then leads Hasker and his colleagues to the position known as “Open Theism” (Pinnock et al. 
1994). 
 
P
3
P  Such an understanding of divine knowledge as necessary leads to a view of God as impersonal and thus to 
pantheism, as we saw earlier when discussing Spinoza’s view (locus 3.3.2). 
 
P
4 
P A more detailed description of this account of divine foreknowledge will follow in section 6.4. 
 
P
5
P  The list of eternal entities would be endless, since all integers alone already constitute an  infinite amount. 
 
P
6 
PThe “inner place behind the curtain” signifies the holy of holies in the temple, the place where God himself 
dwells. 
 
P
7
P The second question (Can God create a stone He cannot lift?) is actually reducible to the simple logical 
impossibility of the first (Can God create a square circle?). See George Mavrodes’ Some Puzzles Concerning 
Omnipotence.  
 
P
8 
POnly as a matter of speaking, of course, since in STR there is no absolute simultaneity to begin with. 
 
P
9
P No pun intended, of course… 
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7 – CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  The past as the future of the quest for truth  
Until very recently, the quest for truth has been a central concern in philosophical 
enquiry. The nature of truth is also an issue that is fiercely debated in our time, as Western 
society seems to be transitioning from a modern to a postmodern worldview. For the 
Christian philosopher, however, the fact that truth is one of the descriptors of God provides 
direction in the quest for a philosophically sound answer. The general aim of this study has 
been to contribute to the enquiry into the nature of truth by a further clarification of the 
notion of truth as one of the attributes of the God of the Bible. And since there was reason 
to believe that current debates in this field were affected by new views of time, our 
investigation expressly included a section on the philosophy of time and its implications 
for views of divine eternity.  
To lay a solid foundation of traditional and current thought on truth, we started out 
with three chapters that each explored a different source of knowledge for our topic, 
namely the history of Western philosophy, the Christian scriptures, and classical theism’s 
thought regarding the divine attributes. In order to facilitate comparison of the various truth 
views emerging from these sources we also looked briefly at how the term ‘truth’ is 
currently used in daily conversation. In this respect we found that the term’s main three 
uses were factuality, genuineness and faithfulness, with each of these representing a 
correspondence to a different ground for truth namely empirical reality, ideal reality and 
the human self. We also saw that factuality, or correspondence with empirical reality, is the 
clear favorite in our own time.  
Our survey of Western philosophical thought on truth in Chapter One revealed that 
the first two millennia were dominated by the question how truth can be reliable if 
empirical reality is in constant flux. Many thinkers asserted that truth itself must be 
grounded in something unchanging, either an unchanging ideal reality or an unchanging 
element within empirical reality, and it was therefore the truth sense of genuineness that 
tended to occupy center stage, with factuality as a close second.  
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This focus on reality changed radically with Descartes’ skeptical approach to 
knowledge and his retreat to the only thing he felt he could really trust, namely the 
existence of his own mind. With this shift, the truth sense of factuality finally won out over 
genuineness, though at the same time belief in the actual feasibility of factual knowledge 
started to wane. With the thought of Kant the universality of knowledge was briefly 
retrieved, but the confidence in factual truth eroded further, and with it the prominence of 
the factuality sense of truth. 
In contemporary philosophy, represented by Kierkegaard’s existentialism and 
Rorty’s postmodern approach, we noted that the effort to retrieve the link with reality was 
officially abandoned. Kierkegaard’s view celebrated subjective truth instead, and with 
Rorty and his confreres truth has become relative, while the idea of foundational truth is 
now seen as a mere myth and even as a means of suppressing society’s disenfranchised. 
Even though factuality is still the primary meaning of truth in daily life, philosophy has 
largely moved away from a focus on reality as the ground of truth and toward man himself 
as the actual creator of truth. We also noted that this focus on the person did not mean a 
replacement of factuality with the more personal faithfulness sense of truth, but that the 
search for truth has simply come to an end and is now generally regarded as a misguided 
endeavor from the very beginning.  
Chapter Two focused on the Bible, our second source for the notion of truth. We 
found that in the Old Testament the faithfulness sense of truth was seen to be primary—a 
striking contrast with what we had encountered in terms of philosophical views. However, 
the realisation of early philosophy that truth needs an unchanging ground was also found 
here, namely in the fact that the root meaning of ’emeth, the Hebrew word for truth, is 
firmness or reliability.  
In the New Testament this genuineness sense of truth was further accentuated by the 
root of ’emeth’s Greek counterpart. Aletheia meant above all non-concealment or 
uncovering, a meaning that seemed to imply the revealing of a full state of affairs. 
However, further comparisons with either the daily or philosophical notions of truth 
became increasingly difficult as the full meaning of aletheia unfolded. Truth in the New 
Testament was found to carry a strong sense of personhood and power, and often to denote 
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an entity or specific content-filled substance rather than a mere formal relation between 
entities. These features applied most strongly when truth was attributed in noun form to 
God and his word. 
Our conclusions concerning truth in the Bible were summed up in a 5-point list, 
which stressed the following characteristics: (1) firmness and reliability, (2) the 
prominence of faithfulness and relative importance of genuineness, next to factuality, (3) 
personhood and personal agency, (4) denotation of a content-filled entity as well as a 
relation, and (5) when used in noun form of the divine, the fact that it calls forth a strong 
sense that all truth finds its ultimate source in God. 
Our third source of insight into the nature of truth was classical theism and its 
thorough application of philosophical method to biblical concepts, particularly in the area 
of the attributes of God. Eight attributes were explored in Chapter Three, namely 
perfection or infinity, aseity or necessity, incorporeality, immutability, omnipotence, 
omniscience, goodness and eternity. Our aim was to identify those properties that seemed 
promising sources of insight because of their conceptual links with truth. It was noted, 
however, that several of these truth-related attributes were subject to debate, and that these 
disputes often centered around specific views of time and eternity. This was especially the 
case for the attributes of omniscience, immutability and the personhood implied by divine 
goodness. It became clear that in order to gain a distinct understanding of these properties 
and their relation to truth, clarification of the attribute of eternity would be key. 
With this aim in mind, we first explored the foundational concept of time in Chapter 
Four. Investigating both philosophical and scriptural arguments concerning the nature of 
time, we specifically focused on two questions, namely whether time is dynamic or static, 
and whether it is finite or infinite. We found good philosophical evidence that time is most 
plausibly regarded as both dynamic and finite.  
One of the main arguments for static time was that Einstein’s theory of relativity 
presupposes time to be static, and this theory is almost unanimously accepted as true. 
However, the fact that Lorentz’ rival theory was found to be empirically equivalent while 
allowing for a view of time as dynamic rather than static left this argument less than 
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effective. A second line of reasoning for the static view, that ‘becoming’ is merely mind-
dependent, was seen to potentially argue against static time rather than for it, since it 
confirms that temporality is an undeniable fact of at least one part of reality, namely mental 
reality. Finally, static time was seen to necessitate a view of the self as merely a series of 
totally disconnected consciousness-instants. Denial of the most basic human experience of 
having an enduring self thus yielded a prima facie argument that seemed impossible to 
defeat. 
When we looked at the issue of time as finite or infinite we found no firm arguments 
for infinity and strong evidence for time’s finitude. The notion of an actual infinite seemed 
clearly problematic, while Leibniz’ question why, if time is infinite, a cognitively perfect 
God would not have created the world sooner remained simply unanswerable.  
But would the biblical view agree with these findings? Here we found that the 
foundational doctrine that God created the world ex nihilo provided firm support of our 
philosophical conclusions. On the static view past, present and future are all equally real, 
and there is thus no actual state of affairs of God existing before or without the universe. 
Thus He cannot be the creator in the full biblical sense. Scripture therefore points strongly 
in the direction of time as we know it actually passing and having a very real beginning, in 
other words as dynamic and finite. With our philosophical conclusions about time thus 
confirmed by biblical thought, we returned to our investigation of the attributes of God and 
our aim to get a clear picture of divine eternity. 
Chapter Five engaged us in a thorough analysis of the two main views of eternity, 
namely atemporal timelessness and temporal everlastingness. And here our conclusion that 
time is dynamic and finite seemed to lead to a difficult dilemma. For if time is finite then 
temporal everlastingness is no longer an option. Everlastingness was feasible as long as 
time could be seen as infinite, but finite time would make a temporal divine being finite 
and that would be unacceptable in view of divine perfection and necessity. However, the 
alternative view of eternity as atemporal timelessness also led to seemingly insurmountable 
problems. How can God be timeless if the causal relation to the universe that creation ex 
nihilo requires necessarily draws him into time? How can such a being be deemed 
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omniscient if He has no knowledge of tensed facts, and how can He really respond to the 
prayers and free will decisions of his temporal human creatures? 
It is here that we found Craig’s view of eternity as timeless without creation and 
everlasting from creation onward to provide an eminently plausible scenario, with answers 
to most of the problems so far encountered.  Ironically, divine personhood, which has often 
been understood to favor an essentially temporal view of eternity, was seen to provide 
foundational evidence for Craig’s hybrid position. If God is a person, which is biblically 
undeniable, then He is a being with free will and his decision to create the universe 
becomes a contingent fact. Therefore, even though the act of creation necessarily draws 
God into time, his temporality is not an essential attribute as the proponents of 
everlastingness often argue. This is an important point, for if divine temporality is regarded 
as a an essential attribute, it implies a view of God as fully subject to time and thus limited 
in knowledge and power, i.e. Open Theism. But if divine free will guarantees that divine 
temporality is not essential, then such a limited view of God no longer follows. 
But if divine temporality is not essential then neither is divine timelessness, taking 
the wind out of the sails of those who argued that a timeless God is utterly transcendent, 
unrelated to creation and human life, and therefore basically irrelevant. Thus, on Craig’s 
view, there is an alternative to both these extremes, but is his theory coherent? Two points 
are crucial in answering this question: the relation between the timeless and the temporal 
phase in the divine life, and within the temporal phase itself, the relation between our own 
human time and God’s real time.  
Concerning the first relation, we must resist the temptation to see the phases of God’s 
life as one phase preceding the other. God’s timeless phase is not temporally prior to his 
temporal phase. Instead, we can envision the timeless state as “a boundary of time, which 
is causally, but not temporally, prior to the origin of the universe” (Craig 2001b:272). 
When God creates the universe, time comes into existence and God enters time, but this 
does not mean that He is temporally finite, because without creation He exists timelessly. 
The second relation, between God’s time and ours, is solved with Craig’s proposal 
that relativity theory does not necessarily imply the loss of absolute simultaneity, and 
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Lorentz’ alternative theory is proof of this fact. But if there is absolute time and 
simultaneity then as humans we no longer “inhabit different worlds” as Craig put it,  but 
our varying perspectives all become related to one common reality (Craig 2001a:43). We 
concluded therefore, that Craig’s approach to eternity seems coherent and that it is able to 
solve most of the conundrums that have plagued the eternity debate so far.  
With our new eternity view in hand, in Chapter Six we revisited the divine attributes 
and were able to propose solutions to several of the problems we had noted in Chapter 
Three. It was seen that immutability and omniscience benefited most from our detour into 
time. Immutability could now be understood to accommodate a limited amount of change 
in God,  allowing him to be really related to creation and to mankind, without this 
becoming a threat to his perfection or necessity. The revision of omniscience meant it 
could now be seen to coherently accommodate changing knowledge next to eternal truths, 
while also providing a plausible explanation of God’s apparent knowledge of future 
contingents. Finally, divine personhood was found to be fully compatible with both 
timelessness and temporality, and thus in no way to imply a view of God as essentially 
temporal. 
With these properties redefined, the full set of attributes, including divine eternity, 
was now ready to divulge its insights into the notion of divine truth and to speak to the two 
issues that had emerged as pivotal, namely the three senses of truth as factuality, 
faithfulness and genuineness, and the question of how truth is grounded. Concerning the 
first issue, some of the attributes were seen to closely reflect the three senses of truth, with 
aseity appearing to express genuineness, omniscience factuality, and goodness 
encompassing faithfulness. Regarding the question of how truth can be grounded if the 
world is always changing, it was specifically our new view of immutability that was eye-
opening. For if God is both timeless and temporal, truth can come in different kinds, some 
changing and others not, and these types can now be meaningfully related because 
timelessness and temporality are coherently related in the person of God. In terms of the 
attributes, this meant that while omniscience and goodness sometimes imply changing 
truths, these attributes are unchanging in themselves and are ultimately grounded in the 
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absolutely unchanging and unchangeable attribute of aseity, which reflects both that God is 
(existence) and who He is (character).  
Moreover, these insights resonated well with the first two of the five characteristics 
of the biblical notion of truth we had encountered in Chapter Two. We had seen there that 
the biblical notion requires firmness and reliability, and this aspect seemed now guaranteed 
in the unchanging attribute of aseity. We also saw that both faithfulness and genuineness 
were more strongly represented in scripture than they are in our own time. In the attributes 
this was reflected in a hierarchical structure in which omniscience (factuality) seemed to 
depend on the attributes of goodness (faithfulness) and aseity (genuineness), two properties 
that were seen to closely converge in the primary reality of the person of God.  
The attributes of personhood and omnipotence also contributed significantly to our 
further understanding. We already noted above that divine personhood played a key role in 
showing Craig’s hybrid view of eternity to be coherent. It is personhood that not only 
allows for but even prescribes contingency and time in God, because being a person means 
having free will. Of course this same personhood aspect was  explicitly confirmed in the 
third of our five conclusions regarding biblical truth, just as its importance was already 
noted in the preference of faithfulness and genuineness over factuality. Omnipotence was 
important in stressing the fact of God being a content-filled entity, and thus not somehow 
reducible to a synthesis of contradictories as pantheism would have it. And again, this 
insight was found to correspond with our conclusions regarding truth in scripture, in this 
case with point four of our 5-point list.  
Finally, the revised attribute of eternity itself was investigated for its potential to 
elucidate truth. Of course, what we learned here was that it is the connectedness between 
the different time levels and with timelessness itself that makes truth secure and accessible 
to man. For with this new eternity view we were actually able to provide a workable 
solution to the ubiquitous question of truth and change. If God is both timeless and 
temporal, then changelessness and change can coexist in the person of God and thus in 
divine truth, and Molinism proved that such a view can indeed be coherent. The second 
threat to truth, relativism, had emerged only recently under the influence of STR and its 
denial of absolute simultaneity. But here also Craig’s theory proved very beneficial by 
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giving a coherent account of how absolute simultaneity can be combined with the findings 
of physics—via Lorentz’ theory—and then meaningfully relating God’s absolute time with 
our own measured time. 
The revision of the attributes had thus led us back to the notion of truth in the Bible, 
confirming four of the five conclusions we had reached in Chapter Two, namely that truth 
must be firm, that faithfulness and genuineness play a bigger role than they do in our daily 
view, that truth can be personal and that it can denote a definite content-filled entity. What 
about the fifth conclusion, that all truth finds its source in God? It became clear that this 
conclusion was now also reinforced. Divine aseity affirmed that all existing things are 
created by God and exist only in dependence upon him. Moreover, this attribute had been 
found to ground the other senses of truth. This allowed us to take our findings regarding 
divine truth and apply them to truth in general. We noted that if philosophy wants to 
continue its quest for truth, the only way forward seems to be a return to the past and to 
some of the views that may have been discarded too hastily.  
Views that merit reconsideration are a grounding of truth in something unchanging 
that can guarantee reliability, while still allowing enough change to be applicable to our 
daily lives in a changing world. Moreover, to allow for both changelessness and change 
such a ground should have personhood rather than be an impersonal entity, but to avoid 
subjectivism this personal ground should also be supra-human. The great merit of Craig’s 
view of eternity is that it opens the way for such seemingly incompatible characteristics as 
changelessness and change, personhood and supra-humanity to be reconciled. It has thus 
proven to be an eminently fertile ground for progress in the quest for a sound 
understanding of truth. 
 
7.2  The way forward 
Coming to the end of this project I realize that we have only barely touched upon the 
possibilities that are opened up by Craig’s eternity view. The Christian worldview 
prescribes a strong dualism between God and creation, between existence a se and our own 
fragile and dependent type of life. Such dualism has often led to apparently unsolvable 
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conundrums. But if Craig’s approach is sound a lot of these problems could be resolved 
after all—and this without compromising the crucial doctrine of creator-creation dualism. 
Further research can therefore be done into each of the divine attributes, with especially 
immutability, omniscience and personhood meriting a lot more attention. Such work could 
possibly address issues in areas like determinism and human free will, the exact nature of 
the divine knowledge, and the existence and nature of the human self. Concerning the 
attribute of truth itself, our research has really only been able to sketch some dim contours 
of how this property of God should be understood. One area that needs further analysis is, 
for instance, the exact relationship between aseity or genuineness on the one hand and 
perfect goodness or faithfulness on the other.   
Within the philosophy of time itself more questions can now be addressed also, for 
instance regarding the exact implications of time being dynamic and finite. One question 
that emerges from this understanding of time is how we should view God’s creative 
activity. Was creation a one-time finished act or does God continue to create the future 
right now in the present moment? Another time issue I would love to take on if “time were 
not an issue,” is the unanswered question of the extent of the present. As we saw in 
Chapter Four, the idea of minimal indivisible time intervals or ‘chronons’ is not without 
problems, while the positing of a higher time dimension tends to lead to an infinite regress 
(locus 4.3.1). However, if a higher time dimension could be posited that is truly 
qualitatively different, such an infinite regress might be avoided, and here divine eternity 
might provide some interesting answers. Scripture certainly points in this direction with its 
verses on God’s continual sustaining activity: “The Son is... sustaining all things by his 
powerful word,” and “... in him [Christ] all things hold together” (Heb 1:3, Col 1:16). 
Finally, the eternity view we have explored could open up new perspectives in the 
area of theology. Theology has seen a recent surge in popularity of two views of God that 
are at least partly dependent on views of time, namely Process Theology and a great 
variety of mystical views of the divine. Process Theology sees development and thus 
temporality as essential to God, while mystical views regard God or the ‘ultimate reality’ 
as so utterly transcendent that He is completely detached from the temporal and thus more 
easily dismissed as irrelevant. Neither alternative seems to reflect the biblical notion of 
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God as all-knowing and transcendent on the one hand, and deeply involved and responsive 
to our actions and prayers on the other. Craig’s hybrid view of eternity may show the way 
forward in dealing in a scripturally sound manner with the legitimate issues that lie at the 
basis of both views.  
It has become clear, then, that our understanding of time and eternity has far reaching 
implications, both for theology and philosophy; both for our understanding of who God is 
and what that means for the way we should live our lives, and for our insight into one of 
the most basic questions on the minds of philosophers throughout the centuries, namely 
“what is truth?” 
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